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


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THE GREATEST EXPERIMENT IN HISTORY

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TO MY WIFE

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PREFACE

THE six addresses printed in this volume were prepared and delivered during last year's session of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, and are now published by courtesy of the Institute. Such references as they contain to current events all bear date between the last week of July and the fourth week of August, 1923.

They were in the main dictated before delivery, but some parts were spoken from notes. I have relied for the text entirely on the admirable stenographic staff provided by the Institute. No one is more conscious than I that the texture of addresses prepared and delivered in this manner is in many ways unsuited to the printed pages of a book; but I could not have compressed them or corrected their many faults of arrangement and style without completely rewriting them. I publish them therefore with a few purely verbal corrections, and I ask my readers to overlook some looseness of form as pardonable in the spoken, if not in the printed, word.

For the same reason I have decided not to encumber the text with notes and references. But I desire to make here the fullest possible acknowledgment of my debt to Mr. George Trevelyan's admirable *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, which I read on my way out to the United States. I have quoted Mr. Trevelyan by name in more than one of these addresses, but I owe a great deal to his luminous interpretation of British development which can be acknowledged only in this general way; and if any quotation which I have made from him

directs new American readers to his work, I shall feel that I have quoted him to good purpose. My thanks are also due to Mr. Philip Kerr for much useful discussion and advice at the time when these addresses were being prepared.

I should add that the address on India contains two or three passages taken from an address which I delivered to the Society of Arts in London in 1921.

I cannot launch this volume without a word of genuine gratitude to the Williamstown Institute itself. Under President Garfield's tactful and impartial guidance the Institute has become a wonderful school of international politics. I shall always feel greatly indebted to it for bringing me into personal touch with the broad circle of enthusiasts who are gathered there, each representing some clear and useful point of view. It was a great experience to dwell for a month amongst such fresh and candid minds, and to explore with them the many problems and misunderstandings which divide the nations and distract the world. I hope the Williamstown Institute of Politics is now an established thing. It is doing true service to the cause of international understanding and good will.

EDWARD GRIGG.

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LECTURE I

THE GREATEST EXPERIMENT IN HISTORY

THIS is the first occasion on which I have had the honor of addressing an American audience, and I approach the task with some trepidation, particularly since I am to deal with some of the thorniest aspects of international affairs. You no doubt know that the attitude of the people of the United States towards the rest of the world is something of a mystery to foreigners. You flashed into the orbit of our lives at a moment of terrible crisis six years ago, like a comet of surpassing brilliance and power. You exercised a potent—indeed, a decisive—influence upon our affairs. And then, like a comet, you entirely disappeared. Since that time we have heard passing rumors of your reappearance on our horizon, but these rumors have so far always proved false. At such and such a date, the political astronomers say, America will again be visible in the western firmament. So we go out with our telescopes and we scan the western sky. But the sky is all cloud, and we never see anything except perhaps a few sparks from the tail of some great luminary, such as one of your senators, who has flashed across Europe and is just disappearing again below the western skyline.

You will understand therefore that an Englishman coming to the United States to speak on international politics feels rather like one of those individuals in Jules Verne's story who were packed into an enormous gun and fired across space into the moon. At least I felt like that when I sailed from England a

fortnight ago. But now I am here, I do not feel at all that I am in the moon. The surroundings are somehow familiar, the atmosphere is closely akin to that of the life which I left behind me in England. No Englishman can feel that New England is not still the just possessor of its name. In a thousand indescribable but nevertheless convincing ways I find myself—if you will allow me the presumption—at home. I have therefore no doubt at all that if my addresses in Williamstown fail to receive the attention which the theme deserves, the fault will lie in the poverty of the speaker, and not in the sympathies of his audience.

I am going to speak to you about the British Empire, British policy in the world, and the British point of view, not as an apologist, but as one who holds for an article of reasoned faith that the British Empire is justified by its works and needs no apologies. You may disagree. If so, let us discuss our differences at the Round Table which is being conducted for the purpose by my old friend, Mr. Philip Kerr. But do not expect me to speak in any part but that of an unrepentant Englishman.

So much, ladies and gentlemen, by way of preface. From the standpoint which I have described I shall survey in due course a good deal of territory where angels fear to tread, such as the Near Eastern question, the German Reparation question, and the present state of that much discussed but little read document, the Treaty of Versailles.

All this is dangerous ground. It was the scene of the world's most terrible conflagration, which burned for four long years. The flames have subsided, but the embers still are red. I shall speak of it with a

whole-hearted desire to wound no feelings, to excite no further bitterness, to bring nearer, if may be, the day of settlement and genuine peace. What would be the value of such an Institute as this, were it to shun the burning problems, and dally only in the outskirts of the questions which perplex the world?

But to-night, before coming to these great problems, I want, if I may, to give you a picture of this British Empire. What is it? How far is it like your great Republic? How far is it unlike? I want to discuss this, not in legal or constitutional terms, but as a human subject, showing how our men and women, shaped from the same potter's clay as a majority of yours, have come to think and feel and regard themselves as they do to-day.

The British Empire is not an empire at all in the old sense of the term. The word "empire" suggests a large system of government, the cement of which is despotic rule, spreading from the center to all parts of the circumference. Such in fact was the Roman Empire; such in essence was the German Empire; such was even the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In all these the sovereign and ultimate constitutional power was that of a despotic emperor.

We have no such Emperor for our Empire, though we have a monarch who is the symbol of our allegiance to a far-descended political tradition and a great common ideal. With the Throne as the symbol of all that holds us together, above party, above politics, above the issues and sentiments which distinguish or divide, we are a commonwealth of peoples rather than an empire, consisting partly of five nations which have reached complete self-government in its most democratic form and of one nation which

is just struggling to reach it, and partly of other peoples, some almost of our own political stature, already far advanced in self-government, while others are at very various stages upon that long and arduous road.

Not one part of this Empire pays tribute or taxes in any form to the British Government. Their revenue is sometimes, indeed, supplemented by grants from the British Treasury. Whatever it be, the revenue of each country is spent entirely on its own affairs.

Many parts of this Empire have written constitutions of their own, but the Empire as a whole has none. It is a world-wide organization, owning so little armed force that it would collapse in a day were force the power which makes it one. No force could hold the great self-governing Dominions like Canada against their will. India, with a population of three hundred and twenty-five millions, is garrisoned by only sixty thousand British soldiers and two or three thousand British civil servants—fewer men in proportion to the whole than it takes to police New York.

The binding power of this Commonwealth is, therefore, not despotic power or military force. It is interest, sentiment, tradition, good will—and, above all, a belief in the virtue and value of the Commonwealth as a whole.

This British Empire as it stands to-day has in the main been built and formed within the period of your history as a Republic—a period just less than one hundred and fifty years. A brief comparison of your history and ours during that period will illustrate both our points of likeness and our points of difference.

I will take your history first. The keel-plate upon which this Republic was built nearly a century and a half ago was the principle that all citizens should have an equal voice in choosing the leaders of the state. That principle was applied, not at the actual moment of the birth of the republic, but within, I think, a couple of decades, and it has been the foundation of your state ever since. You applied this principle to an area larger than a democracy had ever attempted to rule before. Even so, you extended the area rapidly decade by decade till you reached the Pacific Coast, and then you extended it oversea. It was a vast and splendid experiment; and now the whole world sees that the experiment has been so far successfully worked out, that the Union stands for a commonwealth of states still vowed heart and soul to democracy, still governing themselves locally in state affairs, but indissolubly linked under one flag from sea to sea.

What are the chief problems which you have had to face in that great chapter of history?

First and foremost, you had to conquer the prairie, subdue the mountains, and tame the wilderness. History is full of the wars which man has waged against man. The names of great soldiers stand out upon the roll of fame with those of statesmen, seers, and kings. But the soldiers who fought nature and the elements, who went out first by ones and twos and threes as scouts and pioneers, then as leaders of long wagon-trails, and who thus blazed the way for the great armies of settlers that finally claimed and civilized the great spaces of the West—these soldiers are less widely known, their names forgotten, their deeds unsung.

But the conquest and settlement of the land is nevertheless an epic in itself, stained indeed in many places by violence, greed, and crime, but carried to its consummation in the main by men and women of signal endurance and sterling worth, who have bequeathed their character to the lands which they made.

The elements were not the only adversaries which the pioneers had to face. They had to win the land by conquest from the Indian, the original owner of all this vast estate. It was no easy task both to prevail against that untamed enemy and also to deal justly with his unquestioned right to sufficient land of his own. The history is a long one; it is now almost complete. I mention it here only because this wave of conquest which swept over your Southwest and West has many counterparts in British history, and I should not be afraid to have our record compared with yours by some preëminent historian of the English-speaking stocks.

There is yet another problem inherent in the rapid development of new wealth from the soil which you and we have both had to face. Such exploitation invariably leads to the accumulation of vast fortunes, and of the power which goes with vast fortunes, in the hands of a few. There is a real peril to democracy in these conditions, but you have surmounted them, or are surmounting them. So are we. Huge as is the power in the hands of wealth, in some ways dangerous, in many ways beneficent, it does not undermine the essential virtues of democratic government in any part of your Commonwealth or ours.

Beside the problems of conquest and development, you have had, as I see it, two other deeply searching

problems to confront. One of these was the existence of slavery, left by the evil traditions of an earlier age in the bosom of a Republic dedicated to freedom. You have wiped away that inherited stain, and all honor to you for doing so, since the cost was paid, not merely in money compensation, as we paid it, but in the blood of fathers and husbands and sons.

Our sympathies in that struggle were to some extent divided between North and South. I shall have occasion later to mention one reason why. But as Member of Parliament for Oldham, one of the boroughs of Lancashire and the greatest spinning center in the world, I cannot resist the pride of reminding you that the democracy of Lancashire, headed by the great Liberal, John Bright, stood firmly loyal to the anti-slavery cause from beginning to end of the war, even though the shortage of raw cotton told severely upon the cotton industry and produced much distress. It is true, I believe, that the democracy of Britain, even at great cost to itself, never fails to respond to the appeal of a just and clearly expressed ideal. Divided as were the sympathies of the Ministers of the day, the opinion of Lancashire and the steady advice of Lord Lyons from the British Embassy in Washington, carried the day; and Lincoln acknowledged his debt to Lancashire in a letter of which the County Palatine will always be proud.

I should like to read you just one extract from that letter. It was written by Lincoln to the workingmen of Lancashire, England, on February 18, 1863, when the issue of the war was still far from clear. He begins by acknowledging at some length the resolu-

tions of support and sympathy which he had received from Lancashire and then he goes on :

I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the working-men at Manchester, and in all Europe, are called to endure in this crisis. It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow this Government, which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain the favour of Europe. Through the action of our disloyal citizens, the working-men of Europe have been subjected to severe trials, for the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and re-inspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation ; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the American people.

Lancashire is very proud of having received that letter from the greatest of all your great men.

That terrible ordeal of the Civil War also decided the hardest of all your problems—whether the democratic spirit, vividly expressed in state patriotism and the maintenance of state rights, was capable of enduring and establishing the subordination of states to Union in those things which touch the life of the nation as a whole. This was the newest of all the experiments which you undertook to make for the world when the Union was first formed. Democracy is by nature what geologists call “fissiparous.” It

needed imagination, it needed political instinct, it needed also great leadership to prevent the narrower demands of local freedom from breaking up the splendid fabric of democracy which the Fathers of the Republic had made. If you had failed, the cause of democracy would have suffered heavily throughout the world.

And now you have acquired territory far beyond the boundaries contemplated by your fathers. You are yourselves involved in the task of governing a more backward people oversea. You have fought in a great war, sending your men to save a continent of which their forbears shook the dust forever from their feet. You are no longer an air-tight Republic. You are a great World Power.

I have sketched this thumb-nail outline of your great history—not inaccurately, as I hope—for purposes of comparison. The comparison is not intended to be odious, like many comparisons, but useful; and I will tell you frankly why.

There is in America a widespread belief that the British Empire belongs to the Old World while the United States belongs to the New. This belief has many facets. The most important are well illustrated in the *Life and Letters* of that distinguished American, Walter Page, whose memory will always be honored wherever the English tongue is spoken. Walter Page, I need hardly say, was not an unsympathetic critic of British ways and ideas. He was in some ways the most understanding you have ever sent us, and I fear that his appreciation of us was in some respects too generous for our deserts. But even Walter Page seems never to have grasped what

the British Empire really is, or how it came about, or how it carries on. He harps on our absent-minded piracy, on our belief in ruthless exploitation of backward races, on our failure to appreciate the gospel which the American President of the day was seeking to apply, for instance, in Mexico. In a word, he always speaks as if England alone were the British Empire, and as if her principles, compared with those of the United States, were those of the Old Testament compared with the New.

Such views in the mind of such a man are significant. If Walter Page with his knowledge and experience held them so tenaciously, how much more tenaciously must they be held by that large proportion of the great democracy of America which has not had his opportunities of seeing us and studying us at work and play!

Now if this view were true, it would be very remarkable. Our history in the last century and a half, as I shall endeavor to show, has been very similar to yours. We, like you, have had to conquer the wilderness in many parts of the world. We, like you, have had to do our best to deal justly with the original native owners of the soil. We, like you, have had to make up our minds about slavery. We, like you, have undertaken the government of backward peoples. We, like you—pacific as we are—have found ourselves involved in wars.

Have we dealt with these questions so very differently from you? We have in some respects, certainly. Our problems have been more varied, and some of them even more difficult. But have we acted on divergent and incompatible principles? It would be remarkable, I say, if we had.

Look at this fact. The history of the United States has been made in the main by men and women of the same original stock as ourselves. Judging by the names which are still most prominent in your national life, the older American stock still leads the way. I have seen it stated that the families of British origin account for about sixty out of your one hundred and five millions of population at the present time. That figure interests me, for it is very nearly the same as the total British population in the British Empire. Ours is more widely distributed. It is carrying a heavier responsibility for backward peoples, since it is itself rather less than one-seventh of the total population of the British Empire. But it is of the same stock by origin as those sixty millions of yours. It comes of the race of Cromwell, Wesley, and Wilberforce. Is it likely that the two branches of that great family have so wholly diverged that one is still living by the Old Testament, while the other has found light in the New?

I should like to have put this question to Walter Page, for I am sure he would have answered it luminously. But his delightful voice is unhappily stilled, and I must do my best therefore to answer it myself.

I answer it quite confidently—No. We have not lagged so far behind, and you have not advanced so far in front, that the main principles by which we instinctively direct ourselves are seriously dissimilar. Let me analyze our history very briefly for the last hundred and fifty years, and let me show how we have answered the same questions which confronted you. You cannot understand the British Commonwealth of to-day without taking this history and these answers well into your minds.

There is a widespread idea that the British Empire as we see it to-day is an ancient institution, not perhaps as venerable as the Holy Roman Empire but almost as incompatible with the ideals of modern democracy. This idea is erroneous. The British Empire has no doubt its faults; but to whatever cause they are due, they are not due to its antiquity.

The British Empire as it stands to-day is considerably more modern than the United States. Great Britain recognized the independence of the American people in 1783. Pitt's India Act, which first established British official responsibility for India, was passed in 1784, and India was not securely added to the Empire till the close of the Napoleonic wars, thirty-one years later. British colonization of Canada was itself in the main the result of American independence. You then sent forty thousand loyalists homeless into the North, and these, as the United Empire Loyalists, became with the French the foundation of the present Canadian Dominion. The Canada Act, which established Upper and Lower Canada, was passed in 1791. New South Wales, the first British Colony in Australia, was first settled in 1788. Cape Colony, the first seat of British power in South Africa, was annexed in 1814. New Zealand was annexed in 1840, three years after Queen Victoria's accession to the throne. The occupation and development of tropical Africa belong almost entirely to the second half of the nineteenth century.

When American independence was declared, the Empire consisted only of Lower Canada and Newfoundland, the West Indies, and the old country, Great Britain. Nine-tenths of it has been added since, and the whole process could not have taken place

but for the lessons which were taught us and the forces which were released by the loss of America. The British Empire is, in fact, of more modern creation than the United States. You had a great deal to do with creating it yourselves.

The first point at which the lesson you taught us was applied, was in India. We fought for India decade by decade in the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, because we were struggling against great Powers upon the continent of Europe which threatened to strangle us and to dominate the whole world, including India. Had we failed in that struggle, India would have fallen a prey to the military domination which was aimed at us, and the history of the Empire of to-day would never have been written. It is absurdly unhistorical to say that we acquired India in a fit of absent-minded piracy; but we did acquire it in an instinctive struggle which left us no time for thought about anything except the immediate preservation of our liberties. On that struggle our very existence hung—the struggle against Louis XIV right up to the struggle against Napoleon. The forces arrayed against us, especially when you turned away, were almost too great for us, and we nearly failed—as nearly failed as in the last great war, which was no more or less a struggle for liberty than those which we waged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. You in this country have inherited vast resources, and your title has been challenged in the last century and a half only by a handful of weak Indian tribes. We had then comparatively few resources, and the enemies arrayed against us were seeking to dominate the world. It was not a free-booting expedition, but a century-long, life-and-death

ordeal which ultimately placed India under the British flag.

And then we applied the lesson which you had taught us. Your old friend, Lord North, had not confined his maleficent activities to the Western Hemisphere. He also tackled the East, and but for the genius of Warren Hastings, the system of control and interference which he sought to establish would have lost us our Eastern as well as our Western sources of power. Fortunately, Warren Hastings was our man on the spot, and after his time, Pitt put through the India Act, which made the government of India independent of political or financial intrigue in England. I take the date of the India Act, therefore, 1784, as the date at which British power was finally established in India, constantly threatened though it was till Waterloo ended Napoleon's career.

It was, moreover, about this time when the present British Empire was being founded, that a new principle began to govern our relations with the East. This principle was based upon the realization that with the wealth of India we had acquired a responsibility for the welfare of her peoples. The idea of trusteeship then first emerged. Mr. Page in his letters gives it a more modern origin. He tells Lord Grey that it had been born with the advent of a Democratic President to power in the United States, about a century and a quarter afterwards. He also records very faithfully that Lord Grey was amused.

I do not wish to put the British claim in this respect too high. The idea of trusteeship has been gradually developed during the last hundred and thirty years. Later on I will give examples of its development. But I am sure of this, that it first re-

ceived some practical application towards the end of the eighteenth century, when Britain awoke to the great responsibility which India entailed. I need not remind you of the tremendous indictment brought against Warren Hastings by Edmund Burke, which was one of the first signs of that awakening. Burke's whole case was based upon his belief that Hastings had exploited the Indian people without regard to justice or fair play. Hastings was acquitted, and I think in the light of history we must feel that his acquittal was justified, even though we would not justify all his acts. The central fact about his administration is this. When he went to India, the servants of the East India Company made all they could from the districts over which they were set and came home rich and prosperous. Thackeray's Nabob in *Vanity Fair* is a well-known character. What is not so well known is the fact that Hastings was the man who brought this system of exploitation to an end. He formed the servants of the company into what was called at the time the Covenanted Civil Service—covenanted because every member of it pledged himself to set aside all temptation to individual profit and to work in India simply for his pay. Since that time the Covenanted Service and all the Services have held consistently to that principle.

I might perhaps give you another example of how that early notion of trusteeship emerged. It comes in a minute written by Sir Thomas Munro, who was the Governor of Madras in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the period of the Napoleonic wars. He writes a minute on the condition of the Indian peoples dated December, 1814, and I found the other day this passage in it:

When we reflect [he writes] how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk into barbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilization, we see no reason to doubt that if we steadily pursue the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects as to enable them to govern and protect themselves.

That was written a century ago.

It is indeed one of the chief charges made by foreign observers against British government in India that it has done so little to develop Indian resources. As someone once said, we have been so afraid of exploitation and exploiters that our methods have been those of a family solicitor—so cautious and so conservative that hardly any business project has been able to survive official examination into its merits. The latest distinguished foreign visitor to India, one of the most famous of living Frenchmen, was deeply impressed by the backwardness of our policy in this respect. I remember hearing him speak upon the subject last year. I think we have to admit the justice of the charge. But this at least can be said of it—that it acquits us of the opposite allegation that we have exploited the resources of India in the way usually described as “imperialist” without regard to Indian interests. Our sense of trusteeship may have been overdone, but it has certainly not failed to safeguard the Indian peoples against exploitation.

So much for the first great problem which confronted us when this present Empire was being formed. The second problem which forced itself upon our consciousness towards the end of the eighteenth

century was the slave trade from Africa. The slave trade was stopped, but existing slaves remained slaves, and a powerful movement was set on foot to make all slaves under the British flag free. Here again was a test case in which the forces favoring imperialism, exploitation, and the whole idea of possessive rule were pitted against those which fought for the elementary rights of man and the cause of liberty. You know which cause prevailed. All slaves beneath the British flag were set free on the first of August, 1834—thirty years, I hope you will forgive me for reminding you, before they were set free in the United States.

That first of August was, as George Trevelyan has pointed out in his remarkable book on *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, a turning point in the history of the world. Trevelyan describes the scene when on the last night of slavery the negroes in the West Indian islands went up on the hilltops to watch for the sunrise which would bring them freedom with its first rays. But, as he truly says, "Far away in the heart of the African continent, whose darkness was yet unexplored, none understood or regarded the day." The decision was, however, of supreme significance to the African peoples. It determined their future in this sense—that when the great areas of tropical and subtropical Africa began to be opened up by the white man, the black man was already sure of a position from which slavery at least was excluded. Had it not been so, the exploitation of Africa would have been terrible indeed. I have always felt that Wilberforce's name should stand amongst those of the great liberators of all time. The movement which he started has certainly influenced

human development as profoundly as any liberating movement in history.

I have mentioned the British record in regard to the slave trade not, as I told you, in order to draw odious comparisons, but in order to illustrate the fact that the development of British ideas in the nineteenth century has not been on very different lines from yours. With you, the question of slavery was even more difficult. A more perplexing economic question and a supreme constitutional question were both involved. All honor to you, therefore, I say again, for the fact that you ended slavery at so great a cost to the whole of your great land.

There is much more which I should like to say about the question of exploitation and imperialism. The British record in this respect has been steadily progressive, and I think that if you studied not only the administration but the spirit of the administration upon the spot in any of the British colonies where backward peoples own the land, you would not find any serious difference of principle between it and the progressive government which you have yourselves set up in the Philippines. One of the test questions in this respect is the ownership of land. I cannot go into detail about this at the moment without pulling this opening address entirely out of shape and keeping you far longer than I am entitled to do. But those of you who are interested in the subject will find it useful, I am sure, to study the land system in British colonies—any colonies you please—Nigeria, East Africa, New Zealand (which is the latest Dominion created in the country of a backward race), India, Burma, or the Sudan. Study the record, study the existing system in any of them;

you will find it valuable to the understanding of the trend of British ideas.

I come now to another side of British development, perhaps the most significant of all. You will remember that I spoke of your conquest of the wilderness. We have fought that great war against nature too. Canada lies so close to your own borders that I need not remind you of the great romance which carried civilization across the prairies and over the Rocky Mountains to the old settlements on the Pacific Coast. That is the work of British and French in equal degree. It is one of our sources of pride that the two great races have worked together so closely in founding the Canadian nation of to-day. In Australia the story was the same, though the fight was in some respects perhaps even more severe, for the exploration of Central Australia involved a battle against the most terrible of all enemies—thirst. It was the same again in South Africa; it was the same in New Zealand. In all four great Dominions, vast spaces have been reclaimed by steady courage and endurance for the use of civilized men. All that I said, and said most sincerely, in praise of your great pioneers, I should like to claim as the equal due of ours. All these Dominions have been built up since the time when you parted from us in 1783. They breathe the very spirit of democracy which is in your veins. They look at Europe as you do, from a great distance, with questioning eyes. They think far more of the future than the past. But they are British, all of them. They are the British counterpart of the spirit that animates you and has made your moral influence of such importance to the world.

There is, however, another fact about them which

needs to be explained. Let me beg you, if I am not wearying you with my tale, to come up for a moment into a high place and look back upon the wonderful chapter of history which records the settlement of new continents by men of European race. The movement began in the fifteenth century with the great explorers. It continued in tiny settlements until by the end of the eighteenth century there were large plantations of British and French in North America, large plantations of Spanish and Portuguese in South and Central America, and plantations of Dutch and a few British in South Africa. As these great settlements reach maturity, they break away. America breaks away in 1783. Within forty years the Spanish and Portuguese colonies have also broken away from their mother states. Is it to be wondered at that everyone assumed ultimate secession to be the certain course of the British Colonies which came to be founded about or after that date?

Yet look at the fact. These four great Dominions—Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand—have all of them long reached and passed the stage at which secession seemed inevitable. One war against secession has in point of fact been fought. It was the war which we fought at the beginning of this century with forces from all parts of the British Empire in South Africa—a civil war in its nature, on a smaller scale but as sad and moving as your own. The issue in South Africa may perhaps not seem to be quite settled yet; but the fact remains that the South African Union came into the Great War with the same promptness as the other Dominions in August, 1914, and that it did so under the leadership of the great Dutch Prime Minister, General Botha,

who had been himself a leading fighter against the British forces only fourteen years before. Elsewhere there is no struggle to record. The movement which everyone expected towards secession in the British Dominions has simply not taken serious shape.

I say that everyone expected it in the middle of the last century. Was it unnatural? They had before them the examples of all the other European settlements in distant lands, which had grown to maturity in the conduct of their own affairs. They were also deeply prompted by the belief which dominated a large section of European opinion in that century, that nations could not be free within a system larger than the nation state. Mr. Gladstone himself, one of the greatest liberals of the nineteenth century, made this strange error in his famous reference to your Civil War, when he said in Parliament that "Jefferson Davis and the leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either—they have made a nation." I need hardly tell this audience that in modern British opinion Lincoln had a truer perception of the nature of freedom and of the claims of the state than Gladstone had. But Gladstone's error is typical of the school of thought which assumed that the British Dominions must break away as they came to man's estate.

This, then, is a remarkable fact. It is another turning point in history, and it was revealed to the world with amazing vividness in the first week of August, 1914. Even we ourselves did not know how close the bond of sentiment really was. But in that week it stood revealed. From the uttermost parts of the earth the younger nations rallied to the old flag, and you

know how great their effort was. New Zealand, twelve thousand miles from the European theater of war, with a population only one-eighth the population of Belgium, suffered more casualties in the cause of freedom than Belgium herself.

To what was this strange reversal of the whole current of history due?

It was not due, I need hardly tell you, to any lack of national spirit in the Dominions. Their national spirit—you know it in Canada—is intense. In the old days the early settlers dreamed of their mother country as home. Kipling records it in his “Song of The Native-Born”:

They change their skies above them,
But not their hearts that roam;
We learned from our wistful mothers
To call old England “home.”

And the longing for the old homeland has often been enshrined in beautiful verse—none more beautiful, I think, than the Scottish Canadian boating song:

From the lone shieling and the misty island
Mountains divide us, and a waste of seas;
But still our hearts are true, our hearts are Highland,
And in our dreams we see the Hebrides.

But the longing for the mother land belongs only to the generation which left our shores. Their sons and daughters have made their home in the new land, and it is there that their patriotism centers, deeply rooted as it should be in their own soil, demanding as it should for its life breath its own native air. The poetry of the Dominions nowadays is full of this splendid national patriotism. I wish I could quote you the

song of an Australian, written not long ago by an Australian girl, Dorothea McKellar. It gives a marvelous insight into the special magic of Australia for her own men and women. The last verse runs (I quote as best I can from memory) :

An opal-hearted country,
A wilful, lavish land,—
Oh, you who do not know her,
You will not understand.
But wheresoe'er I wander
And wheresoe'er I die,
I know to what brown country
My homing thoughts will fly.

Someone once said that, if you want to know the heart of a people, you must look to their songs. You have only to look to the songs of the British Dominions to realize how intense their national patriotism is, and how impossible it would be for them to look to any political future which in their minds limited the freedom of development of each nation on its own lines.

Weakness of national feeling is then no explanation of this great reversal of history. Is it central control from that old political bugaboo, Downing Street? Why, it is sixty years since Godley, the first superintendent of Canterbury in New Zealand, declared that he and his friends "would sooner be governed by Nero on the spot than by a committee of archangels in Downing Street." That famous saying tells the whole story, and you may be sure of this, that Britain took the lesson of the American Revolution to heart. We had our Gladstones, we had our statesmen who talked of the time when the Dominions

would drop away like ripe fruit; but we had no more Lord Norths, no more George III's. Not only have the Dominions which grew up as separate colonies achieved complete self-government, but one and all they are now united in great federations—federations which, with only a seventh of your population, control an area at least three times as large as the United States.

That is their achievement, their very own, and Downing Street has had nothing to do with it except that Britain has held the seas and prevented interference with their growth.

Downing Street control is then no better explanation of the reversal which I described to you in the current of history, than weakness of national sentiment. Is it "loyalty to England"? Certainly not. I have given you those extracts from Dominion literature in vain if they have failed to make it clear that the loyalty of Canadians is owed in the first place to Canada, of Australians to Australia, of Afrikaners to South Africa, of New Zealanders to New Zealand. It would be quite impossible for young nations feeling a patriotism so vivid as theirs to combine it with a devotion of the same nature to another and very distant land.

What has happened, then? It is a new discovery. While the Dominions have been growing up, while Great Britain has been holding the seas, each and all have developed and discovered a common allegiance to something greater than any of them—greater even than the Old Country itself. That is the British Commonwealth—a Commonwealth of Nations, if ever there was one; a league of nations in being, acting together in every great crisis by instinct even more

than by choice. The old image of the tree with the fruit which ultimately dropped to the ground has faded away. Have any of you ever seen what is perhaps the greatest of tropical trees, the banyan tree? When it begins its growth, the banyan tree has one straight and slender stem like any other tree; and as the central stem gathers strength from the soil, it grows vaster and vaster in circumference itself. But also it throws out great branches almost at right angles, until the weight of them seems certain to bring down the whole tree, unless the branches themselves break off. But the branches do not break. They drop slender tendrils of their own down to the earth, and soon these tendrils themselves spread tiny roots in the soil. At some mysterious moment the first process of growth, when the sap runs outwards from the central stem to all the branches, suddenly comes to an end. The tendrils dropped to earth have themselves become new stems, and the sap runs upwards through them to support the branches and assist the parent stem. That is what has happened in the British Empire during the past century. Originally, like the branches of the banyan tree, the Dominions drew their sustenance from the old stem. Now they draw it from their own soil. But even so, they remain parts of the ancient tree.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is the British Empire—no Empire in the old sense of the term, but a true Commonwealth of Nations in a new and more significant form than any to which the splendid name of Commonwealth has yet been applied. It is a new power, a new idea, a new experiment in history—the greatest experiment, as I believe, in all history, the success or failure of which must profoundly influence

the future of human society. Its power, its influence—not only in material resources, but even more in moral weight—have already been shown. I do not think that my old chief, Mr. Lloyd George, was using the language of exaggeration when he told the Imperial Conference of 1921, the first Conference held after the Great War, that “the sudden revelation of the unity of the British Empire in August, 1914, altered the history of the world.”

The United States has brought to success one great democratic experiment. It has solved the question, much debated in the last century, whether or not a great union of states, “conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” can long endure. The experiment which you made with states, we are making with nations and peoples, one quarter of humanity in number, ranging from the most advanced degree of progress to the most backward, scattered across all the continents, and divided by all the oceans of the world. President Harding remarked in British Columbia yesterday that you in this continent “are not dominated by the habits of a thousand years.” Nor are we. The British Empire would simply never have existed, and it could not now survive, if we were.

We are trying, I repeat, an absolutely new experiment in government. Six signatures were affixed, for instance, to the Treaty of Versailles on behalf of the British Empire—the signatures of Great Britain, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and India. Those signatures represent six standpoints, six currents of national and racial feeling and opinion which combine to make the principles and the

policies of the British Empire. The only organ which we at present possess is the Imperial Conference. There sit the representatives of Great Britain, the four Dominions, and India. The Secretary of State for the Colonies represents all other parts of the Empire. Ireland will now take her place in that Conference. Our principles must be democratic, because five great democracies, four of them newer even than your own, have to be satisfied with the course which our statesmen take. In applying our principles to the problems that confront us in any part of the world, we have to take the whole of the British Empire into account, and to make sure that we are dealing fairly by all the opinions and interests which it contains. Our policies, therefore, cannot be purely European—no more purely European than your own. They must be world policies, or they would fail in a day.

I know that this constitutional position is anomalous. Your Senate has found difficulties in the fact that the British Empire as one state has at present six signatures and may have more. It will certainly have one more, for Ireland will no doubt be admitted to the League of Nations at the next meeting of the Assembly. Granted—it is an anomaly. But have you no anomalies in your constitution?

The division between executive and legislature, which has found its extreme expression in the continuous dispute for power in foreign affairs between your President and your Senate, is an example of the expedients which have been necessary to enable you to maintain a government constantly in touch with the slow-moving democratic opinion of this vast union of states. That is not a wholly satisfactory arrangement from the point of view of the rest of the world.

It often makes for doubt. It constantly makes for delays. There have been moments when we thought it might almost be necessary to accredit an ambassador to the Capitol at Washington as well as to the White House.

But we know your special conditions, and we have done our best to appreciate them. That is all we beg of you in return. When I come to deal with the burning problems of the moment as we view them from the standpoint of the British Empire, I shall ask you always to remember what this Empire is, how variously compounded, how utterly new in its political conceptions and methods, how unprecedented in its effort to represent and reconcile the interests and ideals of communities in every stage of development, from progressive nation-states to benighted tribal families, in every quarter of the world. Ramshackle as our wagon is, it is hitched to three great stars, the star of Justice, the star of Freedom, the star of Peace.

LECTURE II

THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION

WHEN I was in Downing Street with Mr. Lloyd George, I was constantly asked by my own fellow-countrymen and women, and often, too, by American friends of both sexes, "Why does not the Government settle the Near Eastern question?" I should like to tell you exactly how that question made me feel.

You may remember that during the war, or what, perhaps, following a great example, I had better call "the late unpleasantness," a good deal of recrimination was common between officers in command of men in the trenches and officers in command of maps behind the line. I speak of both classes respectfully, because I held both forms of command at different periods of the war. The man from headquarters in the rear was very apt to say, "The whole difficulty about this position lies here," and he would put his finger, in Napoleonic fashion, upon the map, pointing to Hill 60 or some other bump of profound tactical significance upon the ground. Having made this great discovery, he would proceed with his map into the line, and would ask why a raid should not be organized at once to take this inconvenient protuberance. Then the point of view of the man in the trenches began to make itself felt. He would agree at once that it would be a good thing to take Hill 60, just as it would be a good thing to take Berlin; but he would point out that the land between his trench and Hill 60 was unfortunately covered with an acre or so of impenetrable barbed wire; where there was no

barbed wire there were shell holes the depth of a six-foot man and full of water; where there was any unencumbered ground it was of the crater variety, so loose and crumbly that progress in it was terribly slow. These were the practical difficulties, he would explain, of taking Hill 60 to-morrow morning. Of course, the man in the trenches was to a large extent right. The staff officers began to realize after a time that individual and isolated attacks upon inconvenient places or strong points were practically always a mistake; and that the only way of benefiting any part of the line was to attack on a very great front, not with platoons but with divisions and corps. In that way the "late unpleasantness" was ultimately brought to an end.

In other words, the war was won by the application of broad ideas, in which a number of Powers were agreed to act together. I am convinced that there is no other way of dealing with the terrible complications of the Near Eastern question. Considered from the spectator's chair that question looks like a muddle of ineptitude and iniquity which ought obviously to be disposed of at once. The elements of difficulty are easily analyzed in an academic manner. There is, for instance, national sentiment and international jealousy. There is religious feud. There is the great range of strategical questions which have always centered in the eastern end of the Mediterranean. There is finally that desperate disease which you call "European Imperialism." I do not quarrel with the name, although I have seen strong symptoms of the same malady in another continent.

Now all these things are of course at the bottom of the difficulty of securing peaceful and abiding settle-

ments in the Near East, and they are not easily removed. Like the barbed wire, the shell holes, and the crater earth, they are there; they are hard realities; and they cannot be conjured away by the mere waving of phylacteries. If we are to make progress, we must face the difficulties and see if there are no broad principles such as will enable us to overcome the barbed wire, the shell holes, and the crater earth, by acting in sufficient unison and on a sufficiently wide front. I believe that it is possible to arrive at such principles of policy, and I will endeavor very humbly to suggest them in the course of this address.

The Near East has had a peculiar and often decisive influence upon European history. Look, for instance, at its influence on Napoleon.

Very early in his history, when he was still a young servant of the Directory, Napoleon was entrusted with what was called the "Army of England," which was to destroy that island, root and branch. The date was 1797. Napoleon was a good soldier, and he discovered very quickly that the invasion of England must wait for the creation of a fleet. What did he do? In order to pursue the designs of the Directory against England, he turned the "Army of England" into the "Army of Egypt," and proceeded at once to the Near East with the object of blocking the British routes to the East and securing them for a French invasion of India. You all know how Napoleon's ships were broken up by Nelson at the Battle of the Nile and how the whole expedition ultimately failed. Napoleon, however, never abandoned the idea that the way to strike at England was through the Near East. Again and again in his career he re-

turned to this project. Ambassadors were sent to Persia, three at a time; negotiations were constantly in progress with the Sultan of Turkey; and at length, when he had persuaded the Czar Alexander to combine with him against England at the famous meeting at Tilsit, he designed to make Constantinople a base for converging attacks upon the Indian Empire. Many of his sayings illustrate his strong feelings in this respect. "Really to ruin England," he wrote to the Directory in 1797, "we must make ourselves masters of Egypt." Many years later at St. Helena, when his great career had closed, he declared emphatically that "Egypt is the most important country in the world." Another interesting example is a remark credited to him when the Czar Alexander, after the meeting at Tilsit, demanded possession of Constantinople. Napoleon is said to have retorted, "Constantinople—never! That would mean the Empire of the World."

Here you have an example of the instincts regarding the Near East of, I suppose, the greatest military genius produced by mankind.

Remember, too, that all this was before the Suez Canal was constructed (though Napoleon himself had determined that such a canal should be dug) and also before the era of railways. In the later nineteenth century Constantinople, or, rather, Scutari on the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, became the head of a great railway system stretching across Anatolia. At the northern boundary of Syria the railway branches on the one hand down through Syria and Palestine to the neighborhood of the Suez Canal and thence to the cradles of the Mahomedan faith at Mecca and Medina. On the other hand, it branches

into Mesopotamia, running through the scene of the early Babylonian and Assyrian Empires. Another branch was also projected through Persia and Baluchistan to India itself. Obviously, these two factors—the building of the Suez Canal and the construction of the railways—enormously enhance the significance of the whole area. Palestine and Egypt become anterooms to one of the world's most important interoceanic waterways. Constantinople becomes the only gate through which the great military forces of Central Europe can strike at the East without running the gauntlet of sea power.

Follow the course of history down the decades of the nineteenth century. Germany, the new military power, takes the same course as Napoleon. Quite early in the 80's, I think in 1883, she sends one of her leading soldiers, Von der Goltz, to reorganize the Turkish army under German influence. In 1889, hard upon the Armenian massacres, the Emperor William and his consort pay a visit to the Sultan at Constantinople and proceed thence to Palestine, where the Emperor declares in one of his most famous utterances that "Three hundred millions of Mahomedans in the world may count on the German Emperor as their friend." The policy of friendship to Turkey results in a great increase of German trade, but the main development is the constant effort to secure control of the railway which is being constructed across Anatolia, and which will ultimately connect with Mecca and Bagdad.

That is not all. The European branch of this great railway system is also taken into consideration, and Germany pursues a Balkan policy, steadily directed to securing control of the great trunk line which

runs from Vienna and Budapest through Belgrade and Sophia to Constantinople. The vital importance of this whole scheme was a subject of constant propaganda amongst the German people, and you have probably all seen the maps broadcasted to the German people during the war which show a vast trunk line stretching from Berlin through Vienna, Budapest, Sophia, and Constantinople to the East.

In the main, this was a struggle between two great autocracies, the German and the Slav. Mr. Asquith, in the articles which he is publishing in the *Saturday Evening Post* upon the "Origins of the War," gives some very interesting quotations from the Kaiser's speeches and letters to show how great his preoccupation was upon this subject. He wrote, for instance, to Herr Ballin upon December 15, 1912, nearly two years before the war, as follows:

If we were compelled to take up arms, we should do so to assist Austria not only against Russian aggression but also against the Slavs in general. . . . It is beyond our power to prevent this struggle, because the future of the Hapsburg monarchy and that of our own country are both at stake.

I believe it to be a profound historical truth, that the Near Eastern question was the chief cause of the Great War.

Here, then, was from the point of view of the British Empire a menace not unlike the menace of Napoleon, for Germany of course had also created a great fleet. What was Great Britain's attitude? Originally, from Napoleonic times onwards, her chief anxiety had been regarding Russia. Her object at that time was to prevent Russia from turning the Black Sea into a great naval arsenal, immune from outside

attack, across which Russia could easily descend upon Constantinople and thereby seize control of the military routes to the East. This long struggle, which led to one war and again and again to the verge of war, was ultimately settled in 1907 by the Anglo-Russian Agreement, in which all outstanding difficulties were cleared up. The reason was, that a greater menace both to Russia and ourselves had arisen in Germany. Looking back upon the record of our statesmanship during these critical years, I see some errors in our dealings with the Balkan troubles, but I do not see any conciliatory action open to us which we did not take. We made no attempt to block Germany, so far as I know, in her Near Eastern expansion, but sought only to secure that the railways which were to be constructed under her impulse should not be controlled to our detriment. We had almost secured this in 1914, in the Bagdad railway agreement of that year, which was never signed. The main result of that agreement, from our point of view, was to secure two British directors upon the board of the Bagdad railway, so that we should be clearly apprised of the method in which it was being controlled and used. Any other course than this would have meant giving Germany a free hand to mass troops at the head of the Persian Gulf or in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal. Such an event would have cut the British Empire in twain, for nothing is of greater importance to the defense of our Commonwealth than the maintenance of an open seaway between East and West.

Now an observer from Mars might very well say in regard to all this period of history, "Why so

much competition and conflict regarding the territory of another Power?" The point is a good one. It requires an answer. I think the answer is twofold.

In the first place, consider the history of the Turkish Empire in the nineteenth century. In 1817 the Ottoman Empire covered an area in Europe of 218,000 square miles and had 19,500,000 of population. In 1857, after the Crimean War, this had been reduced to 193,000 square miles and 17,000,000 of population. In 1878, after the Treaty of Berlin, when Bulgaria and Rumania had sprung to life, it was further reduced to 129,000 square miles and 9,500,000 of population. In 1914, after the Balkan wars, when the Balkan League had thrown itself upon the last remaining ramparts of Turkey in Europe, it fell to 10,000 square miles and under 2,000,000 of population. Roughly speaking, that is to say, in one hundred years it lost nineteen-twentieths of its European estate and nine-tenths of the alien population which it ruled.

Many European nationalities were submerged in the large area which Turkey lost during the nineteenth century. With the spark kindled by the French Revolution those nationalities gradually awakened to life again, and struggled against their Turkish overlords. Serbia is the first of the Balkan peoples to begin the struggle. Greece is the first to succeed. Then follow the other Balkan nationalities, Bulgaria and Rumania.

Throughout the whole period the sympathies of England were definitely and strongly cast with the rising European nationalities. The passion which the movement evoked is shown not only in British policy but in British poetry. Milton was the first Eng-

lish poet to urge the Greeks to freedom, and he was followed by a long and illustrious line from Byron and Shelley, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, to Kipling and Flecker in our own. I do not know whether American school boys all read Byron's tremendous call to the Hellenic nationality in the poem entitled "The Isles of Greece." English school boys thrill to it still.

Not only poets but private individuals of English and Scottish race have also played their part in this history. Their names are legion. Perhaps I may mention an old colleague of mine, Mr. J. D. Bouchier, first an Eton master, afterwards for nearly forty years, I think, correspondent of *The Times* in the Balkan peninsula. He was in everybody's confidence, universally trusted, universally loved. He knew everybody's secrets, and I could never understand how they remained secrets after he had learned them, because he was unhappily deaf, and the only way of communicating with him was to shout. The Bulgarian Government struck a stamp in his honor when he died, some little while ago. He was typical of many Englishmen who have developed a passionate interest in the struggle for freedom and played some part in it themselves.

Nationalism fighting for freedom is a great force, though its record is stained by many crimes. None realized both its strength and its weakness better than Shelley, who sang in the morning of the nationalist revival a century ago. There is something deeply poignant, for instance, in the contrast between the first and last stanzas of the last chorus of "Hellas." Shelley begins upon a note of triumphant prophecy—you all know the lines:

The world's great age begins anew,
The golden years return,
The earth doth like a snake renew
Her winter weeds outworn;
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.

That is the keynote of the whole poem, a kindling faith in awakening humanity. But in the last stanza the reverse of the picture seems to strike a chill to the poet's heart, and he ends appealingly in the minor key:

Oh cease! must hate and death return?
Cease! must men kill and die?
Cease! drain not to its dregs the urn
Of bitter prophecy!
The world is weary of the past,—
Oh might it die or rest at last!

Just a century has passed since Shelley wrote that inspired poem. Looking back over a hundred years we do indeed see nations draining to the dregs the urn of bitter prophecy. But yet, who can doubt, as Gladstone declared, that the struggle was in the main a noble one, not only fought for noble ends, but gradually through mist and fire attaining them? Nations, like men and women, must have faith, in Lincoln's great words, to do the right as God gives them to see the right, and not grow weary in well-doing.

Here, then, in these fierce national movements was one potent reason why the Powers were perpetually concerned about the future of the Ottoman Empire.

That Empire, moreover, had difficulties not only with the European nationalities which it ruled, but

also with its Asiatic subjects in Arabia, and no one could tell how long its apparently palsied hands would be able to hold the scepter won by the magnificent military virtues of the earlier Turkish conquerors.

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Another great cause was the obvious fact that the paralysis of government in the Turkish Empire was holding up the whole development of the world. Railways were bound to be built across Asia Minor to the East. That vast area was bound to be developed for trade and commerce. Palestine alone was a great granary of the Roman Empire, but it had entirely ceased to be a granary under Turkish rule. The same blight seemed to be upon all Turkish possessions, except in so far as it was mitigated by the trading activities of the Greeks and other foreigners acting under the special privileges conferred by the Capitulations. Development of the Turkish Empire by European capital was therefore inevitable. The whole question lay in this: Was this development to be unregulated so that at any moment Turkish concessions to one Power might endanger the vital interests of another? Or was an honest attempt to be made to regulate political and commercial competition so that rivalry should in no event if possible be allowed to degenerate into war?

It is sometimes thought that these questions of railway development and of trade, and so on, are of interest only to capitalists, exploiters, and pioneers of that kind. If you came to my constituency in Lancashire you would understand that that is not the case. The workingman knows that he depends on foreign markets and studies them with great care. A millhand will get up in a meeting which I am address-

ing and ask if I think there is any prospect of markets improving in the Near East. That shows that the pressure behind this thing is not what it is supposed to be, pressure from a few great men handling great financial power. It also is a democratic thing; it comes from workingmen who have come to know that their bread and butter, their livelihood at home, depends upon these oversea markets, affected by the politics of the world.

So much for the prewar history. In spite of the efforts of European statesmanship, war ultimately broke out. Turkey joined the Central Powers, and was involved in their defeat. What of the peace settlement?

Historians will certainly point out that the Western Allies made a great mistake in not negotiating peace with Turkey at once. The reasons why they did not do so were manifold. For the first six months of 1919 they were sufficiently occupied by making peace with Germany and the other European powers. The Eastern settlement was then delayed again while President Wilson took the Treaties back to Congress, because an essential part of the Near Eastern settlement in view depended upon American participation. It became evident in 1920 that America would not participate, and negotiations with Turkey were then begun. But by that time the British army had been entirely demobilized. Slight rifts were apparent in Allied unity, and the absence of the United States unquestionably impaired the influence of the Western Powers.

This was all the more the case because the American President had been responsible with the British

and French Prime Ministers for the preliminary dispositions taken in Asia Minor when the Greeks were sent to Smyrna. The understanding then was that the French were to take responsibility for Cilicia, the Italians for Adalia, the Greeks for Smyrna, and the Americans, if Congress approved, for Armenia. Great Britain confined herself to the Arabian peoples to whom she was pledged in the war.

I hope I shall not seem presumptuous when I point out that the British part is the only part of this settlement which has been maintained. Great Britain undertook to set up an Arab state in Mesopotamia in return for the support given her by the Arabs during the war. She has done so at very considerable expense to the British taxpayer. An Arab Government is now in complete control, and the only British forces remaining in Mesopotamia are air forces centered at Bagdad and maintained there by request of the Arab Government. They are to be removed as soon as the Arab Government has perfected its own military and police arrangements within a maximum period of four years. Great Britain has also set up an independent Arab ruler in Trans-Jordania, where another member of the Shereefian family holds the throne. In Palestine her task has been more complex, because she was pledged not only to the Arabs but to the Jews to support the Zionist movement. This has involved her in great difficulties, because the Zionist movement is unpopular with the Arabs and has evoked great opposition amongst them. Great Britain has persevered, at considerable cost again to her taxpayers; but the ultimate success of the Zionist movement must depend upon the amount of financial

support coming from the richer members of the Jewish community. If that fails, the experiment is bound to break down.

Whether, however, you look at Mesopotamia or at Trans-Jordania or at Palestine, the British Government has carried out its engagements, and has succeeded, I submit, in securing and maintaining a form of settlement which will enhance the peace of those regions. I am sure that the principle of Arab freedom is sound and right. The main problem now is to maintain it, and for this purpose every effort should be made to secure some coöperation if not confederation amongst the Arab peoples, whose greatest peril is their passionate addiction to internal feud.

Great Britain, then, has carried out her part of the settlement. The other part was international, but she was pledged to it although she had in it no territorial concern. What has happened? France retired from Cilicia. Italy retired from Adalia. The American mandate for Armenia was never taken up. The Greeks in a hard and lonely struggle for three years maintained their part of the settlement, and were driven last year back across the Aegean and the Bosphorus. During these events there has been a constant process of negotiations with the Turks, involving at every stage fresh surrenders by the Allies. I was glad to hear the tribute which Mr. Morgenthau paid at the opening of the Institute to the efforts of the British Government to stop the inroad of the Kemalist forces into Europe last year. England did prevent a terrible outrage in Constantinople and in Thrace by the determination which she then showed. It may interest this audience to know that Mr. Lloyd

George at that time received a large number of messages of support and congratulation from the United States, where feeling seemed to be considerably aroused. One witty American particularly amused us by telegraphing, "Earn civilization's everlasting gratitude by keeping the brutes out of Europe. America expects every Englishman to do his duty!"

Well, we did our best; and at any rate we stopped massacre in Constantinople and war in Thrace. The Turkish organization in Constantinople and Thrace was complete. The Turkish male population had been marshaled in battalions. It possessed arms. It was ready to act. Only the British stand at Chanak and Scutari prevented a repetition of the horrors of Smyrna on European soil. But I cannot profess myself satisfied with the attitude which Britain has taken since. Unfortunately the Near Eastern question became a pawn of party politics in England last year. Politicians are the same all over the world. They played with the war weariness of the English people, and Mr. Lloyd George's resignation was followed by a complete reversal of the British attitude. Since his retirement we have been as eager as all our friends to refuse nothing to the conquering Turk. The result is that depressing, I would almost say that degrading, document, the Treaty of Lausanne.

The only thing to be said in its favor is that it is a peace. But those statesmen must be optimistic indeed who have any belief that it will endure. There are three points about it on which I should like briefly to touch.

Look first at the settlement in Thrace. Turkey is given Eastern Thrace up to and including the Maritza River, and also including Adrianople. She

is given back territory, that is, which she has lost once before in the Balkan wars. That territory contains at the lowest estimate a very large Greek population. An exchange has been arranged, but on that point I would humbly endorse what Mr. Morgenthau said in his very interesting opening lecture—that such an exchange is much too difficult an operation for the Turkish Government. It will lead to disorganization and great misery if it is attempted. In it there lies the seed of very serious international trouble.

The history of the last hundred years is sufficient warrant for the assertion that the experiment of restoring the Turk to Europe is doomed to failure. He is an alien element planted like the point of a weapon in the flesh of Europe; till that element is finally removed Southeastern Europe will arrive at no lasting territorial settlements. President Wilson showed a broad and penetrating insight into realities when he declared in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points:

The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations, under international guarantees.

This was also the view of the Allied Governments in Europe, for in their reply to President Wilson on January 10, 1917, they declared their war aims to include

the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody

tyranny of the Turks and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to western civilization.

It is fashionable now to take a somewhat more lenient view of the Turk's record and a more optimistic one of his prospects in Thrace. For my part I think we had best be guided by those who have known the Turk longest. Lord Cromer, for instance, who had to deal with the Turk practically all through his life, made the following declaration many years ago :

The Turks, who have always been strangers in Europe, have shown conspicuous inability to comply with the elementary requirements of European civilization and have at last failed to maintain that military efficiency which has from the days when they crossed the Bosphorus been the sole mainstay of their power and position.

I do not believe that there is anything in the history of the last two or three years to warrant any serious modification of that verdict.

The most ominous factor in the European part of the settlement is, however, the reëstablishment of the Turk without conditions of any sort in Constantinople. One reason against this arrangement is that Constantinople is upon the Bosphorus and forms part of the great question whether the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should be open to the ships of all nations, armed and unarmed, at all times. I will deal with that great question in a few minutes. But Constantinople does not owe its hold upon the minds of men solely to the fact that it stands upon the Bosphorus and is therefore the most important strategic point in the world. It was also the cradle of eastern Christianity. St. Sophia, for nearly five hundred years now a Mahome-

dan mosque, was before that the Mother Church of half Christendom. I do not believe that any modern necromancer, however potent his incantations, will ever exorcise the age-long spell in which Constantinople has bound the hearts of the Greek and the Russian peoples. Religion was born in the East. As you move eastward, so you may note the increasing power wielded by it over the hearts of men. I do not say that Eastern Christendom will inevitably seek to dispossess the Turkish Empire of all rights in Constantinople, but as surely as the sparks fly upward, as surely as the sun will rise to-morrow, before—and long before—the close of the present century, the Turks will cease to be sole wardens of that historic city. Mustapha Kemal was wise indeed when he placed the capital of the new Turkey at Angora. Is it too much to hope that the Turks will now keep it there?

So much, ladies and gentlemen, for the purely European aspect of the Treaty of Lausanne. To my mind there should be emblazoned on its covers the figure of Justice with broken sword and shattered scales.

There is much less to criticise in the Anatolian part of the settlement. Anatolia is now the natural homeland of the Turk, and his future there will depend entirely upon his own capacity to restore and to develop his inheritance. He is taking great risks. It was time that the Capitulations in their old form were ended, but it is perilous for the Turk to have refused to put anything in their place. He has succeeded in securing the abolition of all foreign jurisdiction. He has expelled or is seeking to expel all the races which have hitherto done his business for him.

Can he himself maintain and establish fair conditions for trade and business? In the minds of many experienced observers he seems to have doomed himself almost inevitably to economic ruin. The parable of the buried talent applies to him as it applies in every part of the world. If he does not develop his inheritance, others will. There is no force in the world that will stop that.

The most tragic part of the settlement is undoubtedly the lot of the Armenians and other Christians in Anatolia. I do not understand how a certain school of writers and publicists upon the Near East has come to condone the appalling record of the Turk towards his Christian fellow-subjects since the national uprisings in his Empire began. During the war, extermination was ruthlessly carried out as a settled policy; and not less than one and a half millions of Christians, women and children no less than men, were starved to death or left to die from exposure in the mountains. This policy has been renewed from time to time with ghastly callousness since the war. There is no question about the facts. They rest mainly upon the evidence of members of the American Red Cross and other American institutions in the Near East, and they are proved beyond cavil.

The fashionable thing is to say that the Greeks and other Balkan peoples have committed excesses, too. They have. We ourselves used poison gas in the war because the Germans used it. Nevertheless we do not condone the use of poison gas. Undoubtedly the Christian peoples have retaliated at times with great severity upon the Turks. But every instance of this which to my knowledge has been proved is an in-

stance of excesses committed by angry soldiery. There has been nothing remotely resembling the cold-blooded extermination of alien populations far away from the scene of war. On the contrary, the Turkish population which has been under Greek government in Europe has undoubtedly been treated with great consideration and fairness. Compare that with the terror created in Anatolia, far from the scene of conflict—a terror so great that Greece now has a million and a half of refugees from Asia upon her hands. These refugees include no men of military age, no women of marriageable age. All these were taken by the Turks. Think what this means, both to those who were taken, and to those who were left.

It is idle, in my opinion, to ignore the possibilities of this question. I have only a dim recollection of the events of the Spanish War, but I seem to remember that righteous anger over Spanish cruelty in the colonies had much to do with the course which the United States then took. Spanish cruelty in Cuba is lovingkindness compared to the Turkish policy of massacre. In England a great political wave was caused by Gladstone's Midlothian campaign on the Bulgarian atrocities, more than forty years ago. Such a thing may happen again. At present our people are war-weary, and they feel inarticulately that while the world is full of wrong, force is no remedy. But wrath renews itself, and the voice of their anger will one day be heard again if these excesses do not stop. It is fairer, therefore, not to mislead the Turk, but to let him know at once that world opinion will not long tolerate a form of nationalism that feeds on human sacrifice and makes a political instrument of massacre.

I come now to the greatest and most perplexing of the problems of the Near East—the regulation of the Straits between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

I will try to give you in a few words a picture of how that question arises. If you will look at the Black Sea upon the map, you will see that it is almost equal in size to the eastern end of the Mediterranean between Greece and the coast of Palestine. It is, in other words, a very large area of blue water or open sea. The distance from Constanza on the European shore to Batum on the Asiatic is greater than the distance from Brindisi in the heel of Italy to Smyrna on the Anatolian coast. The Black Sea in the past has carried a very large trade, and it will carry an even larger one in the future. All Southern Russia naturally exports its products from the Black Sea ports. There is also the wheat of Rumania, which has this egress alone. There is the oil of Rumania and of the Caucasus. And finally there is the trade, which must rapidly increase, carried down to the Black Sea by the Danube, which is now being canalized so as to carry large ships from the Danube to the Main and from the Main to the Rhine itself. The greater part of the trade of Austria and Hungary at least should come this way. It is one of the starved and stricken areas of the world at the present moment, but when trade begins to revive, it will develop there rapidly. It is certain that the revival of Russia will also be most marked, to begin with, in the South.

You observe, then, that the Black Sea is an important trading area. It is also a critical area from the strategic point of view, for the following reason. If it is closed to other Powers, it is dominated by the

riparian Powers. These are four only in number: Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. The closing of the Black Sea to other great Powers means therefore that it becomes a Russian lake and that Russia in consequence dominates Constantinople.

If you look at the map again, you will see that the Black Sea is connected with the Mediterranean by a very narrow strip of salt water—so narrow that at both ends, at the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, it is less than three miles across and is therefore by the ordinary tenets of international law within the territorial waters of Turkey. Here, then, is the problem. An accident of geography has made the nation which holds both sides of these Straits the warden of a great open sea, into which and out of which ships of all nations desire free passage. Accident has further determined that the nation now holding that position, which has held it for nearly five hundred years, should be a weak and failing nation, in constant diplomatic trouble for more than a century. How is the problem thus created to be resolved?

There are three possible solutions, two of which have already been tried. In the first place, you may decide that the territorial character of the waters of the Straits is also to settle the character of the Black Sea and that the Straits are therefore to be closed at the will of the Turkish Empire. Russia has always favored this solution, and she managed to secure it for a few years in the nineteenth century, but was ultimately deprived of the position by the strong action of other Powers, of which Britain was foremost. At that time the Black Sea, which she dominated, was not neutralized, and she was therefore able to use it as a vast arsenal for creating military and

naval power. I need not return to that aspect of the problem. At the present day she advocates the same solution, but declares herself ready to have the Black Sea neutralized. Unfortunately, this does not in reality add anything to the security desired by other Powers. It will be evident to you that if all men-of-war were barred from the Black Sea, the whole of its trade could be held up at any moment, if Russia desired to do so, by a couple of hastily armed privateers. Russia's protest that she would not so use her power may be perfectly genuine, but the world is not inclined to give such privilege by prescription to any single nation over a great area of world trade. The Black Sea, for instance, will once again become a great wheat-exporting area, and such action, quite apart from the loss which it would inflict upon those whose ships were held up, might affect the price of wheat throughout the world. It is evident, moreover, that if there were no men-of-war upon the waters of the Black Sea, Russia as a great military Power would be free at any moment to transport troops across it in great numbers to seize Constantinople, which would be without defense, and with Constantinople the head of the railways dominating Asia Minor and Arabia. Once upon the Straits with military power, a very little artillery hastily moved into position is enough to block the passage of other nations' ships. Clearly this solution would put Turkey and the Straits completely under Russian dominance. It was naturally, therefore, advocated at Lausanne by M. Chicherin and advocated with great ability. It was, however, unanimously set aside by all the other Powers, and I think it is never likely to be permitted again.

The second form of solution is compromise. All sorts of compromises were tried in the nineteenth century; none of them can be said to have worked satisfactorily. Unhappily, a new compromise has now been invented at Lausanne. Under the Straits Convention which is attached to the Treaty of Lausanne, the ships of commerce of all nations are now permitted free entry so long as Turkey is not at war. The ships of war which nations may send into the Black Sea are, however, limited to a strength not exceeding the strength of the strongest naval Power in the Black Sea itself. In other words, no Power can send into the Black Sea a naval force stronger than the force which Russia maintains in those quarters. You may well ask, How is this strength to be ascertained, and who will administer the rules? A commission is appointed by the Convention, with Turkey as its chairman, and this commission is to decide twice a year—in January, say, and July—what the Russian naval strength really is. I cannot imagine a more fertile source of disputes. Who will agree as to the strength of one naval unit as compared with another? There would be acrid argument upon the subject if relations at any time became strained. The history of all diplomacy should have taught us to beware of paper formulæ of this kind.

But that is not all. Under the rules to be administered by the Commission the naval strength of Russia is not to include ships in reserve. In January, therefore, Russia might have many ships in reserve and would naturally give her strength as such and such. The strength of other Powers would be regulated accordingly. In February Russia might bring her ships out of reserve and possibly double her strength,

but the other Powers would have no redress until the Commission went to work again in July. Obviously this is not a convention that will be easy to operate. At every step it will become a greater quagmire. Diplomacy never drifted into a more dangerous morass.

For Turkey, moreover, it is especially perilous. In the Convention the rules affecting the Straits are profoundly affected according as Turkey is neutral in a struggle or not. Think what that means. It means that if struggles are feared, Turkey will inevitably become a diplomatic pawn in the manoeuvring for position which always precedes such outbursts. Nothing can be more perilous for a power like her. It is exactly that from which she has suffered most terribly in the past. The paper arrangement by which coastal areas on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles are demilitarized is, moreover, sheer pretense. It makes no difference whether forts are constructed there or not. Artillery can be planted in a night which will have an even greater effect in blocking the Straits. It is provided that if any Power thus violates the demilitarized areas, Turkey is to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations. But what can the Council of the League then do? The Straits will be blocked, and many days, perhaps weeks, must pass before any action is taken by other Powers, even should they desire to intervene.

I have described to you the two kinds of solution which have hitherto been tried and which have always failed. I have regretted the fact that one of these forms of solution has been taken up again in the Treaty of Lausanne. What other solution remains?

It is this—that all the Powers of the world should

agree that, inasmuch as the Black Sea is evidently blue water which should be open to the ships of all the world, the Straits connecting it with the world should also be blue water and free at all times, in all conditions, to all ships of all Powers. This, I was delighted to observe, was the solution recommended by the American observer at Lausanne. Mr. Child, who was first United States delegate last year in the earlier part of the conference, made the following statement on the subject on December 6. Speaking for the United States he said :

We cannot accept the position stated by any one who has spoken for the position of the nations on the Black Sea ; we have heard no one speak with the assent of all. We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce in the Black Sea is the exclusive affair of the states bordering upon it. We assert that it is the concern of all the nations of the earth. It is untenable that any one nation by the virtue of geographical position should hold the power of depriving every other nation of these rights. This would be not only against the interests of our national policy ; it would be against the interests of every nation in the Black Sea ; it would be against the whole historical development of the freedom of the Black Sea. The unlimited control of the straits and the Black Sea by any one nation is against the policy of the world.

I need hardly tell you after the, I fear, wearisome argument which I have just presented to you, that I whole-heartedly endorse the sentence that “no nation by the virtue of geographical position should hold the power of depriving every other nation of these rights.”

Mr. Child then went on to state in very definite terms the policy of the United States. With regard

to the Russian proposal to close the Black Sea, he said :

It is impossible for me to overlook the proposal made by one of the delegations here, that by agreement all warships should be excluded from the Black Sea. I would find it equally reasonable to exclude warships from every international body of water. No nation has gone further than the United States in policies of naval disarmament, but no nation would be more ready to uphold the good sense of maintaining sufficient naval force to act as police of the free seas, to protect its citizens and their ships wherever they might be, to suppress piracy and other menaces, and to act at times for the public good and to give relief to suffering, just as ships of war have recently acted in the Near East. . . . We, I believe, in common with every commercial nation, wish access to every free body of water in the world, and we will not be satisfied if our ships of war may not pursue their peaceful errands wherever our citizens and ships may go.

This declaration of policy was in complete accord with the views of two greatly interested riparian powers, Rumania and Bulgaria. Mr. Duca, the first Rumanian delegate, said :

For a long time past the Powers had found it necessary to place the Danube, which flowed into the Black Sea, under a régime of international freedom. That freedom could not be real unless this international river were free up to its final outlet, the Straits. . . . The Straits must therefore be free for the passage of ships of war and of commerce without any restriction or limit.

Bulgaria, though she is seeking a direct access to the Aegean, took roughly the same view.

The fact that the Straits are the real mouth of the Danube makes it quite certain, I think, that Hungary

and Austria would have spoken in the same tone had they been present at the conference. I expect that the present interest of Germany is the same.

Critics may say: "But the Turks are under Russian influence, and no Russian Government would ever sign such an agreement." Perhaps it would not—we have not tried. But whether all other Powers signed or not, the time has come, I am certain, for the great progressive Powers of the world to make declarations of policy such as you yourself have already made in the past. The absolute and permanent freedom of the Straits is included in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. The progressive Powers should have made the absolute freedom of the Straits, for which they had fought, a declaration of principle in the terms of peace. If other Powers would not accept the principle, they should have reserved their freedom, and they should not have allowed themselves to sign anything contrary to it. I profoundly admire the attitude taken by the American Government in the passages which I have read to you from the statement by its representative. I only wish that the British Empire had stood firmly by your side.

The freedom of the Straits, however, cannot be justly maintained in principle unless the Powers which declare it are prepared to make some provision for the security of Constantinople. I speak with a sense of the great delicacy of all these questions, because Constantinople is deeply venerated by the sentiment of a large number of Mahomedans. The British Empire contains, I think, very nearly half the total Mahomedans in the world, and it has always maintained spiritual freedom and due regard for all religions as one of its fundamental principles. There

is, however, another religious sentiment which is kindled by the name of Constantinople, and it is essential for us to do the utmost justice possible to both forms of religious sentiment, for they are very real.

I have already argued that Constantinople cannot remain permanently under absolute Turkish control, as provided in the Treaty of Lausanne. I have quoted the great authority of Lord Cromer, with his life-long experience in the Near East, as evidence that no such arrangement is likely to last. I have shown that it was against our declared war aims in the Fourteen Points and in the statement of war aims made to President Wilson by the European Allies. What solution, then, can we find? I am personally convinced that no enduring solution is possible except in the establishment of Constantinople as a free port under international management and international guarantees. I believe also that this control should be extended to the shores of the Straits in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, and that in sign and guarantee of this international arrangement Gallipoli should be held as an international stronghold by an international force. I should like to see the flag of the League of Nations flying over Constantinople and over Gallipoli—the greatest historic centers of human strife.

You may say that Turkey would suffer by the loss. I have argued in vain if I have not shown that from a political and strategic point of view Turkey in reality has everything to gain by surrendering her position as the porter at those perilous gates. On the other hand, I think that full provision should be made for Mahomedan sentiment in Constantinople, and also that Turkey should be materially compensated from the revenues of the port of Constantinople for

the material loss which she would sustain. Such a revenue, periodically and punctually paid, would be of enormous value to a Turkey endeavoring to secure a fresh lease of economic life in Anatolia. She would be free from a great incubus; and the whole nature of the settlement would, I believe, increase her chance of ultimate survival and prosperity.

I have, I fear, dealt only in very broad outline with this vast problem of the Near East, but I have tried to bring out the essentials and to let the details pass. It is very easy in such questions as this not to see the wood for the trees. Those who live upon the spot are apt to see nothing but the shell holes and the barbed wire. Those who live at a great distance are prone, on the other hand, to think that solutions may easily be found. The principles of settlement which I have suggested are, unfortunately, not contained in the Treaty of Lausanne. It is, however, impossible to my mind that the Treaty of Lausanne should endure very long. Its life, I fear, will be as short as that of all previous Near Eastern settlements. It is therefore our duty as progressive nations to determine on what broad lines our policy in the future will be shaped, and I have outlined here the policy which I believe the British Empire should adopt. Let me summarize it in a few words.

First, free scope for the emancipation of all subject nationalities under the Turkish flag. Whatever is possible in the way of government of other peoples at the present day, it is certainly not possible to keep the more advanced under the less advanced in civilization. We are doing our share of this work in the old Arab provinces of the Turkish Empire. As I have

shown, we have set up Arab national governments—King Feisul in Mesopotamia and King Abdullah in Trans-Jordania. King Hussein reigns over the Hedjaz and the Holy Places. We are making the best of the Zionist experiment, with due regard for Arab feeling in Palestine. Our responsibility in these territories is governed by mandate from the League of Nations. The British Empire has never yet violated the policy of the open door in its dependencies, but in any case the mandate secures the open door, and it safeguards us in vital interests at the head of the Persian Gulf and in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal. This policy has cost us a great deal. Mesopotamia, for instance, has cost us over two hundred million sterling. A very large party in England represented in powerful newspapers declares that the British taxpayer's money has been thrown away, but I trust we will be true to our pledges to the Arabs and to the mandates which we have taken from the League. If Turkey is really freed from the perpetual struggle with these nationalities in outlying provinces, I believe that she will have a much better prospect of securing her future in Anatolia. She will never live in peace while she still holds a part of Europe and the Straits.

The second principle which I advocate is the absolute freedom of the Straits under international guarantees.

The third is the establishment of Constantinople as a free port and of Gallipoli as an international stronghold under League of Nations control.

You observe that all these principles point the way of greater freedom. That is the true line of the world's development. I told you last week that the

wagon of the British Empire is hitched to three great stars—the Star of Justice, the Star of Freedom, and the Star of Peace. Through great war-weariness, we have faltered and stumbled in putting our signature to the Lausanne Settlement. But our energy and our vision will return; and when they do, I am confident that we shall see the light of our three stars halted over the broad principles of settlement which I have endeavored—unworthily I fear—to commend to you to-night.

LECTURE III

BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN EGYPT

EGYPT, in spite of a widely spread opinion to the contrary, is not, and has never been, a part of the British Empire. Palmerston declared in the earlier half of the nineteenth century that it would be a great mistake for England ever to undertake the government of Egypt. Kinglake, on the other hand, the historian of the Crimea and the author of that most delightful of all books on history and travel, *Eothen*, declared, about the middle of the century, that "the Englishman, straining far over to hold his loved India, will one day plant a firm foot on the banks of the Nile, and sit in the seats of the faithful."

By a characteristic process of compromise, the British Empire has somehow succeeded in carrying out Kinglake's prophecy without disregarding Palmerston's warning. Egypt has never become a British territory. Except during the war, Britain has never been theoretically responsible for the government of Egypt, and has always avoided the position of theoretic responsibility. On the other hand, she has exercised a predominant and decisive influence upon Egyptian affairs for over forty years, and has in a very real sense written two-thirds of Egyptian history during that period.

Egypt, as everyone knows who has visited it, is one of the most fascinating countries in the world. It is, I suppose, the slenderest country, and the strangest for the conditions in which it lives. From the upper reaches of the Nile at Wady Halfa, where it joins the deserts in the northern territory of the

Sudan, it stretches up in a slender belt on either bank of the Nile. Green cultivation extends sometimes for two or three miles, sometimes for a maximum of ten miles on either side of the mighty stream. Beyond this tiny green belt on either side stand the gaunt desert hills and the endless stretches of the eastern and western deserts. About one hundred miles from the sea, near Cairo, the Nile branches out into many streams and forms a delta, about two hundred miles wide. Someone has compared this strange and lovely strip of land to a lotus flower, the delta forming the flower, and the long, narrow strip of cultivation along the banks of the Nile from the delta southwards the slender stem. It is a very true comparison, and I have often felt that Egypt, like a flower, was made to be plucked by conqueror after conqueror as he stepped by.

I do not know whether history records the full number of conquests over Egypt. The Babylonian Empire, the Hyksos, the Assyrians, the Greeks under Alexander, the Romans, the Arabs, the Turks—conquests over Egypt stretch right back across the centuries. Napoleon and Britain locked in a life-and-death struggle on the banks of the Nile, and when their warfare passes over her, she is seized by an Albanian soldier of genius, Mehemet Ali, who makes her history for half a century.

Egypt at this point becomes especially interesting for another reason. She does not, like many other Eastern lands, become the victim of Western civilization; she invites it. Mehemet Ali brought in French engineers to develop irrigation. He established the cotton plant. He developed communications and improved cultivation. At least, he meant to do all these

things, and to some extent he succeeded; but the European advisers whom he brought in were not men of the highest standard, and a terrible horde of bloodsuckers followed in their trail. His management of the Western improvements which he introduced was also typically oriental. It has been recorded of him that when he went out shopping he was like a child. In Paris he would buy up whole shops, and then forget about them, and leave his purchases behind. It was the same with many of his efforts to develop and organize his Egyptian territory. The irrigation works reached a certain point, and then seemed to relapse. The barrages bulged. The dams went into decline. Though real progress was made in his time, it was of a curiously patchy and uncertain description.

But he made Egypt his own territory, and defied the Sultan, who made his title as ruler of Egypt hereditary.

Mehemet Ali's immediate successors were the worst possible specimens of oriental autocrats. Hideous stories are told of their cruelty and their incompetence; but the strange thing is—it is typical of oriental countries—that some of the most hideous and cruel stories are recorded with enthusiasm to this day by the Egyptian peasants who suffered from them. We need not trouble with these matters until the later days of Ismail, when Europe began to feel the serious necessity of intervention. Ismail's most glorious days were undoubtedly at the time of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. He entertained the Emperor Napoleon's consort, the Empress Eugénie, with reckless magnificence. The road, for instance, from Cairo to the pyramids at Ghizeh was

built for the Empress in astonishingly few days in order that she might drive by carriage all the way. The method was the usual one in oriental countries. The peasants all along the route were taken off their fields and forced to work upon the road until it was done.

After this splendid outburst Ismail's affairs began to decline. He had borrowed so vastly that even the worst extortions which he inflicted upon his peasantry failed to meet the interest charges which he had undertaken to pay. Further borrowing was impossible, and judgments began to be given against him on behalf of European creditors in Egyptian courts. It is worth while noting what his debts amounted to. In 1863, when Ismail succeeded to the throne, the public debt of Egypt amounted to three millions of Egyptian pounds. Thirteen years later, when the European Powers began to think it necessary to intervene, it amounted to nearly one hundred million. Roughly speaking, Ismail added about seven millions a year for thirteen years to the debt of Egypt. The most remarkable feature of this financial record is that the actual administration of Egypt during the period was entirely paid for out of revenue, and there was nothing to show for the hundred millions borrowed, except sixteen millions spent on the Suez Canal. The remaining eighty millions had simply gone in wild personal extravagance.

This was the situation in 1876, when at last the European Powers felt that something must be done. The grounds on which they acted are interesting. Disraeli was in power in England, and his Government was not particularly interested in supporting the claims of the European bondholders. But a hu-

manitarian wave of feeling in England, which about that time made itself strongly felt in Gladstone's Midlothian campaigns, was forcing the sufferings of the Egyptian peasantry into prominence. Typical of the reports which reached England was one presented in 1878 by Sir Alexander Baird, who was sent there to assist in the relief of the population. He said that incredible distances were traveled by women and children begging from village to village; that many died from starvation, many more from diseases brought on by lack of nourishment. So terrible were the straits to which they were reduced in the cities and towns that they were "driven to satisfy their cravings with the refuse and garbage of the streets." The British Government, therefore, held that the Powers should intervene, not in the first instance to compel payment of interest, but to protect the people against further extortion and to suspend payments until sufficient time had been given to put the finances of the country into order again.

French opinion under M. Gambetta was also affected by the humanitarian argument, but the French Government refused to believe that the financial situation of Egypt was what the British believed it to be.

French public opinion [writes Lord Cromer, of that period when he himself was first commissioned to represent his country in Egypt,] held that the Khedive could pay his debts if he chose to do so, that the distress alleged to exist in Egypt was fictitious, and that the arguments based on the impoverishment of the country were fabricated in order to throw dust in the eyes of the public and to excite humanitarian sympathy where no sympathy was deserved. An

opinion was also entertained by a large body of the French public that the Khedive had hidden stores of wealth on which he could draw if he thought fit to do so. Subsequent events showed that this store had no foundation in fact. But there were at the time some reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.

The argument between France and Britain proceeded for some time, and ended for the moment in Britain's surrendering to the French point of view. Lord Cromer, with some pathos, gives the reason. "The Berlin Congress," he says, "was then about to sit to regulate the situation arising from the recent Russo-Turkish war. It was necessary to conciliate the French. The French initiative was therefore followed."

The French view of the Egyptian question was in a few months proved wrong, and it ultimately became necessary to insist that Ismail should put his finances in the hands of European commissioners. British and French commissioners were appointed to put the tangle straight; but Ismail did not like good advice, and managed so well to evade it that the financial situation was hardly at all improved. Three years later, therefore, he was called upon to abdicate, and the Turkish Government appointed Mehemet Tewfik Khedive in his place. This had hardly been accomplished, when a new storm broke over Egypt. Mehemet Tewfik was a competent and progressive ruler, but the irregularities of the preceding reign had produced a spirit of insubordination in the army, and this grew to a head under a peasant leader, Arabi Pasha, who ultimately led a revolt against him. There has been much discussion of the nature of this revolt. It was certainly not purely military,

for it enlisted a good deal of support from the Egyptian peasantry. It is probably the first manifestation of an antforeign sentiment in the Egyptian people, directed at the moment not so much against the European advisers at Cairo as against the Turkish rulers who had been fleecing and maltreating the whole population from end to end of Egypt.

In any case, the Powers had once more to consult upon the course which they should take. It was not possible to contemplate the elimination of a competent Khedive by utterly incompetent military leaders who would have reduced the country to more serious straits and rendered cure impossible. The history of our intervention at this moment is remarkable. Disraeli's Conservative Government had been followed by that of Mr. Gladstone, profoundly wedded to non-interventionist principles. These were illustrated in the same period by Mr. Gladstone's furiously criticised action in accepting defeat at the hand of the Dutch at Majuba Hill and withdrawing from the Transvaal. Mr. Gladstone, however, took a different view of our duty towards the Egyptian peasantry, and very unwillingly decided that armed intervention was essential. We invited France, Italy, and of course Turkey to take joint action with us. Efforts to arrange terms between the Arab and the Egyptian Governments had failed. By June, 1880, 14,000 Christians had left Egypt, and some 6,000 more were crowded at Alexandria, waiting for ships to take them away. Even local sheiks were beginning to denounce the Egyptian military party, and Arabian and Turkish families joined the Christian exodus. Riots broke out in Alexandria and in Benha. In Alexandria fifty Europeans were slaughtered in cold

blood, and many more were terribly wounded. It was evident that the whole framework of government and society in Egypt was collapsing. Mr. Gladstone declared in the House of Commons "that we should not fully discharge our duty if we did not endeavor to convert the present interior state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict to peace and order. We shall look during the time that remains to us to the co-operation of the Powers of civilized Europe, if it be in any case open to us." He added, however, that if coöperation proved unattainable "the work will be undertaken by the single Power of England." M. Gambetta had been succeeded in France by the Freycinet Ministry. Gambetta strongly counseled intervention, but a division in the French Parliament resulted in the defeat of the Freycinet Government. France, therefore, refused to intervene. Italy also refused, while expressing "thanks to the British Cabinet for having entertained the idea that the friendship of Italy for England might take the form of an active coöperation." After terrible vacillations the Turkish Government also ended by failing to co-operate. To students of Near Eastern politics the passages in which Lord Cromer discusses the vacillating delay of the Ottoman Government in coming to a decision on the Egyptian revolt are worth many thousands of passages by writers without his practical experience.

Britain, therefore, went into Egypt alone, won the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, and reëstablished the Khedive of Egypt in full control of his dominions. A strange and wonderful chapter of history follows. Lord Cromer became the British Agent in Egypt. It was announced that British troops would not be main-

tained in Egypt any longer than was necessary to secure the good order and security of the Khedive's Government. These professions were sincere. As evidence of their sincerity, it is worth recording that when Lord Salisbury's Government succeeded Mr. Gladstone's in 1887, Britain had already made an attempt to withdraw her troops from Egypt by agreement with the Turkish Government. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff was sent to Constantinople in 1887 to negotiate for the British withdrawal on condition that Turkey recognize our prior right to reoccupation if foreign intervention again proved necessary. Turkish diplomacy dealt with this proposal in its usual manner. It was nearly signed again and again, and then after weeks of negotiation, ultimately declined. Turkey had found a new friend in Europe, and Von der Goltz was reorganizing the Turkish army. Under this inspiration Abdul Hamid was beginning to reconsider many questions—the Egyptian question amongst them—and whether his action in refusing the British offer was wise or not, it was perfectly legitimate.

What was this Egypt across which the British bugles once more rang, not sounding now to battle against a European foe, but proclaiming a new era of progress and peace?

More than 90 per cent of its population was, and is, the ancient peasantry, huddled by the banks of the life-giving Nile, unchanged in spirit and outlook by successive conquests, the same to-day as on the rock sculptures painted sixty centuries ago. A small percentage are Bedouins or Nomads, still moving

from place to place in the desert, or semi-reclaimed and planted in small settlements on the borders of the irrigated Nile lands. The rest are children of the ancient river, born upon its banks, living by its bounty, perishing when its waters are withheld, and sometimes, too, slain miserably by the sudden wrath of its floods. If you take the whole area of Egypt, Nile and desert, the population is 12 to the square mile. If you take the irrigated area alone, it is 600 to the mile.

Patient, industrious, long-suffering, kindly natured, unwarlike, undreaming, unstirred by any thought but that of holding life precariously by infinite toil, this peasantry is Asiatic rather than African in type, and it is practically all Mahomedan. You may see the men raising water laboriously by stages from the Nile level to the runlets which irrigate the fields by the same seesaw swing of pole and bucket depicted on their oldest monuments. Their habitations are hovels of Nile mud, which have not changed for seven thousand years. The man works in the fields. The woman works in the house and fetches water for it from the Nile, a statuesque figure with a pitcher on her head, the same before Israel entered the land of Goshen, the same for generation after generation since Moses led his people forth to change the history of mankind. There are over twelve millions of this peasantry, the same in face, the same in spirit, the same in life since they built the pyramids for remote and heartless Pharaohs, in the misty morning of time.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is the real Egyptian people. It is always well to keep them in mind, when the noisy streets of Cairo are echoing with political

ambitions which take little thought of the real Egyptian, the peasant by the Nile.

Ninety-one per cent of the landowners have holdings of five acres or less, and this 91 per cent owns only 25 per cent of the land. Who owns the rest of it?

There is in the first place a small class of yeomen, called sheiks and omdehs, who are Egyptians by race and who are the official heads of the village communities. They are often rapacious and cruel, seeking to screw out of the peasantry what the pashas screw out of them.

The large landowners are only 7 per cent of the landowning class, but they hold among them 40 per cent of the land. The proportion therefore is 40 per cent of the land to the pashas, 28 per cent to the peasantry, and the remaining 32 per cent to intermediate owners, the great majority of whom have small holdings of from five to twenty acres.

The pashas and large landowners, who form the nobility of Egypt, are not Egyptian but Turco-Egyptian. They are the descendants of the Turkish conquerors, but their Turkish blood is now very largely blended with Egyptian. Before our advent this class was all-powerful, and they have always as a class detested us for coming between them and what they regard as their lawful prey, the Egyptian peasantry. On the other hand, they are not strongly wedded to Turkey, for they fear the pure Turk as a super-pasha, who would, if he returned to Egypt, unquestionably spoil the Turco-Egyptian as gladly as he would spoil the pure Egyptians. Lord Cromer describes the Turco-Egyptian's most prevailing characteristic as "a catholic capacity for impotent hatred."

He hastens, however, to do justice to the Turco-Egyptian's better qualities. He is the only being in Egypt, except European foreigners, with any capacity for government, and he has long been the only efficient element in the Egyptian governing machine. The Egyptian Ministries have always been, and still are, mainly Turco-Egyptian in their composition.

There remains a very large foreign element, which in its meaner category includes all the sweepings of the Levant and in its higher category the men who control practically all the trade and business of the country. The British have never been in any way predominant in Egyptian business. The French and German communities were both very powerful, as are the Greeks, some of whom have been domiciled in Egypt for three generations, but remain subjects of Greece and foreigners in the land of their adoption. This large, powerful, and variously blended community is the real kernel of the Egyptian question. They live in Egypt, they make great fortunes in Egypt, they exercise a potent influence over Egyptian development; but they pay only light taxation (until Lord Cromer's advent they paid none) in return for what they draw from the country, and they live under the laws of their own nations, maintained for their security in Egypt under the Capitulations. Fifteen nations still have these capitulatory rights in Egypt, so that Egyptian progress depends in large degree upon the good will of fifteen foreign governments. In Lord Cromer's time there were seventeen, but Germany and Austria-Hungary have since been eliminated.

One other class has become important in later years—the mass of students training mainly for

minor posts under government in the El-Azhar University at Cairo. I shall have something to say about these later in my story.

It is idle to study the course of affairs in Egypt without keeping this picture of her population always in mind. Twelve million peasants, as close to the soil and as unchanging as the Nile mud in which they live; and above them a million or so variously composed of Turco-Egyptian pashas, of foreigners in every variety from men of light and leading to the scum of the Levantine peoples, and of a relatively small class of educated Egyptian effendis. The million make the politics of Egypt, but the twelve million are its true native owners and the bed-rock of its prosperity.

This baffling human problem the British Empire in the form of Lord Cromer tackled hopefully after Tel-el-Kebir. Lord Cromer's position was remarkable. In theory he was only the equal of other foreign representatives in Cairo. He had no constitutional authority. All that he could do was to offer advice to the Khedive in the hope that the Khedive might be pleased to accept it.

The Khedive did so, no doubt assisted by the fact that the presence of British troops was the only security for his throne. The long history of gradual reform thus begins. British and other foreign advisers of proved capacity were introduced into different departments of government. Honesty was restored. The irrigation system was reëstablished and immensely developed. For the first time foreigners resident in Egypt were induced to pay some part of the taxation. Burdens on the peasantry were gradu-

ally reduced, while the revenue of the country steadily increased. Lord Cromer's era is one of increasing, and to Egypt hitherto unknown, prosperity.

Throughout this period the chief difficulties lay not with the Egyptians but with the foreign element. France in particular obstructed Lord Cromer's activities and made progress arduous. These diplomatic hostilities continued until 1904, when the Anglo-French agreement brought misunderstanding with France to an end. On that occasion the British Government once more declared that "they had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt." The French Government undertook for their part not to obstruct British action in that country.

I do not propose to detain you with an elaborate historical or statistical survey of Lord Cromer's long record in Egypt. He found Egypt in 1883 a country torn by internal dissension, terribly exploited by foreign adventurers of every kind, the prey of constant divisions between the European Powers, and on the verge of bankruptcy and starvation. The method of government most common throughout the land was well described by a traveler who declared that "everybody seemed to be bastinadoing everybody else." Lord Cromer left Egypt in 1907 prosperous and rich, with a contented peasantry, and with a new sense of security permeating all classes, including the foreign population. The story of this almost miraculous change is best read in his own history, entitled *Modern Egypt*. He pays no tribute to his own achievements; but as a truthful, racy, and comprehensive account of the period it has no equal.

He himself was, I believe, proud of having disposed of what he called "the three C's" in Egypt.

These were, first, the *corvée*, or, in other words, the system of forced labor without pay and under penalty of flogging, which was rife throughout the country; second, the *courbash* or thong with which the flogging was inflicted, and which was the main instrument of taxation in use by the Egyptian bureaucracy; and third, the corruption which destroyed all possible prospect of welfare in the country. He writes that when he first went to Egypt there was absolutely no system of accounts in the government, and no one could tell exactly what was the real expenditure or the real revenue. Receipts were often nominal and expenditure ignored. It was, for instance, the custom that pashas should order special trains and hand the railway a written I O U for the charges. The I O U was entered as a receipt in the railway revenue, and that was the end of the transaction. It must also be remembered that money was not the only medium in which corruption thrived in Egypt. More important to every human being in the land was water—water in the shape of those fertilizing runlets from the Nile, which meant life or death to millions of the peasantry. In Ismail's time most of the water in districts where pashas owned land went to those lands and little to the surrounding country. The taxation on crops was maintained nevertheless.

Another example that is worth studying as an example of Lord Cromer's work is the great project of the Assuan Dam, which was not carried out until after his retirement. I believe that that dam, which cost much less than one-tenth of all Ismail Pasha's borrowings, has made a return of something like 500 per cent to the Egyptian Government. It is one of the most striking examples in the world of the

extent to which Western organization and capacity can redeem and permanently establish the welfare of millions of helpless human beings.

The most remarkable of Lord Cromer's achievements was, however, the fact that he managed in some way or other to carry out these reforms in spite of the Capitulations. When you remember that almost every project of reform in Egypt affected foreigners and had, therefore, to be referred for the consent of seventeen distant governments; when you reflect that most of those governments knew nothing about the subject and listened only to the interested pressure of their own nationals; when you consider, moreover, the temptation always besetting foreign Powers to use obstruction in Egypt as a pawn in the general diplomacy of the world in places remote from Egypt, you will understand that Lord Cromer's achievement was no easy one. The possibility of bringing in some beneficial change in Egypt often depended upon whether or not two or three foreign governments were on good terms in Morocco or Persia or the New Hebrides. Egypt, indeed, was like a mirror reflecting the world movement of international affairs. Every change on the international chessboard affected it.

All this time Lord Cromer was in theory nothing but one of many foreign agents in Cairo. It is worth while comparing his position with that of your own representatives in Cuba when you were obliged to return there in September, 1906, after the breakdown of the government which you established in 1901. Mr. Taft was, I think, your chief representative, and carried out a task very similar to Lord Cromer's, with much the same position, or lack of

position. During the period of your provisional government, which lasted from September, 1906, to January, 1909, that is, for two years and a half, you respected all the forms of the Cuban constitution, and were in principle only offering advice to those who were responsible for government. In point of fact, you governed the country, and thus enabled it in two years to undertake once more with certain reforms the task of managing its own affairs. I think you withdrew your troops finally in April, 1909. Mr. Taft's success in Cuba resembles in some ways that of Lord Cromer in Egypt.

These two examples illustrate the extraordinary capacity which you and we both possess for scorning logic, ignoring theoretic difficulties, and somehow or other squaring the circle. Lord Cromer, however, worked under difficulties which did not exist in Cuba. There were no foreign Capitulations in Cuba. There were no foreign Powers really interested in it. There were certainly no international rivalries blocking your efforts at reform. But despite this difference, the resemblances are remarkable.

New difficulties in due course, however, arose to perplex Lord Cromer and his successors. Lord Cromer at the end of his great book quotes a letter from Sir Herbert Edwards to Lord Lawrence, written a few years after the annexation of the Punjab in India, as an example of the increasing difficulties of making his advice palatable. Sir Herbert Edwards wrote:

We are not *liked* anywhere . . . The people hailed us as deliverers from Sikh maladministration, and we were popular so long as we were plastering wounds. But the patient is well now, and he finds the doctor a bore.

Impatience with the doctor grew and grew in the time of Lord Cromer's successors, Sir Eldon Gorst and Lord Kitchener. The two were on the whole, however, remarkably successful in different ways. Gorst strove patiently to understand and meet the desires of the rising Egyptian intelligentsia. He might have done much in this direction but for his untimely death in 1911. Lord Kitchener, on the other hand, was the friend of the peasant. He talked their language, his fame amongst them was great, and he understood them as even Lord Cromer, who did not speak their language, had never done.

It became very evident, however, during Sir Eldon Gorst's and Lord Kitchener's régime that a real force of nationalism was growing up amongst the young men educated at the El-Azhar University at Cairo. This movement was greatly encouraged and stimulated by the Young Turk revolution, and much study was devoted during the period immediately preceding the war to the best form of constitutional development to satisfy and develop it. This serious undercurrent of discontent, which increased in volume every year, was due in part at least to our educational policy. We made the same mistake in Egypt as in India by training hundreds of young men to such a standard of efficiency as would enable them to undertake subordinate work in the state departments hitherto performed by foreigners. At the outset this was a sound policy. It ended by producing masses of superficially educated young men for whom there was no room in government service and no prospect of employment elsewhere. Meanwhile, education in a broader sense was undeveloped.

There was, moreover, an imponderable element of

danger in Mahomedan fanaticism. The religion of Islam was a subject of difficulty in many minor ways to those who sought to humanize life in Egypt. Lord Cromer records a striking instance when some malefactors were on trial for armed robbery on a village. The Grand Mufti, or chief law-doctor of Islam, claimed that they should be punished according to the laws of the Koran, which laid down six different forms of punishment. The criminal "might have his right hand and left foot cut off, and then be decapitated; or he might be mutilated, as before, and then crucified; or he might be mutilated, decapitated and eventually crucified; or he might be simply decapitated or simply crucified, or decapitated first and crucified afterwards." None of these penalties could, however, be inflicted if there were a dumb man amongst the accused.

This is typical of the obstacles raised by a seventh century code to the humanitarian standards of the twentieth century. Another difficulty was official recognition of hired perjurers. Lord Cromer states that, according to information given him, the British found on occupying Cyprus that perjurers took out licenses for the legitimate exercise of their profession.

Under all this mass of custom, strange to the Western mind, fanaticism was always smouldering, and its fires were fanned at the close of the war into a serious conflagration. For the time being it was present, but inactive. At the same time the Nationalist propaganda was growing stronger. Lord Cromer had always looked upon it with sympathy, and believed that the country could be steered into constitutional government without of necessity going

through any violent anti-British agitation. The hope was not realized, partly owing to the mass of discontented young men produced by the universities, partly also to the constant propaganda of foreign Powers in Egypt, but mainly to the war. Foreign activities in Egypt were protected by the Capitulations, and secret work of the most sinister description was therefore very difficult to prevent. When disorder occurred in Egypt after the war, it was generally the railways on which the rioters concentrated, and Lord Milner states in the report of his Commission, with which I shall deal in a few minutes, that "there is reason to believe that the attacks upon them were carried out in pursuance of a preëxisting plan for a Germano-Turkish attack upon the Canal, supported by a simultaneous uprising in Egypt." This is an illustration of the difficulties with which Lord Cromer and his successors were contending,—difficulties which were never present in Cuba. Before the war, however, the movement had not touched or stirred the peasantry, who regarded Lord Kitchener as a source of limitless power and also as a sure champion of their interests.

One story of Lord Kitchener's methods will illustrate the quaintness and wisdom of his diplomacy.

In 1912 a constitutional crisis of considerable perplexity arose owing to the declaration of war between Italy and the Turkish Empire over territory bordering on Egypt, the territory of Tripoli. By all the laws and customs of the universe, Egypt, as a province of the Turkish Empire, should have been engaged in war with Italy. It was not desirable, however, from her point of view or from ours, that she should participate, and at first there was no sign of

any desire to do so on the part of the Egyptian people. The comparative success of Turkish armies against Italian in due course, however, stimulated a new sentiment. The Bedouin tribes were suddenly kindled with martial enthusiasm and proclaimed their desire to send men to serve with the Turkish armies. As usual Lord Kitchener, as the father of the people, was asked to receive representatives to discuss the matter in detail. He applauded their zeal. He gave them all possible good advice upon organization and equipment, and at the end of the interview he added with a beaming face that the Egyptian Government would be delighted to learn that the Bedouins were now to become a soldierly people. This was quite enough. The Bedouins of Egypt are traditionally exempt from military service, and the full meaning of developing sudden military zeal had not yet struck them. Lord Kitchener's hint was sufficient, and the Bedouins sent no assistance to Turkey.

The time came at last when diplomacy and compromise proved inadequate to deal with the situation. Turkey declared war upon us in common with the Central Powers, and it became necessary to define the position of Egypt. The Egyptians were nominally subjects of the Sultan of Turkey. This situation had of necessity to be ended. Three courses were possible; first, that Egypt should commit an act of war against Turkey. This would have put an end to her allegiance, unless Turkey were able to reassert it, but would have in no way defined her relation to Great Britain. In the alternative, all this might have been summarily cleared away by the annexation of Egypt to the British Empire. The British Government, how-

ever, deliberately chose a course in keeping with their repeated declaration that Britain had no desire or intention of annexing Egypt. A proclamation was accordingly issued, placing Egypt under the protection of Great Britain, and declaring the sovereignty of Turkey over Egypt terminated.

This declaration was well received in Egypt, and the Government and people of Egypt threw themselves with real good will into the support of the Allies in the war.

When the protectorate was declared, the British Commander-in-Chief in Egypt issued a declaration that Great Britain would take upon herself "the sole burden of the present war, without calling on the Egyptian people for aid therein." Nevertheless the Egyptian Government supported the British authorities with the utmost good will, and Egypt contributed in many important ways to the success of the Allied arms in the Near East. The Egyptian army sent a few units to join the British forces in resisting the Turkish attack upon the Suez Canal, which also took part in some subsequent operations; but these operations were never very serious and the Egyptian units suffered no severe casualties. On the other hand, the Labor Corps raised in Egypt was of inestimable value to the Palestine campaign, and Egypt played a considerable part in supplying the army with food and transport at some sacrifice to her own people. It is worthy of record that the Egyptian Government also wrote off an account of three million sterling which was owing to it by Britain at the end of the war.

The forces of discontent, however, grew steadily during the war, and for the first time they began to

affect a part at least of the peasant masses. It is impossible to look back upon the management of Egypt during the war without regretting many things. Egypt became a huge cantonment containing troops in great numbers from New Zealand, Australia, and India. Most of the experienced British representatives in Egypt at the same time went into military service of one kind or another and left the Egyptian Government without its familiar advisers. Many things were done during that period which reacted seriously upon the feeling of the Egyptian people. The conduct of troops from oversea not familiar with Egyptian conditions was in itself very often deleterious to the reputation of the Empire. Engaged as we were in a life-and-death struggle, we concentrated on necessities and thought little of the future. The Egyptian Government seconded us in the same spirit and was not well served by its own sheiks and omdehs, the local representatives of the Egyptian Government, who carried out war measures amongst the peasantry. Those who are interested in the record of the war in Egypt should read the passages devoted to it with great candor in the report of the Milner Commission published in 1921.

There were certain factors, for instance, which did much to alienate the good will of the peasantry. The recruiting for the Egyptian Labor and Camel Transport Corps was at first taken up by all classes with enthusiasm, and the men engaged in it for good pay reënlisted again and again. In the later stages, however, local rulers anxious to show their zeal undoubtedly put pressure upon the peasantry and attributed their action to British orders. There is much conflict of opinion as to the extent of these abuses,

but they were frequent enough to cause widespread discontent.

There were also many misdemeanors perpetrated in the requisition of transport animals and of cereals. Prices paid for animals were, for instance, quite reasonable, but when the peasantry came to buy back their stock at the end of the war, they found that the price, owing to world causes, had risen, and they were proportionately indignant. The Egyptian Government, moreover, enacted that cereals should be sold for army supply at a fixed price, which was rather less than the fluctuating market value. Price regulation was carried out in all countries engaged in the war, but in Egypt its effects were serious, owing to the opportunity which it gave once more to the local Egyptian bureaucrat. He requisitioned more cereals than were really required at the government price and sold the surplus for his own benefit at the market value.

Finally, collections were made for the Red Cross fund organized locally and at their own request by the Egyptian authorities. We should have looked more carefully into the request and seen that the funds subscribed were really all voluntary and that they went to the source for which they were intended. It is to be feared that the collection failed in both these ways. At the end of the war the British Red Cross subscribed £100,000 for the relief of sufferers in the Egyptian Labor Corps and their families, but it was then too late to undo the harm which had been done.

As in all countries, the cost of living also rose steadily, and this entailed great hardships upon the peasantry. It was a thousand pities that at this mo-

ment when they were more than ever required, the familiar figures of the British inspectors riding through the fields and listening to grievances had almost entirely disappeared from the Egyptian countryside. As Lord Milner reports, their absence "made it easier for the peasants to believe reports which were spread of the imminent departure of the British, when the land would be divided among the fellahaen with an unrestricted water supply and no taxation." Everyone with experience of Eastern countries knows how rapidly such propaganda can spread amongst the ignorant masses. It was unfortunate, too, that a new Sultan succeeded at this period without the hold of his predecessor upon all classes of the Egyptian population. The Government was obliged to carry a great deal of rough-and-ready legislation in Egypt as in all parts of the world during the war, and martial law had to be enforced in order to make rapid legislation possible. It was used for many excellent purposes—to prevent, for instance, the increase of rent in the dwellings of the poorer people; but the use of it was misrepresented and it did great harm. There was, moreover, a very long delay in abolishing it, mainly because Egyptian ministers were unable to obtain the necessary amnesty, and it was only finally withdrawn in the present year.

So much for the internal conditions of Egypt during the war. The only thing to be said about many aspects of it is that they were due to the terrible pressure of war upon everyone. The thorough investigation which has since been carried out has tended in the main to modify if not entirely to dispose of many of the wild stories which were current

of maladministration or tyranny. But there is no question that the effect of war conditions in Egypt was very serious. They introduced a new feature, moreover, into Egyptian conditions, namely, that discontent for the first time affected the peasantry. There is much to be set against this aspect of the war period in Egypt. But for the Protectorate and the safety given her by British arms, Egypt would unquestionably have become an actual theater of war, and suffered proportionately. Had Turkey been able to reassert her sovereignty, the Egyptian people would have been forced by conscription into the Ottoman armies. Had Turkey and her Allies, the Central European Empires, won the war, Egypt would have had small prospect indeed of the independence to which she considered herself entitled. But these considerations are contingent and speculative. They carry little weight against the domestic grievances which were actually felt by the Egyptian population during and after the war.

The intellectual classes in Egypt were, moreover, profoundly stirred by the slogans which the Allies uttered like trumpet calls during the war. "Self-determination" is a vague and dangerous phrase. I propose to discuss it in another lecture. In Egypt its explosive effect may readily be understood, inasmuch as it kindled many other parts of the world to violent and often revolutionary agitation. Egypt was, moreover, profoundly stirred by the Anglo-French declaration of November, 1918, that both Governments intended to create and to support self-governing Arab kingdoms. The redemption by the British of their pledge in Arabia intensified this factor. "Why," Egyptians said, "should there be a king

of the Hedjaz, a king of Irak, a king of Trans-Jordania, all exercising constitutional powers under self-governing conditions, and no such system established in the more ancient civilization of Egypt?" This led to an intensive propaganda which did not touch the peasantry but had a profound effect in the cities and in the neighborhood of the railways.

Undue if natural haste was moreover shown by the British authorities immediately after the war in attempting to reform and improve the system of administration. Many good men became available as the armies demobilized, and it was not unreasonable that some of them should be drawn at once into the task of putting Egyptian affairs upon a better footing. But the number so engaged was far too large, and it is not possible to justify the increase of British officials from three or four hundred in the earlier years of the Occupation to upwards of sixteen hundred in 1921. This error has since been rapidly corrected, but it did very great harm at the moment.

The result of these various causes was a violent agitation for a final settlement of the Egyptian question immediately after the armistice. It was in practice impossible for the British Government to go into the question at the moment with sufficient care, since both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were bound immediately for Paris, where their time was absorbed by the Peace Conference. But their refusal to receive an Egyptian delegation which asked to be allowed to come and discuss Egyptian conditions, until later in the year, caused strong feeling, and this was aggravated by the decision of the Egyptian Government to send Zaghlul Pasha, leader

of the Egyptian Nationalists, out of the country in March, 1919. Riots and bloodshed followed in Tanta, Alexandria, and other parts of the Delta, and the foreign population suffered seriously. These disturbances lasted only a short time and were undoubtedly due principally to an anti-British organization which had meant to coöperate with the Turkish offensive in the war. But the effect of them was still further to inflame opinion. In every Eastern country, moreover, as indeed in every country in the world, the feeling of the population is profoundly affected by economic conditions. These became increasingly severe upon the poorer classes in town and country in the period immediately following the war, and much of the agitation which characterized that period should be laid at their door.

As soon as its hands were freed of the Peace Conference, the British Government sent Lord Milner with a strong Commission to Egypt to report upon the situation and the measures to be taken. They arrived in December, 1919, and worked in Egypt till April, 1920. Afterwards they held long conferences with Zaghlul Pasha and other Egyptian representatives in London and reported finally in December.

Every student of Egyptian affairs should study the Milner Report. It is a clear, impartial, and penetrating document, thoroughly characteristic of the great administrator whose name it bears and who had given an important part of his early official life to work for the Egyptian people. I will not wait to summarize it here, but will content myself with explaining the chief difficulty which it indicated.

The main obstacle to the immediate development of national self-government in Egypt was not the

British Protectorate, but the Foreign Capitulations. These Capitulations are still held by fifteen powers (those of Germany and Austria-Hungary have been terminated in the Peace Treaty). The restrictions imposed by them upon the sovereign rights of Egypt were not by any means unnecessary in all respects. They protected the liberty and property of foreigners and secured them against arbitrary action on the part of local authorities. On the other hand, they exempted foreigners from all taxation except the land tax and the house tax, which had been successfully imposed upon them by the efforts of Lord Cromer. Here were two great bars to national self-government. In the first place, agitators, miscreants, and enemies of the state were at any time able to escape the national government by claiming foreign nationality and the protection of a foreign Power. This was habitually done. On the other hand, the exemption of foreigners from taxation crippled the government in raising revenue, since it was obviously inequitable to impose taxation upon the Egyptian people which was not also imposed upon foreign residents. Negotiations had been in progress for some years with a view to substituting some less objectionable system for the Capitulations. But it had become quite evident that no foreign Power would abrogate its rights unless Great Britain were prepared to undertake full responsibility for foreign security, foreign property, and foreign interests in Egypt.

Lord Milner therefore proposed to carry out the grant of self-government in a treaty which would preserve sufficient rights to Great Britain to enable her to secure the abrogation of the Capitulations by

foreign Powers, and in the main the proposals which were made were accepted by the Egyptian Government and also by Zaghul Pasha, who represented the Nationalist movement.

At this point, however, a new difficulty arose. It was important to discover before proceeding with the treaty in England whether it would in reality prove acceptable to the Egyptian people, and it was difficult to decide in what way the true will of the Egyptian people was to be ascertained. The Nationalists refused to recognize the Turco-Egyptian ministers who formed the Government as adequate representatives of Egyptian opinion. The Nationalists, themselves, on the other hand, were not very ready to give pledges of support to any proposals which they themselves had not fathered and approved. In the end Lord Milner decided to hand a memorandum briefly recapitulating the proposed features of the treaty to Zaghul Pasha, the Nationalist leader, and to invite him to secure some pronouncement of Egyptian opinion upon these proposals before they were submitted to the British Government. The arguments for taking this step were strong, but the consequences were unfortunate.

The proposals in the first place immediately became crystallized in public opinion as "the Milner-Zaghul agreement," and were published in the Egyptian press in that form. This created a serious constitutional difficulty in England, since the proposals had not been submitted to the Government, and carried no official authority beyond the fact that they were recommended by the Milner Commission. There was strong objection in England to their publication before they had been sanctioned by the Gov-

ernment, and much obstruction was caused in consequence. On the other hand, Zaghlul Pasha returned from Egypt in true oriental fashion with fresh conditions, and it became evident to the Commission that if they started discussion anew there would be no end to the process of oriental palaver. The fact was that no Egyptian dared to commit himself to an agreement of any sort. Zaghlul and his associates were unhappily tied by the violent things which they had said in their popular campaigns, and feared the consequences of making conditions of any kind with Britain. In the summer of 1921, therefore, it became apparent that on the Egyptian side no conditions would in practice be accepted.

The difficulty of the Egyptian Nationalist leaders was real and intelligible. As politicians they were bound by their past, and there was much to be said for the contention that Egypt might concede many conditions in a treaty negotiated after she became an independent Power which she could not with due self-respect concede before her independence was granted. On the other hand, it was really impossible for the British Government to abandon entirely its rights in Egypt and to leave the future to the chances and changes of Egyptian politics, complicated as they naturally would have been by foreign propaganda in many different forms. To have accepted such a solution would have put England back at the dead-point which she had surmounted single-handed forty years before by her occupation of Egypt. It was not possible for any British Government to adopt such a course. No ministry which adopted it could have survived in the House of Commons.

The situation once again curiously resembles your

own experience in Cuba. Cuba was ceded to you in January, 1899, by the Spanish Government, and you governed under military rule for a period of three and a half years—till May, 1902. During the period of military government the Cuban authorities adopted, early in 1901, a constitution based upon the same principles as your own and submitted it to the American Congress. Had you adopted the course demanded of us by the Egyptian Nationalists, you would have taken this constitution as presented to you and ratified it without amendment. In point of fact, however, you insisted on the modification of the constitution by the introduction of the Platt amendment, and it was not until the Platt amendment had been accepted by Cuba that your military rule was terminated. The main provisions of the Platt amendment, which was afterwards, I think, embodied in treaty form, were as follows:

1. That Cuba should enter into no compact with a foreign Power which might tend to impair the independence of the island;

2. That she should incur no debts beyond the service of her resources;

3. That she should undertake to continue and develop the system of sanitation which you had introduced;

4. That she should lease to you such territory as you required for naval stations;

5. That she should allow the United States to exercise "the right to intervene for the protection of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property and individual liberty, and for discharging the obli-

gations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris upon the United States.”

In principle, after a long period of negotiation, we adopted the same course as you, with some slight variations. When further discussion, continued for over a year, had proved the impossibility of securing a treaty on terms very similar to the Platt amendment, we decided to proceed by unilateral action. In February of last year a proclamation was issued in Egypt, announcing that the British Protectorate over Egypt was terminated, and Egypt was declared to be an independent sovereign state. But the proclamation also declared that the following matters were

absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it might be possible, by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides, to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt:

(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;

(b) The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;

(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt, and the protection of minorities;

(d) The Sudan.

At the same time a letter addressed by the British Government to the Sultan of Egypt explained that no obstacle would be placed to the reëstablishment forthwith of an Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs which might prepare the way for the creation of the diplomatic and consular representation of Egypt in foreign countries, and also to the crea-

tion of a Parliament, with a constitutionally responsible government.

The British Government took care to assert its special rights in regard to Egypt by declaration not only to Egypt itself but to foreign governments. A dispatch was forwarded to all the Powers on March 15, 1922, announcing the termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt and ending with the following declaration:

The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognized by other Governments. These special relations are defined in the declaration recognizing Egypt as an independent sovereign State. His Majesty's Government has laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other Power. In pursuance of this principle, they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another Power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.

The proclamation was well received in Egypt, though some criticism was inevitably directed against it. In the year and a half which has passed the Egyptians have elaborated their own constitution and are now about to hold their first elections.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is a brief and, I think, uncolored summary of recent history in Egypt. I would ask you before I conclude to compare for a moment the treaty conditions upon which we have insisted in Egypt with the conditions which you im-

posed upon Cuba. They are roughly the same in principle. We have declared Egypt to be a free and independent state, with this sole reservation, that we do not admit the right of any other Power to intervene in her affairs or to threaten her safety. You have done the same in Cuba. You control the foreign relations of Cuba. We do not claim exactly such control over those of Egypt; but it is evident that we cannot permit the Egyptians in practice to carry out a foreign policy contrary to the treaty conditions which we have laid down. We also declare that if any foreign interests have to be protected in Egypt, we shall be the Power to protect them. So do you in Cuba. I do not think that there was any conscious imitation of the Platt amendment on the part of the Ministers who elaborated the British conditions for Egypt, and the similarity is therefore all the more remarkable.

The task of Egypt is, however, beset with greater difficulties than was the task of Cuba. Cuba had no foreign Capitulations. Cuba was never a serious theater of international rivalry. Cuba is not an important thoroughfare in the world's communications. National self-government in Egypt cannot possibly succeed until we are enabled to secure the abrogation of the Capitulations on terms which will substitute our guarantee for the present rights of immunity and internal jurisdiction exercised by foreign Powers. It is quite true that Turkey has succeeded in emancipating herself from these Capitulations, but the conditions of Turkey in the last two years bear no resemblance to those of Egypt. One Turkey is quite enough at a time for a suffering world, and Egypt neither wishes nor has the power to emulate the Turkish ex-

ample. All those best acquainted with the facts upon the spot are convinced that the conditions secured for herself by Turkey cannot possibly endure. We desire that the future of Egypt should be laid on firmer and more reasonable foundations. The difficulties are great, but I am confident that we shall succeed.

There is one other marked difference between your relation to Cuba and our relation to Egypt. You have, it is true, insisted upon the cession of such naval facilities as you require upon the Cuban coast, but this bears no real resemblance to the much broader requirements of the security of our communications in Egypt. It is quite impossible to guarantee the safety of the Suez Canal if Egypt is in hostile hands. The defense of the Suez Canal, as the war proved, can only be conducted from Egypt and in Egypt. That makes our military relation to Egypt of very grave importance, and precludes us altogether from ever withdrawing our forces. Long discussion with Egyptian Nationalists has revealed only one difficulty in this respect; they do not object to the presence of British troops on Egyptian soil, provided that these troops are definitely there for the guarding of British communications, and not as a garrison over Egypt. This point in practice whittles down to the location in which the troops are to be cantooned. I do not know how this will ultimately be solved. Troops cannot be cantooned upon the canal itself—partly because the Canal Zone is neutral territory, and partly because the supply of fresh water and all other necessities is absolutely dependent upon Egypt. The fresh water for the canal comes from the Nile. Nothing, moreover, could prevent hostile

forces operating with Egypt as a base from making the canal impassable by air activity and other methods. The troops, therefore, which guard the canal must be located in Egypt. Where shall they be located with most regard for the susceptibilities of the Egyptian people? That is a point still to be determined, but it cannot be insurmountable.

I have said nothing in this lecture about the Sudan. It is too large a theme. Lest, however, I should seem to be passing over a vital subject, let me make two observations upon it.

The Sudan is no part of Egypt, either by history or by race. It is not connected with Egypt by rail, and its trade goes entirely to the Red Sea by Port Sudan without touching Egyptian territory. It was, however, reconquered with the assistance of Egyptian forces; Egypt has assisted in its development in other ways; and Egypt is vitally interested in the supply of water from the Nile.

The present government of the Sudan is a condominium of England and Egypt, though in practice England entirely controls the administration. The cession of the Sudan to Egypt desired by a group of Egyptian extremists is absolutely impossible. It is violently opposed by the natives of the Sudan and would merely lead to bitter hostilities in which, if history goes for anything, Egypt without our assistance would certainly be worsted. We cannot, therefore, admit the Egyptian claim to single sovereignty over the Sudan, but we are bound to secure her interests in the Nile waters, and we are carrying out measures at the present time to increase that supply. Obviously, this is a matter that can be regulated by treaty without serious impediment.

Is the world worse or better for the work of two generations of Englishmen in Egypt? Other nations must answer that question for themselves. For ourselves, we believe that the world is better for it, partial as our success has been and manifold our mistakes in attaining it.

All nations at least have profited, like Egypt herself, by Egypt's new-found prosperity. Her products, necessary to mankind, have vastly increased. Her consumption of other nations' products has risen proportionately. There has been no favoritism in this. The door has been open to all comers on the same terms as to Britons.

At the same time a breath of new life has touched the Egyptian peasant across the brown waters of the Nile. In the valley of the Nile all change comes from without. Walk through the Cairo museum amid the monuments and records of ancient Egypt. Scarcely a line changes for forty centuries. Craftsman after craftsman repeats his father's work and rests with his fathers. There is nothing so unchanging in all human history. Then pass into the rooms where Greek influence first dawns upon the Nile. It is a sudden *réveille*, after centuries of death—new line, new life, new thought, new energy.

The culture of his masters changed, but for sixty centuries the Egyptian peasant remained no more than Egyptian clay, formed and used and broken at his changing master's fancy. But now a light has broken upon that long unheeded being. He knows his rights at last, and he is tenacious of them. Through sixty centuries the Egyptian peasant has had no friend like the kindly, quickening touch of British Imperialism.

LECTURE IV

THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

As you all are aware, a very grave series of communications between the British, French, Italian, and Belgian Governments on the subject of Allied policy towards Germany has been published this week. That correspondence speaks for itself, and I do not propose to-night merely to recapitulate what the correspondence contains. It will be more useful, I think, to give you a broad survey of the causes which have brought the Allies to so serious a deadlock in their dealings with the nation against whom they were single-minded and whole-hearted comrades-in-arms only five years ago.

It was in August, 1914, that the Great War broke out and spread like a prairie fire till all the world was struggling in its flames. It was in August, 1918, that the Allies launched their united and victorious advance into Germany. It is now in August again, only five years later, that a profound moral division is suddenly revealed between them. What are the causes? Who is to blame?

I can only give you this survey from the British point of view. It is evident that some other nations do not accept or even understand that view. Suspicion grows, misunderstanding accumulates. The result no man at this hour can tell. But this at least is certain. The British peoples will not change their view; for, as I will endeavor to show you, it is based on fundamental instincts and beliefs. We can only

follow the right, in Lincoln's words, as God gives us to see the right. Neither we, nor any nation, can do more.

I use grave language because the hour is grave. There are those who see only economic differences in the present deadlock in Europe. They say that the trouble is easily explained. France wants cash; England wants trade. The two aims are incompatible. Therefore France and England disagree.

This, ladies and gentlemen, is a shallow and misleading analysis. The situation in Europe has indeed been seriously complicated by economic differences; but it would not have become so baffling or so intractable through economic differences alone, important and powerful as these may be. Nations, like individuals, must live; and those who cherish ambitions of social advance towards a better and higher life for all their citizens need not only to live, but to live well. In this way the economic struggle is always intensified by moral and political ideas. But the great issues which from time to time divide the nations like a gulf are not purely economic, nor even merely economic-and-moral in the hyphenated sense which the lesser forms of international difference usually bear. They are moral in a deeper sense. They touch the innermost soul of our national civilizations; and when their touch is once felt, we know, however inarticulately, that we are standing for some fundamental, some inalienable element in our national code.

That, ladies and gentlemen, was the sudden process of mind and feeling which threw the five British democracies with a simultaneous impulse into the Great War. I am not going to discuss the origins of

the war, for I have no personal knowledge of them which can throw any new light upon the facts or influence the interpretation to be placed upon them. The British estimate of the facts has been succinctly and luminously summarized by Mr. Asquith in the articles which are now appearing in the *Saturday Evening Post*. No merely human tribunal can sift or weigh the facts, in this generation at least, with adequate authority or impartiality to convince those who from the outset have taken different views. But Mr. Asquith gives the British view—the view on which our statesmen acted then and have acted ever since. To our mind the question is settled, and this generation of Englishmen will continue to act in that belief.

But the action of our democracies in August, 1914, was not reasoned. It was instinctive. We flung ourselves into the war with a swift and passionate resolve, because we believed that the blow struck by Germany against France through Belgium was a felon blow, the suddenness and force of which were rendered possible only by a long-planned and cynical breach of treaty faith. Undoubtedly our interests were involved. To have kept out of the war would have increased greatly our immediate wealth; but in the long run it would have gravely endangered our insular and maritime security. There was no time, however, for our democracies to hold the scales delicately between immediate and ultimate risk. It was no calculation of interest which kindled us in a night, however deeply our interests were engaged. We felt that Germany had challenged something fundamental in our code of right and wrong, and we sprang to arms without calculation, instinctively.

Our judgment on that point has not changed, and on that moral judgment we based our ideas of right and wrong in the lines of the peace which, after four years' ordeal by battle, we and our Allies were at last able to impose. In our settled opinion, Germany is chiefly responsible for the terrible history of the last nine years; and we have not relaxed, nor will we relax, the undertaking which we signed at Versailles and sealed in all our Parliaments to make Germany pay to the utmost of her capacity for the devastation which she wrought upon her enemies.

We see that question in one light only—"Who is to suffer most after the war, the devastator or the devastated?" Our answer to that question has never wavered.

These are facts. I do not state them in order to keep alive any bitterness. Germany appealed to the sword. She was judged by the sword. Our peace with her was based upon our conviction that she was wrong, and that since she was also defeated she should in justice take the consequences and repair to her utmost capacity the evil which she had done. But we had, and have, no desire to hold down or destroy the German people. They have changed their masters since the war; and provided that they carry out their contract in the peace, we desire that they and all the world should return as rapidly as possible upon the old and peaceful ways which are now so broken and clogged.

The British Empire, then, is absolutely at one with France and with the other European Allies in demanding reparation from Germany. Those who say that we have lost interest in reparation are misstating the facts. Those who say that our claim to repa-

ration is unjust will make no impression upon our minds.

This argument may seem crude to you. Financial and political theorists are entitled to analyze these views and claims, and to form what opinion upon them they may. But the world at present is governed by the plain man and woman. You are governed by the plain man and woman, and chiefly (I am given to understand) by the plain man and woman in the Middle West. We are governed by the plain man and woman, too. It is better, therefore, if you want to analyze and understand what the nations feel, why they feel it, and how they are likely to act, to find out how the plain man or woman thinks and feels.

So much for reparation. But reparation is not the only or even the main feature in the peace settlement, though it has come to wield so predominate and baleful an influence over it.

The Treaty of Versailles, with its sister-treaties, is nothing less than the constitution of postwar Europe. Under this great charter old nations have recovered their freedom; new nations have sprung to life. The new lines upon the map of Europe are all based upon the principles of this great settlement—principles declared by the Allies to be the beacon of their eyes throughout the war. No one, so far as I know, has questioned the broad justice of this framework of peace.

No statesmen, however, are infallible. Sound as the general framework is, it has, like every human structure, many points of minor weakness, many points where the uprights may fail in part to bear the strain. The League of Nations was added to the Treaty in the trust and hope that through its mecha-

nism these strains and weaknesses might be adjusted, as time went by and revealed them one by one, without endangering the whole structure or kindling a new war. A better and higher form of sanction has never been attached to a peace settlement. The Covenant may have its faults; it may (and I think it does) assume too lightly that the sovereignty of nations over their own affairs and interests can be modified by international control and yet in essentials preserved. But every nation was free to make such reservations to the Covenant as it pleased. The value of the League would not have been seriously impaired thereby.

The peace settlement also provided a means by which the reparation payments should be assessed, not by the claims of the victors, however just, but by the capacity of the conquered to pay. Armchair critics may assert the contrary, but few of those who know the conditions in which the statesmen at Paris worked believe that any sum could have been fixed at that moment within the power of the German people to discharge. For one thing, the financial condition of Germany was still largely a matter of speculation. Experts held astonishingly divergent views. For another thing, the pressure of democratic feeling in every European country with claims against Germany was potent and even fierce. The Treaty of Versailles therefore recited the scope and ground of the various Allied demands, and left a judicial commission to investigate German conditions and decide thereby what total proportion of these demands the German people could reasonably be required to meet.

Finally, the Treaty made careful provision for those Powers (and especially France) whose future

security was a legitimate source of anxiety, not only to themselves, but to their Allies. Germany and the other enemy countries were almost completely disarmed. The left bank of the Rhine, and a zone of fifty kilometers on the right bank, were demilitarized. The left bank was occupied by the military forces of the Allies to ensure that these conditions and the other provisions of the Treaty were duly carried out. In order, moreover, that the security of France might be assured beyond the period of occupation for all time, a Treaty of Guarantee was signed by the British Empire and the United States.

That, ladies and gentlemen, was in outline the framework of the peace. In the British Empire it was regarded by an overwhelming majority as a just peace. Criticism of it has made some headway here and there; but so far as I am able to judge it has never seriously impaired the weight of democratic sanction behind the Treaty either in Britain itself or in the Dominions. The British Empire stands, and means to stand, by the Treaty of Versailles.

Why, then, has the sequel produced so much misunderstanding, so much controversy, so much bitterness amongst the old Allies, that we have reached our present pass? Every nation has its own view of the causes. I will endeavor to give you the prevailing British view, shorn of the political and personal animus which is found in much of the written and spoken British criticism of British diplomacy since the armistice. I speak, at any rate, with intimate knowledge of the circumstances since May, 1921.

I am not in any way criticising the decision of the American people when I say that the first and most

important change which came over Europe after the signature of the Treaty was the decision of the United States not to ratify it. Your Senate was of course responsible to your own public opinion, and we have no more ground for complaint against their interpretation of American views and interests than you would have against us had any of our Parliaments refused to ratify the Treaty. The fact remains, however, that the absence of the United States as a working partner in the settlement has profoundly affected European history. You had intervened in the war with decisive effect. The ideas to which expression had been given in the Peace Treaty were throughout Europe regarded largely as those of the American people speaking through the voice of the American President. The Italians had a verb, *Wilsoneggiare*, which indicates the influence of your ideas upon the European mind. The Germans, I think, talked at times of *Wilsonismus* as a new form of political thought. Mr. Keynes has given the impression to hundreds and thousands of readers that American inspiration was entirely balked and thwarted in the peace settlement. There is no truth, to my mind, in that view. Feature after feature in the peace settlement which I have described was directly attributable to the powerful advocacy of the American President.

You must understand, therefore, that the decision of the American people to fall out of the ranks and to refuse their signature to the settlement profoundly weakened the moral forces and the moral sanction behind the Treaty. It also affected the mechanism of the Treaty in very important ways. It was, for instance, of the gravest moment that the Reparation

Commission had to do its most critical work without American participation. The lapse of the Treaty of Guarantee to France also exercised a profound influence upon the European situation. I shall deal with these two aspects of the matter later on. It is sufficient here to insist that the peace settlement lost a great deal of its authority and security in the minds of many European peoples when it was known that it would not be passed by the Senate of the United States.

The American people sometimes seem to me to resemble a body of men conferring in a house at night upon matters of vital import to crowds outside the house, waiting and wondering in the dark. The house is lighted, the blinds are undrawn. The members of the conference within are speaking to each other, thinking only of each other's arguments and attitudes, oblivious of the watching eyes without. But the questioning eyes are there, and every gesture made by the party within the house carries a grave significance to the forgotten watchers in the surrounding night.

There is no part of Europe upon which the American withdrawal exercised a greater influence than Germany. Germany had originally declared her readiness to conclude an armistice upon the terms laid down by the American President. The terms of the peace had hit the German people very hard. There were those among them who were rebellious and eager to resist. There were those among them who bitterly resented the imputation of guilt upon which the main fabric of the Treaty was built. There were those among them again—and I think these were the greater number—who felt a sudden loss of

courage and hope. They had but lately driven out their autocratic and military rulers and substituted for that powerful system a democratic form of government. They had not the training, they had not the experience, they had not at the moment the will to give such government real power and life. Like the people of Germany, the Government drifted into a hopeless, aimless, rudderless state of mind. A strong government in Germany could undoubtedly have gone far to meet the demands of the Allies. In my opinion, the German Governments since the conference of May, 1921, when the terms were fixed upon which M. Poincaré now takes his stand, have all been conscientiously anxious to carry out what is called "a policy of fulfilment" towards the Allies. But they have never had the strength; and their repeated failures, their repeated complaints, their unchanging characteristic of seeming always on the verge of collapse, so far from exciting compassion in the observer has, on the contrary, generally kindled his wrath. I believe that German Ministers have had a Platonic desire to carry out Germany's obligations, but they have not shown the driving power or the will to get the people behind them and defeat that section of the German people which has been steadily opposing a final settlement.

The section to which I refer is a strong combination of the financiers and industrialists. To us in England it has seemed at times that since the armistice the German people have been as completely sheep in the hands of the Industrialists as they were sheep in the hands of the Militarists before and during the war. We have not doubted in England that they have been sinking month by month into a graver state of

misery and collapse. But we have regarded their decline as the result mainly of their own lack of democratic decision and strength. Every country in the course of history secures the government which it deserves. If the German people had had the character to pull themselves together in the desperate national emergency into which they were flung by the collapse of their armies at the end of the war, they would not now be in the straits which have brought the specter of revolution so menacingly close. In the face of a national peril they have remained broken up into numbers of groups. Government after government has tried to pull sufficient elements in these groups together to do the business of the country as it ought to be done. No government has yet succeeded. From all that I have heard of Germany I believe that revolution is very imminent. The new Chancellor, Herr Stresemann, may prove to be the savior of his country. But the qualities which the hour demands are not dexterity, diplomacy, or finesse; they are leadership, clearness of purpose, and firmness of will. No one will welcome the appearance of a republican government in Germany with the strength to pull the people together once more so much as Germany's late enemies, the English people.

To anyone who has watched the constant failures, the constant evasions, the constant appeals for a new chance which have come from German Governments during the past three years, the indignation of France appears natural and right. The French people are indeed prosperous, and they have thrown themselves with splendid energy into the restoration of that long strip of France which the German armies destroyed. They have had the money to do this, and

they have spent it without stint. All the money devoted to this purpose has been lent to the French Government by French investors. And still the prosperity of the country rises higher every month. The Government, however, has unquestionably been moving into greater financial difficulties with every new loan which reconstruction necessitates. This expenditure has never been shown in the normal budgets of the French State. It is recorded in a separate budget, and the assumption of every Minister of Finance since the armistice has been that it would be recovered from Germany. French Ministers have therefore had strong reason to press their reparation claim to the greatest possible length. If any criticism is to be made of them in this context, it is that they have never perhaps quite realized, and have certainly never assisted to make the French people understand, the practical difficulty of transferring great lump sums of gold or gold values from one country to another in the present state of the world.

The financial burden placed upon France by reparations has tended, therefore, increasingly to drive French Governments into what seems to us a policy of extremes. They have also undoubtedly been gravely influenced by a growing sense of insecurity. The failure of our joint Treaty of Guarantee came like a sudden revelation of new danger to France. As I shall endeavor to show later in this address, the British Empire attempted to remove that feeling of insecurity by the offer of fresh guarantees. But a single guarantee in any case is not equal to the double guarantee, and there is always the natural feeling in France that since one treaty of guarantee has been repudiated in the United States, another treaty of

guarantee may suffer a similar fate in the British Parliament. I shall discuss in due course the policy into which France has been driven by the accumulating burden of reconstruction and the growing sense of insecurity. In this context my only object is to describe her state of feeling and to register my view that her feeling is very natural. British opinion has not gone the length of French opinion in wrath and indignation against Germany. But it has in point of fact been aroused again and again by German evasion and inefficiency. There has been, moreover, and there still is, a deeply rooted sense of comradeship with France. We do not change our friends in a day. France was our ally; France had just claims. France should have her claims met if we could assist her in securing them. I have never addressed a British public meeting in which an allusion to our old comradeship with France was not warmly cheered.

On the other hand, two factors have combined to push British opinion in a different direction from that of France. In the first place, the British people as a whole are more accustomed to study international business than the French. They have been quicker to realize the practical difficulties of securing payment from a country with the dwindling export trade and the wildly fluctuating exchange of Germany. In the second place, we put a different construction upon the actual facts of the situation in Germany. It is very important to bring out the nature of this difference of view.

The French argued with increasing insistence that there was no real lack of necessities in Germany, that the wealth of Germany was very great, that money was being spent on reconstruction and improvements

which was really due to the Allies, and that great sums of capital had been concealed abroad. They declared therefore that Germany was immediately able to pay, and that her repeated failures to do so proved one thing only: that strong, and even violent, pressure alone would compel her people to disgorge. At every turn, therefore, France demanded not only the fixation of large sums but the threat of sanctions if these sums were not paid.

There was much in the course of events in Germany, as I have already pointed out, to justify the French point of view. The wealth of Germany as judged by her capital, in a large and thoroughly modern industrial plant, in state forests and state mines, in the other resources of her soil, and in the industry of her population, was obviously very great. No one was able to fix the amount of capital which her financiers and industrialists had exported abroad, but it was generally agreed that the sum was considerable. It was also incontestable that money was being spent by German men of business and also by the German Government on reconstructive work of many kinds. Nevertheless, Germany, after agreeing to a schedule of payments, failed again and again to carry out her promises.

We were as indignant as the French at these failures, but we attributed them rather to inefficiency than to dishonesty, and we saw no hope of setting them right by the French method of cure. Payment could not be made by Germany in terms of the capital wealth upon German soil. It had to be made in some form which could be converted into foreign currency. How could this be done unless Germany's own currency was stabilized? How could her currency be

stabilized without financial reform? How could financial reform be carried out except by a strong German Government? The evidence which reached us of the condition of the German people was overwhelming. It was clear that, in the course which they were following, they were being plunged deeper and deeper every month in peril and misery. We therefore became more thoroughly convinced that they must have time and assistance in reëstablishing the whole political and economic structure of the state, if reparation in any serious degree were ever to be forthcoming from them.

In other words, France believed in knocking Germany about. Britain believed in setting Germany on her feet again. Both Powers wanted reparation, but they disagreed as to the best means of obtaining it.

Behind this difference of view there lay, however, a wider divergence which has become more strongly marked in recent months. The vital features in the peace settlement, so far as France was concerned, were the provisions for reparation to France and French security. The vital features to the British Empire, on the other hand, were the general settlement on a peaceable basis of Europe and the world. In this divergent standpoint, there has gradually come into prominence a very old difference between what I may call the insular and the continental point of view. The continental view is derived from the constant pressure of other Powers across land frontiers, and the age-long tradition of conflict which history has brought down. Fundamentally, there is only a minority in continental Europe which believes that there is any security for peoples except in sufficient, if not predominating, military power. It is a

natural, if somewhat cynical, view, and it has strong warrant in the previous history of the continent. This view has become more and more accentuated in the recent policy of France. While the conquered Powers have been entirely disarmed, only one of the victorious Powers, except Britain, has in any considerable degree reduced its armaments. That Power is Italy. The other victorious Powers and the new nations created by the peace settlement have built up military force in overpowering measure as the basis of their security. Europe, therefore, has been turning more and more into a camp consisting of three different types of state—the powerfully armed, victorious Allies; the little armed and largely unconsidered neutrals; and the totally disarmed enemy states.

To the English mind this aspect of Europe has been incessantly and increasingly disquieting. We are a part of Europe, and we therefore understand far better than you do the traditional difficulties and divisions by which Europe is seamed from state to state. But we are only in Europe to a limited extent. Our insular position has always given us a separate point of view and a separate measure of security. We have therefore not had the same need of military power in Europe, except in great emergency, and we have practically disposed of all our military and air forces since the armistice. Our army now is much smaller even than it was in July, 1914. The division of Europe into camps, some armed and some unarmed, was not to our mind a very reassuring basis of future peace. We did not believe, and do not believe, that the peace settlement can ultimately be maintained solely by superior force. It was originally imposed by force, but the force was used to establish

certain progressive ideas, and a settlement in the long run must stand upon general acceptance of those ideas or fall for lack of moral stamina. We therefore believed on broad lines that there would be no peace in Europe unless it were possible to obtain in all countries a democratic acceptance of the general framework of peace, a great reduction of armaments, and a universal return to the ways of normal production and exchange.

Thus far, ladies and gentlemen, I have sketched in outline the main facts of Western European history since the armistice, as those facts present themselves to the British mind. Let me now trace briefly the development of the two main problems, German reparation first and then French security. I will not deal in figures; they mean little unless they are fully analyzed; and figures are not necessary in order to present the real grounds of difference which have made themselves felt on the reparation question between Britain and France.

I have already explained on what grounds the statesmen in Paris decided that a Reparation Commission should be established to adjudicate and report as soon as possible on the amounts which Germany could raise. It was intended that this Commission should act in a judicial capacity, and it was expressly instructed to acquaint itself with German conditions, and to consult German authorities. So far from believing that the decision to create the Reparation Commission was an unwise one, I am convinced that it was the only possible course.

Why then has the Reparation Commission worked with so little success? Let me remind you of its origi-

nal constitution. On all the main questions of German payment, it was to consist of the representatives of four European Powers—Britain, France, Belgium, Italy—and one non-European Power—the United States. The whole character of the machinery created depended upon this balance in its membership. There were four European Powers all pressing individual claims. There was a fifth non-European Power pressing no claim of its own, untouched by European prejudices and traditions, and capable therefore, as the creators of the Commission believed, of acting as an arbiter should the European Powers disagree. The balance of this machinery was entirely destroyed when the United States decided not to ratify the Treaty of Peace. I am not criticising the American nation for that decision. It was for them to take or leave the Treaty as they thought fit. But the historical fact remains that their absence as members of the Reparation Commission profoundly altered its composition, from the very outset weakened its judicial capacity, and ultimately led to its failure in its task. The *reductio ad absurdum* of the position created by America's withdrawal is fully apparent now, when France as chairman has a casting vote which enables herself and Belgium to override Great Britain and Italy on any point which can be carried by a majority vote.

In its truncated form the Reparation Commission never operated as its creators intended it to operate. It became to all intents and purposes a reflection of the views and claims of the nations represented on it. Instead of arriving at judicial decisions its various members for the most part devoted themselves to showing reason for the demands of their respective

governments; and the actual task of accommodation and decision was thrown back again and again on the governments themselves. Hence conference after conference.

To arrive at agreements became an increasingly arduous task—for several reasons. In the first place German Governments successively failed to honor the undertakings to which they set their hands. French opinion grew more and more indignant as this exasperating process became habitual. In the second place, the French Chamber was of a variety known, I believe, in France as a "*chambre introuvable*." It was elected in the spring immediately succeeding the armistice, and the patriotism represented in it was of a less liberal kind than is habitual in France. This Chamber was always changing the French Ministries; and as German failures became more numerous, its intransigence became more and more marked. We have most of us had new elections since the period of intoxication immediately following the end of the war, but France has not.

The inevitable result was an accentuation of the difference between the French and British views of the problem which I have already described. Whatever the cause of the decline in Germany, it was, we argued, an unfortunate fact. The agreement of May, 1921, had done nothing to stabilize affairs in Germany or to arrest the fall of the mark. It was, in our view, impossible for Germany to secure sufficient foreign currency to pay her dues, unless this decline was stopped. We endeavored, therefore, to secure two things—a period of delay in payment, and agreement on conditions which would give Germany the assistance of international finance. The difficulty with

French opinion throughout this period was its unwillingness to recognize that payment could not be secured on an adequate scale from Germany unless the Allies encouraged and assisted the restoration of German economic life. It was impossible, as Mr. Lloyd George observed, to get beefsteak and butter from the same cow. You could either slaughter the cow or milk it. You could not do both at once. The French would not accept this logic. Their insistence on immediate payments grew greater as German capacity to pay grew less. The thinner the milk from the cow, the more angrily the indignant French milkmaid waved away the stolid British milkman's proposal to try fodder in place of force.

The condition of Central Europe was growing more serious all the time, and our own economic depression was becoming severe. While France was prospering internally, and thinking only of keeping up the pressure upon Germany, we were becoming more and more convinced that a policy of reconstruction and settlement was essential to the revival, indeed to the survival, of many European states. Austria was almost in the pit. Germany was well on the way to it. Russia was being decimated by famine. What was needed was a constructive effort to set all this tangle of misery straight.

The turning point in all the inter-Allied discussion on this subject was the meeting of the Allied and Associated Powers at Cannes in January, 1922. M. Briand, the French Prime Minister, had just come back from the Washington Arms Conference, and it seemed possible that Europe might succeed in clearing up her problems through a bold effort to face them squarely, such as the American Government

had suggested and successfully carried through at the Washington Conference. Great Britain suggested, moreover, that the Germans should for the first time be invited to meet the Allied statesmen in conference. M. Briand ultimately agreed to these suggestions, which were prefaced by discussions of a far-reaching kind, and the Cannes Conference met in the first days of the new year.

Hope was in the air, and the Cannes Conference made rapid progress with its work. Ultimately two decisions were taken. In the first place, agreement was reached as to provisional payments by Germany pending further expert investigation into her financial condition and the means of stabilizing her currency. It was also agreed that a conference of European Powers, including Germany and Russia, should be summoned in Genoa with the object of getting all Powers together in the work of reconstruction, and bridging to some extent the gap between enemy Powers, neutral Powers, and Allied Powers, which I have already described. These agreements had only just been reached, when M. Briand was summoned back to Paris to meet a revolt in his own cabinet. He left at two or three hours' notice, resigned almost as soon as he reached Paris, and thus left the Cannes Conference to wind up its affairs without a French representative of any kind.

Settlement was in sight at Cannes, but the vision was shattered in a night.

M. Poincaré succeeded M. Briand, and from that moment the differences between Great Britain and France have been accentuated more deeply month by month. He began by a steady and bitter opposition to the Genoa Conference, which labored throughout its

sessions under the blight of French disapproval and distrust.

Reparation, however, was not part of the agenda at Genoa, and remained in suspense, pending the further report from the Reparation Commission requested at Cannes. In the meanwhile, Germany's provisional payments were going on, but the Allies knew that Germany could not maintain these payments on the same scale for more than a given time. We pressed, therefore, for the appointment of an expert committee of bankers by the Reparation Commission in the summer of 1922. The committee was appointed, and contained not only Allied bankers of repute, but also an American banker, a Dutch banker, and a German representative. Great hopes were fixed upon the work of this committee, but before it had seriously embarked upon its work, while it was still holding preliminary meetings in Paris, M. Poincaré made a speech declaring that France would not in any way be bound by its decisions. In these conditions the distinguished bankers who composed it considered that their labors would be thrown away, and broke up without making any report.

To meet the situation created by the failure of the bankers' committee, a conference of the Allies was called again in London in August of last year. M. Poincaré came to it with proposals that the Allies should seize a large variety of assets in Germany, and that they should establish a customs barrier between Germany proper and the occupied left bank of the Rhine. He also demanded measures for taking over the control of German finance. I need not go into the detail of the discussions which then took place. Italy was not on the whole in favor of the

French proposals. Belgium was not whole-heartedly so. No agreement was reached, and the conference was adjourned. It was proposed to meet again later in the year, and constant efforts were made meanwhile to find some method of reconciliation through the Reparation Commission. The Reparation Commission, however, had lost any independence which it ever possessed. The French Government at last simply gave orders to their representative, and the Commission became, so far as France was concerned, an instrument of French policy, not an independent arbiter in any sense at all. While these discussions were going on, attention was deflected for the moment to the Near Eastern crisis caused by the Greek retreat from Anatolia. In the course of this, Mr. Lloyd George's Government resigned office, elections were held in England, and Mr. Bonar Law's Government came in.

It is worth remembering now that Mr. Bonar Law's Government came in pledged to coöperation, if that were reasonably possible, with France. Parliament met just before Christmas, and immediately after Christmas a conference was held in Paris on the German question. It was, I think, the fifteenth of the series, and it also failed. Britain went there with proposals to reduce her own claims, and largely to cancel her debts, but these proposals were rejected without consideration by the other Allies. It was declared by a majority that Germany was in default, and France and Belgium marched into the Ruhr.

I have followed in outline so far the reparation question in its various phases to the present time. I will now endeavor to deal with the other great

question which has dominated French thought and feeling during the same period—I mean the question of security.

It must not be forgotten that the British and American Treaties of Guarantee to France were one of the conditions upon which France accepted the general lines of the peace settlement. Let us see exactly how the Treaty provided for French security.

In the first place, Germany was reduced to a standing volunteer army of 100,000 men. She was totally disarmed, and a rigorous supervision has been exercised throughout Germany by Allied Commissions ever since the armistice, to prevent the concealment of arms and make the demilitarization complete. There are no doubt some arms still concealed amongst the German people. In all probability the small arms in private hands are numerous. At the armistice German units demobilized themselves in large numbers without orders of any sort, and many men took their rifles away to their homes. No doubt many of those rifles remain with those who took them then. The British Commission in Germany has, nevertheless, reported for many months past that Germany is completely harmless in a military sense. No modern army can be brought together without something more effective in the way of equipment than rifles alone. There is certainly very little artillery in Germany; there are not many machine guns; there are practically no airplanes; there is none of the vast system of equipment for transportation and supply which a modern army requires. It is impossible for Germany to begin to organize for war again without betraying her designs to the quick eyes of the observers who are watching for any such movement on

her part. This is an important fact in the European situation. No people would have borne without resistance such a movement as the occupation of the Ruhr by what is in reality a handful of foreign troops if they had retained the will and the power to resist by force of arms.

Side by side with the disarmament clauses in the Treaty of Versailles, there was also provision made for the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine. Section 3, Part 3, of the Versailles Treaty reads as follows:

Article 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometers to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembling of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as upkeep of old permanent works for mobilization are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory to the present treaty, and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

In order to assure the complete fulfilment of these and the other conditions of security, the Allied Powers declared their intention of maintaining the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and of the Rhine bridgeheads for a period of fifteen years. The period was to begin "from the coming into force of the present treaty." It was to be terminated only when Germany had complied with all her undertakings. The French maintain that the Treaty of Ver-

sailles has never yet come into force. The period of fifteen years for the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the Rhine bridgeheads has therefore in their opinion not yet begun.

Lest these powerful provisions should prove inadequate to guarantee French security, the representatives of the British Empire and of the United States also signed a Treaty of Guarantee. The object of this Treaty was stated as follows in the first paragraph of the preamble :

To meet the danger that the stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine might not at first provide adequate security and protection to the French Republic, the British Empire and the United States therefore undertake to support the French Government in the case of an unprovoked movement of aggression made against France by Germany.

Article I of the Treaty recapitulated the three articles on demilitarization which I have already quoted. Article II specified that the British Treaty with France should come into force only when the American Treaty was ratified. Your Treaty in the same article specified that it should not come into force until ours was ratified. Article III declared that the Treaty should continue in force "until on the application of one of the parties to it the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection."

The cumulative effect of these successive methods of guaranteeing French security was very great; but your failure to ratify the Treaty caused our own Treaty to lapse automatically in accordance with Article II. France, therefore, was made to feel that

her security would end when the period of occupation of the left bank of the Rhine also came to an end, and that has profoundly influenced French opinion. At first French public men did not seem to take much interest in unofficial suggestions from the British side that the Treaty might be renewed by the British Empire alone. I can remember at least one Frenchman of high standing and influence who declared that France did not regard the moment as opportune for reconsidering it. Towards the end of 1921, however, after M. Briand returned from the Washington Conference, a new attitude became apparent in French official quarters, and after preliminary discussion a new draft Treaty was offered to France by Mr. Lloyd George at Cannes.

In order to meet the French criticisms of the previous Treaty, the new Treaty was modified in certain important ways. In the first place, the French felt that the Treaty was derogatory to France unless it was made reciprocal. For this reason the preamble was altered, and the statement was added that the guarantees to France against any future invasion by Germany were indispensable not only to France herself but to "the restoration of European stability, the safety of Great Britain, and the peace of the world." The draft Treaty then restated the demilitarization articles in the Treaty of Versailles, which I have already quoted to you, and proceeded as follows:

In the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of France by Germany, Great Britain will come to the immediate assistance of France with her Navy, Military, and Air forces.

Article II declared the common interests of the two Powers in the demilitarization clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and pledged them to consult together "should any breach of those clauses be threatened, or any doubt arise as to their interpretation."

Article III declared that the two Powers would concert together "in the event of any military measures inconsistent with the Treaty of Versailles being taken by Germany."

Article IV, as usual in British Treaties, declared that no obligation rested upon any of the Dominions of the Empire unless and until approved by their respective Parliaments.

Article V limited the Treaty to a period of ten years, to be renewable at the end of that period if approved by both parties.

This draft Treaty was published at the time, but it never came into force. It is important to make the reason why it was not adopted by France as clear as possible.

The draft Treaty was accompanied by a Memorandum which was also published at the time of the Cannes Conference. At the outset this Memorandum analyzed frankly the differences of view which had arisen between the two Governments.

Great Britain [it said] fully recognizes France's ground for anxiety and desires to do all in her power to allay it, but she cannot agree to postponing the question of the reconstruction of Europe while meeting France's desires in regard to her reparations and her security. In order to give satisfaction to French needs, the British Government must be able to tell the British people that the two countries are marching together to restore the economic structure of Europe and the general prosperity of the world.

The Memorandum then passed to the character of the guarantee now proposed. It explained that there would be a double value in the guarantee, "since it would not only safeguard France in the event of a German attack, but would make any such attack extremely improbable." It argued that Germany, when once certain that the British Empire would stand by France in a future war, would not be tempted to keep alive any dreams of revenge.

It is of great importance [the Memorandum said] to divert the German mind from any such ambitions, as well as to provide for the defeat of those ambitions should they mature. The British Government believes that both objects can be met by an undertaking that the two nations will stand together against an unprovoked attack on French soil by Germany, and that such an undertaking must ripen and strengthen the friendship of the two nations as years go on.

In order that effect might be given to this Memorandum, the British Government considered it necessary that the Treaty, as already said, should be accompanied by a complete Entente between the two countries. This, it was pointed out, had been the basis of the agreement which gave France the support of the British Empire in the war. The British Government held that such an Entente was equally essential now. Various points were indicated where an understanding was desirable.

The Memorandum concluded with a statement of the sanctions which were necessary to give true effect to such a Treaty and Entente between democratic states.

The time is past [it said] when statesmen can pledge their countries to engagements without full regard to the popular

sentiment which they represent. In order that the treaty of guarantee proposed should be of lasting value to both countries, it is essential that the democracies of the British Empire and the French Republic should feel assured that they are guided by similar purposes and harmonious ideals. All questions therefore should be cleared away, which may be capable of dividing the sentiment of the two countries and marring their accord. His Majesty's Government are confident that there are no outstanding questions which cannot be solved in a manner satisfactory to both governments, and that the treaty of guarantee between the two countries may thus be sealed and confirmed by a complete and durable entente.

Finally, the Memorandum declared the desire of the British Government that this Entente between Great Britain and France, so far from excluding other nations, should form the basis of a wider scheme of international coöperation, to ensure the peace of the world as a whole. They therefore proposed that France and Great Britain together should endeavor to secure the assent of the European Powers to a simple pact declaring that "all nations shall join in an undertaking to refrain from aggression against their neighbors." It was essential, they declared, that the rivalries generated by the emancipation of nations since the war should be averted from the paths of international hatred and turned to those of coöperation and good will. Were these new rivalries unwisely handled, it was not impossible that Europe might be plunged by the coming generation into such a struggle as would overwhelm its civilization in even completer ruin and despair.

It is for the allies [the Memorandum ended] to whom the war bequeathed a position of vast responsibility and far-

spreading power, to stand together against this menace, to combine their influence in averting it, to make sure that in the heart and will of their own peoples, who fought and bled for civilization, the cause of civilization prevails. Great Britain, therefore, offers both to France and Italy her earnest coöperation in building up a great system of European accord which will put the maintenance of peace between nations and the reduction of national armaments in the forefront of its aims; for only so in their belief will Europe secure that sense of safety amongst nations, great and small, which through the many centuries of its political history it has never yet attained.

A similar guarantee was offered to Belgium at the same time; and a Memorandum was addressed to Italy, expressing the hope that she would coöperate in these broad aims. The dispatch to Italy was also published at the time.

I have summarized and quoted this document at some length because it is a complete and a comprehensive statement of the view and policy of the British Government at that time. So far as I know that view has never changed. You will see that the principal motive underlying it is the desire to convert Europe from its present condition, in which one set of nations imposes its will upon another set, while a third set looks anxiously and impotently on, into a system of general accord, in which the peace settlement, while containing full measure of security for France and full guarantee for the reparation due to her and to the other Allies, should be generally accepted by democratic opinion throughout that war-worn continent. It was the aim of the British Government to put this scheme which it was now proposing to its Allies before a great conference containing

also neutral and enemy Powers in the spring of that year, 1922, at Genoa. Great hope was placed upon that conference by those responsible for its assembling.

As I have already related in another context, the Cannes Conference raised great hopes, almost confirmed those hopes, and saw them suddenly shattered in a few hours. M. Briand, who had accepted these proposals in principle, was called back to Paris at a few hours' notice, and suddenly resigned. M. Poincaré succeeded him, and an immediate change came over the character and the temper of Anglo-French relations.

In the first place, the Treaty of Guarantee, already accepted in principle, was never seriously taken up again. We were given to understand that in the form proposed it was of little value for French security. Objection was taken to the period of ten years, but there was no unwillingness on the part of the British Government to consider a longer period if this were found desirable. It was evident that the main dissatisfaction regarding it felt by the Government in France was that it contained no definite military undertaking in the form of the military alliances common between Powers before the Great War. It was impossible for Great Britain, however, to undertake to maintain a number of divisions which she did not at the time possess, in order that she might be able to place them upon the Rhine frontier in a period of three or four weeks. In her opinion there was no menace in Germany which would warrant any such rearmament. The object of the Treaty of Guarantee was to insure France and Europe against the reconstruction of the military menace of Ger-

many. It was in its essence a preventive of rearmament, and not a scheme of armament. It was impossible for British statesmen to depart from this ruling principle of the pact.

Apart from this, the French Government were undoubtedly at the time unwilling to commit themselves to any general agreement on policy in different parts of the world. As time went on, it became increasingly clear that what they mainly desired was a free hand, and it was evident that the Treaty of Guarantee might hamper their choice of the policy which their country was to pursue.

In spite of constant French objection, the Conference of all European Powers at Genoa was held. It succeeded in passing a general pact of nonaggression for a period of, I think, one year, but the main object of the Conference, which was to bring together for the first time Allied, neutral, and enemy Powers, including Russia, for a common effort at reconstruction, was practically destroyed by the sudden signature at Rapallo of a treaty between Germany and the Russian Soviet Government. We have never yet understood the motives which led German statesmen to conclude this bilateral agreement at a moment when all the Powers were met together for the first time to discuss their problems and their difficulties in common. It was generally felt to be a breach of the spirit of the Conference, and it had a fatal effect upon its success.

Since Genoa, the Treaty of Guarantee has been offered again, but it has once again been refused. The fact is mentioned in Lord Curzon's last note. I do not think, therefore, that I am claiming too much when I say that Great Britain has kept her word in

regard to it. The war was sufficient evidence of the military and naval power which the British Empire can exert in defense of any cause. The suggestion that our guarantee was useless unless we maintained a military force which we had not maintained up to 1914 has seemed to us a flat denial of the value of our support, a mockery of the principles for which we fought in the war, and a reversion to the old system of military alliances in which the British peoples are determined, more than ever now, never to be involved.

You in Williamstown, who live amongst these glorious hills, must often have followed winding mountain trails. You climb a dense hillside, and suddenly you come to a point where the trail forks two ways. There are trees about you. There is mist on the slopes beyond. It seems to matter little which fork you take. Yet one trail, if you follow it, will lead you up to the hilltops where sunshine quivers in the air and your vision ranges free. The other trail will take you irresistibly downwards into the valley whence you came, where mist and rain are in your eyes and the thunder rolls overhead. The choice of trails seemed indifferent enough when you made it—a half-turn to right or left over apparently similar ground. But the whole world of difference between the hilltop and the valley, the sunshine and the mist, hung on that moment's choice.

Looking back over the short eighteen months which have passed since the Cannes and Genoa Conferences, I feel that they were just such forks in a mountain trail. At each of them the fundamental question was whether the old continental spirit

should descend again upon European affairs and drive them irresistibly back into the secular conflicts from the last of which we have only just emerged alive, or whether a new direction might be taken, a new effort made to base the peace settlement upon some better sanction than the power of armed nations over the disarmed. France under Poincaré stood stiffly for the continental spirit at Genoa. Germany under Wirth and Rathenau was fatally inspired by that same spirit on the Easter morning when the Russo-German Treaty at Rapallo was cast like a challenge amongst the assembled Powers. Easter Morning! I do not remember, even in the war itself, a sadder ending to an Easter Day.

And now, disastrously led—as we believe—by statesmen holding honestly that reparation and security are to be found upon this road, France and Belgium are in the Ruhr. Here indeed is the turning point for Europe, the last of many leaves which the Sybil has offered that wracked and distracted continent.

I will not detain you with the legal aspects of the occupation, though these are serious. The conditions in which the occupation was first carried out are, in our belief, against the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. But worse has followed since, for action after action into which the French and Belgian Governments have been driven by the necessity of breaking resistance down has violated one clause or other of the Treaty or else the known conventions of international law. The Rhine waterway, for instance, is placed by the Treaty under the Rhine Navigation Commission, an international body, for free use by

all nations. It is closed now by French and Belgian decree. Foreign goods are held in the customs houses. They cannot be recovered by their owners or forwarded to their destinations in Germany. In a thousand ways the trade of Europe is paralyzed by the arbitrary action of two Powers.

Under what law is all this done? Under what law are German subordinate officials, to say nothing of German magnates, sentenced to long periods of hard labor in French prisons and even to deportation to French colonies for a crime hitherto unknown to law, obeying the orders of their own Government? I know of a case in which a German railway conductor was given twelve years' hard labor for asking a French official to telephone an order regarding a train, because he himself had been forbidden to give orders without the authority of his former German superiors. There are laws for war, and there are laws for peace. The Ruhr is under neither. It is a new phase of arbitrary government imposed by one government upon the territory and nationals of another. Britain, believe me, understands the exasperation which has led France into this extra-legal morass; but we look with dismay at the precedent which is being set by Allies who fought with us, as we believed, to reëstablish and enlarge the reign of law in European affairs.

And if the letter of the Treaty be so gravely impaired, what of its spirit? Let me recall a thing always dear to British hearts, a precedent.

In the autumn of 1919 a Rumanian army entered Hungary in order to safeguard Rumania against the communist revolution of Bela Kun which had then seized Budapest. The communist revolution evapo-

rated, but the Rumanian army remained. It began to seize Hungary's assets, and the Allies thought it necessary to intervene. Communications were therefore addressed to the Rumanian Government by the Allies in Paris. The most important of these was sent on behalf of the other Governments by M. Clemenceau. They were to the effect that reparation was a common interest of all the Allies, and that no one Ally had the right to seize enemy assets which were a part of the reservoir of reparation belonging to all. Rumania was therefore informed that she was acting in direct breach of the spirit animating all the Allies, that such a breach could not be tolerated, and that she must desist. I think that the clause in the Treaty of Versailles upon which the British Government now bases its legal case against France was actually quoted to the Rumanian Government and interpreted in the sense upon which the British Government now stands.

I know the answer that is made to this argument. "Granted breaches of the law, in the letter or the spirit. Granted a new and undesirable precedent in international affairs. What else could France and Belgium do?"

My reply is this: "What do France and Belgium want? Reparation and security. They will obtain neither by this course."

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that German resistance has been broken, and that France and Belgium proceed to impose a settlement in accordance with their own ideas. What can they do? They want, in the first place, cash payments. In order that Germany may make them, two things are necessary—first, that Germany should be allowed to put

her industrial machine in order and produce wealth in some form that can be exported across her frontiers; second, that the German finances and currency should be stabilized, so that foreign financiers may have security for lending Germany money and a firm basis on which to assess how much they will lend. These are the only conditions on which Germany can pay. They are the conditions proposed by Britain now and for months past. The occupation of the Ruhr—supposing it does not end in revolution and the dissolution of the German Union—can achieve nothing but further aggravation of the financial problem, further impoverishment of the German people, and therefore not only a further postponement but also a further reduction of the sums which Germany can pay. You do not get more milk from a cow by threatening its life and belaboring it with a stick.

“Ah, yes,” M. Poincaré’s counsel may say, “Germany may be impoverished for a time; but by this means we shall have security, we shall have guarantees, we shall have the ‘gages productifs’ which we are entitled to demand.”

What are these guarantees? What is this security? I will take the two which have been most prominently put forward and discussed. One is the negotiation of an agreement between the industrialists of France and Germany to work Lorraine and the Ruhr together and to secure a definite control of the Ruhr industry to France. The other is the neutralization of the Rhine Province under French and Belgian gendarmerie, and the control of the Rhine railways on both banks by an international management, in which France and Belgium would predominate. It is improbable in my opinion, but not impossible, if Ger-

many is sufficiently broken, that she may accept such terms. It is more likely, I think, that she will collapse in the effort to resist them.

Let us imagine, however, that these plans succeed. What do they mean? So far as the Ruhr is concerned, it means that the heart of German industry is placed in peonage to France; that the share of its product which it devotes to wages is settled by France; that France, in fact, becomes an arbiter over the lives of hundreds of thousands of German workingmen and women. The great industrialists may make such an arrangement; but do you think that in a period when democracy and nationalism are becoming stronger mass-forces every year such an arrangement can last?

Foreign control of German national railways along the greatest historic artery of German national life does not promise any better result. Imagine to yourselves the effect of a settlement which imposed upon you foreign control of such an artery in your own land. Such control might survive for a time; but it could not endure.

The neutralization of the Rhineland is an even more hopeless case. The Treaty has already demilitarized it. To neutralize it, in addition, means one thing only—the detachment of a section of the German people from the German Union, from the sovereignty to which they belong, from their natural political and racial destiny. That would be clean against the very aims for which we declared ourselves to be fighting in the war. It would be a revision of the Treaty dead in the face of the very principles on which the Treaty was based.

All these expedients might be imposed by force

and maintained by force over some brief period of years. But the history of the last century in Europe surely proves the impossibility in democratic conditions of binding one nation to another in a state of permanent inferiority and peonage. To attempt this is to bank up volcanic fires. It cannot be done with security even when the nation which attempts it is far greater than the nation against which the attempt is made. Much less can it be done by a nation numbering less than forty millions, whose strength in population is on the downward trend, against a nation of sixty millions, which increases its population by four millions every five years. The population of Prussia alone is at present almost equal to the population of France; and though Germany may go into temporary dissolution, the union of the German people will come again as surely as the leaves return in spring.

I once asked one of the ablest statesmen in Europe, himself a minister of one of the new nations bordering on Germany, how he would look on the break-up of the German Union. "My people would rejoice," he said, "but I would not, because my pleasure in the temporary disunion of the German people would be darkened by my fear of the certain reunion which would come and of the spirit of revenge in which it would be born."

There is only one ultimate result of the policy now pursued by France and Belgium. It is a long period of increasing unrest, such as Europe suffered from the birth-pangs of German union in the nineteenth century, and ultimately an explosion of the vital forces which all such policies seek vainly to throttle down.

Ladies and gentlemen, I return to the point at which I began. This is not an economic issue, though economic interests are seriously engaged. It is a moral issue. So at least we see it in England; and, seeing it as we do, we feel that we must stand firmly for an instinctive and fundamental element in our code of right and wrong.

France and Belgium are not indeed imperialist powers in the evil sense of that term. They have been deeply wronged; they have been greatly exasperated; their patience has been destroyed. But in the anger of the moment they have taken a turning which, small as the deflection may seem at this hour from the course which we set ourselves in both the war and the peace, is in fact a turning back to the old, ensanguined, fatal path which led Europe to the precipice in 1914. It can only lead to the same precipice again.

The British Empire therefore stands by the Treaty of Versailles, which it ratified in all its Parliaments; but it cannot support new claims beyond the Treaty or old claims which were expressly set aside as unjustifiable and dangerous when the Treaty was made. The Treaty will give France both reparation and security, if even now it be applied with reason and common sense. It will also provide Europe with a just framework of international peace, which will ultimately secure the support and sanction of all Powers, if only a common effort be made to base it on the rock of agreement and acceptance, not upon the sands of military force.

Here is the moral issue which confronts us to-day—as great an issue as that which ranged the world in two vast camps in the war—the same issue, indeed,

in a new form. Britain's interests are greatly involved once more, as they were in 1914. But it is not her interests only which are challenged by the Ruhr policy; it is her instincts, her inmost beliefs, her sense of right and wrong. She appealed to all the Allies only eighteen months ago to make sure that "in the heart and will of their own peoples, who fought and bled for civilization, the cause of civilization prevails." If no one else is with her, if Europe is to blunder back into those very perils which the peace settlement of 1919 was framed clause by clause to remove for ever from the world, she will stand by her faith alone. She cannot do less. No single Power can do more.

LECTURE V

INDIA YESTERDAY AND TO-DAY

I WISH to-night to do my best to give you a picture of the problems presented by India at the present day. It is widely supposed that the only Indian question of any importance is the transition from British rule to self-government. I sometimes see our friends the propagandists representing this transition as a simple matter. The only difficulty, they say, is the spirit of British Imperialism. But for that, the transition could be made successfully by a straightforward act of abdication on the part of the British Government.

You know from your own experience that these questions are never so simple as that; and I desire to show that in the great peninsula of India, with its bewildering congeries of races, creeds, and languages, they are even more complicated than they are elsewhere.

Great Britain has been in India for over two hundred years. She has been consciously responsible for its welfare for a century and a half. What has been the effect on India of this long association? Has it been on the whole good or bad, superficial or permanent? You cannot properly make up your mind on the Indian problem without studying these questions for yourself. I will give you a picture of what, in British eyes, the character of that connection has been, and will pass from that to the problems of the hour. First, the India of yesterday; then, the India of to-day.

Britain's sense of conscious purpose in India, as

I mentioned in my first lecture, emerged in the period immediately preceding the Napoleonic wars. When the threat of Napoleon is at last removed, external pressure upon India ceases altogether. The vast peninsula becomes a British reserve, not only unchallenged but unthought of for many decades by the rest of the world. The dominant motive of trade, which governed the policy of the East India Company in the eighteenth century, entirely disappears. Its monopoly in the East Indian trade is taken from it by the British Government in 1813. No longer held exclusively by the East India Company, trade passes into a great variety of hands; and the Company itself becomes nothing less than a branch of the British Government in the East. Its purpose as a government then takes shape. One of the early Governors, whom I have already quoted to you in a previous lecture, writes as follows in 1827 from Madras. I am quoting from Thomas Munro, the Governor of Madras:

We ought [he writes in a minute to the Company] to look forward to a time when Natives may be employed in almost every office, however high, and we ought to prepare them gradually for such a change by entrusting them with higher duties from time to time in proportion as experience may prove their being qualified to discharge them. . . . Every time that a Native is raised to a higher office than had been filled before by any of his countrymen an impulse will be given to the whole establishment.

It is the policy of the British Government [he says elsewhere] to improve the character of its subjects, and this cannot be done better than by raising them in their own esteem, by employing them in situations both of trust and of authority.

The first gift which we proceed to bestow upon India is education. The renewal of the East India Company's charter in 1813, when its monopoly was ended, contained the stipulation that a certain considerable sum should be spent on education; and when in 1815 the Company's directors expressed some fear that education might create a political movement dangerous to British ascendancy, Lord Hastings, the Governor-General, replied that we could not barter our principles of government for sordid motives of that kind. Twenty years later, the appointment as Governor-General of that great Liberal, Lord William Bentinck, and the arrival of Macaulay upon the Indian scene, gave the final impulse and stamp to our educational aims. English became the language of all higher instruction, because there was no Indian language spoken by more than a small fraction of the Indian peoples. English literature became the staple of education, and India proceeded to imbibe through English textbooks the ideas and ideals of the West.

At the same time, our passion for justice and good administration takes definite shape. Macaulay establishes the Indian penal code, which is, I think, universally recognized as one of the world's best bodies of law.

In British India itself, the administration is gradually perfected, and much oppression, much taxation, much injustice is removed. The practice of suttee, for instance, under which widows were compelled to fling themselves on the funeral pyre of their husbands, is abolished, and human sacrifice is stopped. For another example, war is made upon the Thugs,

a ferocious species of armed robber which infested all the roads in many parts of India.

Wherever oppression and bad government are carried on beyond our borders in Indian states, we intervene to set the matter right; and ultimately, if the rulers fail to respond to our exhortations, we annex the territory direct. The whole process of annexation in the first half of the nineteenth century is extremely interesting. The case of Sindh is the only case which is usually quoted of unprovoked aggression in the expansion of our rule over India. It was annexed in 1843 as the result of a war of defense against Afghanistan, when it became essential to us as a base of operations against the Afghans. It was conquered by Sir Charles Napier, who proceeded to give it the advantages of British rule, and described the achievement in his private diary as "a very advantageous, useful, humane piece of rascality."

If Sindh was a doubtful case, there are, I think, no others where our forward movement was not provoked by very grave disorder, misgovernment, and misery. It is questionable, however, whether Lord Dalhousie, who was responsible for the greater part of this policy, was altogether wise in his determination to substitute direct British administration everywhere for Indian rule. His ideas were quite in keeping with those of his day. The passion for good government, the idealism of a trustee determined to do everything for his ward, were very strong in his heart, and the first half of the nineteenth century had not yet produced that tenderness for local institutions and customs which has become so strong a motive since. There is this, however, to be said in justification of Lord Dalhousie's policy. The last

two great forward movements before the Indian mutiny were the annexation of the Punjab and of Oudh. The mutiny was undoubtedly caused to some extent by the feeling that uncomfortable ideas of Western progress were being spread too rapidly over the ancient Indian ways. But the actual revolt was confined to the Bengal army, flushed with success after its conquests of the Punjab and Oudh. If the leaders and the people at large of these two lately conquered provinces had thrown in their lot with the mutineers, it would have gone hard with us at that time. But our latest victims were our staunchest supporters, and stood most gallantly by our side. The result, although the Bengal army greatly outnumbered the white troops and possessed almost all the artillery, was that the mutiny never spread beyond the area where it originally broke out, and was practically suppressed by the men on the spot before any reinforcement of consequence arrived from England. That is a remarkable example of the fact, which is seldom recognized, that British rule in India from the very start has depended upon the consent and support of a majority of the Indian peoples.

Spencer Walpole records in his history the summary verdict that "centuries hence some philosophic historian will relate the history of the British in India as a romantic episode which has had no appreciable effect upon the progress of the human family." Whatever history may say of British rule in India, I am convinced that it will not say that.

No foreigner familiar with India has failed to recognize that the work of the British Empire there will certainly endure. We can point without cheap pride to railways and telegraphs, to canals and irri-

gation schemes, to the extinction of much cruelty, to the protection of the weak against the strong, to the establishment of a fairer incidence of taxation, to the maintenance of security on coast and frontier, and of a peace unknown to India through all the preceding centuries. We may add, despite its faults, the endowment of India for the first time with a system of popular education, and also to the coördination of the whole peninsula with great advantage to all parts under a single system of relations with foreign states. To realize what this last fact has meant to India, it is only necessary to look at every Asiatic state in the past century. No Asiatic state began to walk the road on which we led India forward for half a century after we were well launched upon our course; none has even approached the same degree of organization, except the island empire of Japan. In Persia, in Asiatic Russia, in China, in the Dutch East Indies, what is there for comparison? Russia and Holland were the only European Powers with Asiatic possessions at the close of the Napoleonic wars. We need not fear to have the progress of Asiatic Russia or of the Dutch East Indies from 1815 onwards contrasted too favorably, decade by decade, with Indian progress in British hands. Still less need we fear the contrast of Indian development with that of Persia or of China, racked by European feuds and rent by faction and incompetence within.

If, however, our gift to India had been a gift only of material things, it might seem that we were disturbing a social organization of almost immemorial antiquity for little real advance in human happiness. "Why," a certain type of philosopher says, "not leave the East alone? It had its great traditions; it

had its own philosophy; it had its civilization and its own ways of life. Why force the West upon a human system so utterly different from it?" "Can it be supposed," I answer, "that it lay in British power to arrest the contact of East and West? The contact was foredestined, inevitable. India tasted it in its unregulated form all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If we had abandoned India after the Napoleonic wars, when the purpose of government first took clear and conscious shape, she would have fallen back an easy victim to the very evils from which our emergence as the predominant Power has rescued her."

Contact between East and West was inevitable. Nothing could arrest the forward march of European civilization seeking the wherewithal to lift its own peoples to higher standards of life. India lay right across their path, an El Dorado of the Orient, which had already been the prey of rival Western Powers for two hundred years. If the British Government had withdrawn, exploitation, so far from losing momentum, would have gathered it, and another era of commercial and military adventure, conducted by private enterprise, would inevitably have set in.

The men whom we sent out to govern India were far removed from all ideas of exploitation or commercial development. Our Indian administrators all came of the British public school type. They went out with high ideals. They spent their energy and the better part of their lives in what they believed to be a beneficent task. They governed millions of human beings, and then returned to England on modest pensions, barely sufficient to enable them to educate

their sons to follow in their steps. There are families whose sons have gone to India for three or four generations. Such families have India in the fiber of their minds. It is essential to remember, when British policy in India is considered, that an important section of the English educated class has been Anglo-Indian, rather than English, in its point of view for a whole century. They may not have done all that was possible, but they have with whole-hearted singleness of mind done their best.

Was there really no gift to India in all this, as some would have us believe, no gift but disturbance and unrest?

The answer to my mind is not in doubt. With our new mechanism of life, with our railways and telegraphs and canals, we brought to India the great endowment of our own political history, our hard-won knowledge and experience. On the scaffolding of our Western system of government there has gradually grown up a mental and moral structure which could not have come into being without its aid. There lives and moves a spirit in India to-day which is Indian through and through, for race consciousness is of its essence and self-reliance its dearest aim; but that spirit could not have come into being without the mental and moral assimilation of ideals sown by British rule. Indian nationalism has a British no less than an Indian parentage. We have given India the communications and the government which for the first time in history have created some conscious sense of unity amongst her warring races and states. We have started the impulse which is surely though slowly bridging the deep gulfs between the castes and creeds. We have sown the ideas of civic

responsibility and self-government which are rising now in a mighty harvest all across the Indian scene. We have given this nationalism its language, our language, the only language in which all races of India can communicate, and in which their common ideals can take shape. The Indian nationalism of our time is not only the product but the justification of British rule.

That side of the picture is essential to the truth. As a member of a family which is closely associated with India I cannot speak of it without what you will, I hope, regard as pardonable enthusiasm. I was born in India myself, and my earliest recollections are all of Indian scenes. But the other side of the picture is essential to the truth as well, and I propose now to paint it for you to the best of my ability.

There are two great criticisms, and I think fair criticisms, which have been directed by men of experience and authority against the British record in India. The first of these criticisms is that our system has been too British, that it has given India many Western institutions and ideas which are not suited to the Indian character or soil, and that the time has come to let Indian ideas assert themselves and give a new character to the whole system of government.

I think this criticism is a sound and serious one, but it is important to analyze its truth.

The colonizing Englishman is a tremendous power; but India was a country already great in history before the first European ship touched Indian shores. It had been the cradle of two of the five world religions; it had given birth to poets, statesmen, warriors, and kings who take rank among the great men

of all history; its foremost rulers, like Akbar and Aurungzebe, had made their splendor felt not only in Asia but in the Western world; it was a civilization distinct from ours, as diverse as Europe in its peoples, static perhaps in character, beneficial only to the chosen few ruling a mass of ignorant and down-trodden men, but nevertheless the equal of European civilization in many of the higher manifestations of human genius and character. This civilization has influenced British ideas, just as British ideas have influenced it.

All work is conditioned by the material in which it is done. A statue carved in marble is necessarily different from a statue cast in bronze. An Indian garden is very different from a garden in the West. Some eulogists of British rule in India argue that it is not the marble, or the bronze, or the soil of the garden, but the genius of the sculptor and the skill and care of the gardener, that give the great result. They speak as though the Indian peoples and the Indian peninsula had merely provided the material in which a heroic political and moral work has been wrought by British genius and efficiency.

When I speak, however, of the results of British rule in India, I assign far more than the rôle of passive material to the Indian side. It seems to me as unjust to claim the whole credit for British genius as to deny its fertilizing and stimulating effect. We hear too much of British achievement on one side and of Indian wrongs upon the other. The main achievement of India in the last century stands to the credit of both peoples, British and Indian, in a common account. Indians as well as British have been an active and essential element in the joint result.

The real process has been one of close and constant interaction. It has been due in varying degrees, of which the Indian proportion has steadily increased, to the mind and spirit of both races. When the time comes to appraise the progress of India, without racial bias or political prejudice, the philosophic historian will find it as hard to assign the credit of the achievement between the two races as to assign between two parents the credit for their child.

There was a great Indian civilization before us, and it has profoundly influenced the development of India under the fresh impulse which we have given. If you take Indian progress in the last century on the side of science, or of literature, or of language, or the arts, you will see much splendid development, but most of it more Indian than British in origin. The literature, for instance, given to India by Indian poets in the English language is much of it remarkable, and some of it will remain among the classics of all time. Indian poets, writing in the English language, with a new impulse given them by that language from the West,—that is typical of the interaction which I mean.

But on the political side unquestionably the British spirit and British ideas have been predominant. The best criticism of this part of our work which is known to me is that of M. Joseph Chailley, a very able Frenchman, who studied our Indian system of government with laborious care for a long period, and wrote a classical work upon it just before the war. Here is his summing up upon our legislation :

The intentions of the Anglo-Indian legislators were excellent and their ideas just. They sought to endow India with a certain, and at the same time, with a varied legislation

which should permit of progress, sustain morality, and respect custom; and they have, in large part, succeeded. But they failed to realize that they were giving place too rapidly and too largely to the juridical conceptions and procedure of Europe, and they thus compromised the magnificent gift they were bestowing on India.

M. Chailley is probably on equally sure ground when he deals with our justice and our courts of law.

The English [he says] have made the mistake of introducing—in the belief that they were working for progress and following the dictates of their own conscience rather than the wishes of the natives—guarantees and formalities which involve cost and delays, and which are distasteful to all but a small part of the population.

And he sums up the consequences in a passage of much insight:

One is struck by the fact that in India generally a condemnation passed by a British tribunal is not held by native opinion to involve moral degradation. I do not mean that even on the frontier the natives despise British justice; not at all. They consider it admirable, and prodigious; but not suited to them.

This no doubt is penetrating criticism, and largely justified. But here again the result has not been due entirely to British pressure. In the old days justice was administered under the oak of St. Louis by the British officer responsible for vast districts, who traveled constantly from place to place, and gave his decisions to the best of his ability after hearing the people who flocked to him. The East is always content with decisions of this kind. In the cities, however, it was of course necessary to establish more elaborate codes. This and our system of education produced a

large class of Indian lawyers, and the activity of the lawyer spread from the center to the district. The result was bad. The actions of the paternal district officer were constantly called in question on technical grounds. He was censured by his superiors, told to travel less and to report more, made to sit upon an office stool and administer by paper instead of moving about and administering by direct contact with the people, which is what the Indian really loves. Every district officer now lives at the end of a wire, and he is so constantly under orders from his superiors that he cannot call his soul his own. It is a great misfortune, and in some way it must be remedied, for the Indian people will not stand much longer the centralized and bureaucratic administration which this interaction of British and Indian development has produced.

Our system of education has unquestionably also not been suitable in every way to Indian interests. Some witty person once observed that the English tried to raise up a generation of Indian administrators on the literature of English revolt. In a sense it is true. Our political textbooks have penetrated in a hazy manner the minds of innumerable Indian students, and the result is not altogether good. There is a wonderful novel on this subject by an anonymous author, which everyone interested in India should read. It is entitled *Siri Ram*. We have produced in our universities a rich harvest of superficially educated young men, who have lost all anchorage in the customs and standards of their own Indian parents, and are still not yet capable of understanding and living by the moral standards of the West. The passion of all these young men is for government service or the

bar. Although a vast majority of the government servants in India are Indian by race, and although the bench is largely and the bar almost entirely recruited from the Indian people, there is not sufficient employment for the university graduates who are yearly turned out.

It is here that a second important criticism has been made by Frenchmen, Americans, and, I think, every distinguished and penetrating visitor who has been to India in recent years. I have heard it again and again—a few months ago from the most distinguished of Frenchmen, who had lately visited India, and again from one of your own administrators in the Philippines. It is that we have failed altogether to develop the wealth of India as it should have been developed; that the revenues are in consequence much less than they ought to be, and the people poorer than they need be; that a prudent but far-sighted exploitation of Indian agriculture, Indian metallurgical resources, and Indian industry would have placed India in a far better position at the present day; and that economic expansion would have found employment for the multitudes of educated or half-educated young men whom the universities turn out. I think that is true. As I have explained, the whole system and personnel of British administration in India have been concentrated for three generations upon moral and political progress, giving little thought to the commercial side. The average Indian civilian has always set his face against the plans for commercial exploitation which have been presented to him. The Government has proceeded with a vast and excessive caution.

So much for the India of yesterday. In one way,

we did too little. In another way, we did too much. But no authoritative foreign student of our rule in India has ever suggested that the sum total of our work was not on balance greatly to the good of India and the world.

Then came the Great War, in which Indian soldiers in the Eastern theater played a distinguished part. The war changed nothing, but it profoundly hastened the march of events. It intensified currents of feeling which were already strong, and it ended by bringing agitation for the trial of a new system in India to a dangerous point. Two elements were very plain in the strong feelings aroused by the war. One was Asiatic reaction from Western ways and ideas, due largely to the terrible spectacle presented by Europe during those four years of terror and strife. The other was a great increase of economic pressure, due mainly to the collapse, after the war, of India's export trade and exchange.

The British Government and the Indian Government had already between them long been studying a new scheme of legislative reform to develop the Morley-Minto legislative councils which had been created before the war. I need not go into the details of the new system, I am sure, before the present audience. My friend, Mr. Lionel Curtis, who took part in the construction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, lectured to this Institute about them last year. Their main feature was the creation of new legislatures, not only in the provinces, but at the capital, based on new electorates and able to carry legislation over the head of the Government. Among the branches of control delegated to the legislatures

was budget control, the most important of all, although the Viceroy retained the power in emergency of overriding such legislation with the consent of the British Parliament. So far the new legislatures have been doing well, and new elections are to be held this year. The noncoöperation movement which aimed at destroying them has failed, at any rate, temporarily; and the Indians who have taken part in the legislative work have shown debating capacity and a real sense of dignity and order. I was glad to hear the tribute paid to Indian legislators by two or three speakers at various times during the meetings of this Institute.

It cannot be pretended, however, that the new system solves the main problems which confront India at the present day, or if not at the present day, in a future so near that they must be taken into account. I will try briefly to present these problems to you.

The first of these and the most fundamental is the economic problem. You have already heard from other speakers at this Institute valuable statements upon the economic problem which is becoming acute throughout Asia. Population in India has increased enormously, and the production of food has not increased in the same scale. Hence it is absolutely necessary for the welfare of the Indian people that food production should be increased. There are many ways in which this may be done, such as reclaiming areas at present uncultivated, fertilizing areas which are growing poor, and introducing greater science into the production of food crops. I doubt, however, whether India will ever again be able to produce all the food which her growing population will require. She must therefore also develop her industries to

employ the population, and she must increase her exports to pay for imported food. It is most essential also that the Governments throughout India should be able to dispose of increased revenues in order to have money for assisting the development of Indian resources. The taxation certainly cannot be increased. It is therefore necessary that India's revenue should be enlarged.

This is the branch of Indian development, as I have already indicated, in which the British Government of India has been weakest and least foreseeing. They must devote a new attention to all these problems, and they must secure specialists and experts for the work that is to be done. I am told that the results yielded in some Indian States which have secured such expert advice from Europe and America have fully justified the experiment. The knowledge and experience of Western experts and administrators is absolutely essential, not in very great numbers, but in key positions where their advice can be widely distributed and easily obtained. This will not be done by private enterprise in any form in India. There is no tradition of private enterprise of that kind, and funds will never be forthcoming from private sources. It must be done by Government. I attach the very greatest importance to this aspect of the Indian problem, and I have been confirmed in this view by all that I have heard from Americans with experience of India in recent years.

The economic problem really overshadows the rest; but there are also political problems of great perplexity to be solved. To my mind one of the greatest of these is the power and prestige required to maintain secure and progressive government. India

has known nothing hitherto but autocratic rule. Through all the centuries she has had no other experience. Until comparatively recently, the life of the vast majority of her peoples has been passed in village communities which have cared little about how the larger world outside was governed, provided they were not taxed too heavily, and provided heaven sent rain and the earth gave them sufficient increase for a scant livelihood. They accepted our advent as contentedly as they had accepted the advent of foreign conquerors before. But for that we never could have governed India peacefully for so long a period with only one short-lived and greatly localized revolt. When we emerged from the Napoleonic wars, I believe, we were a people of only ten millions in England taking responsibility for more than two hundred millions in India. Even now, the British in India, including officials, soldiers, traders, and people of every sort, amount to only 120,000, amidst an Indian population of 320,000,000. You will understand that the position of this tiny Western nucleus would have been impossible, if the presence of the British in India had not been the subject at least of popular indifference, if not of popular consent. The evidence goes to prove that on the whole it has been backed by popular consent. Behind British rule there looms and has always loomed the prestige of a great people, who time and time again have proved their mettle in Indian wars and whose power is believed to encompass the earth. But this prestige has stood behind the British Government in India only as the ultimate power of the State stands behind the law in England or America. It has been a moral power, and the government based upon it has hitherto been

willingly accepted because, on the whole, the feeling and the interest of the Indian people have been steadily upon its side. Those who ruled India before our advent, and those who still control the religious feelings and primitive ideas of its inarticulate millions, have until lately broadly approved our character and seen virtue in our aims. But for that reasoned acceptance, which carried with it an almost universal willingness to coöperate, British rule in India would already be a dream of the past. The measure and capacity of Indian coöperation grew steadily from the first opening given to Indian ability by our administrators in the first part of the last century, and has continued right up to modern times, when the Nationalist movement first began to gather strength.

But all that reasoned acceptance and contentment are greatly changing now. As I have said, the economic pressure has increased. The Indian peoples are no longer isolated in small communities. The welfare of the millions depends far more than before on activities and facilities outside the borders of each small community which Government alone can maintain and control. Government therefore has entered into the lives of the people in many ways hitherto unknown, and we ourselves have accustomed the Indian people to a new reliance upon the assistance and foresight of Government. The failure of Government, as the Indian people see it, to save them from the economic depression of recent years has therefore greatly weakened our moral position. This is a serious fact to be reckoned with in the India of our own time.

Where, then, is adequate power to be found in

India for maintaining the government which the country requires? It is hard to realize the importance of this problem amid democratic conditions such as you are accustomed to here. Government here is supported by the instinct, as well as by the reason, of a vast majority of the population. No such assumption is justified in the East. Just look at Indian history.

India has been swept by conquest after conquest. These have always entered across the mountain passes in the northwest, and have driven the Indian population southeastwards against the eastern coast. The last invasion was the great Mahomedan invasion which put the Moguls on the Imperial Throne. You must therefore imagine India as a country in which the great warlike races are gathered, roughly speaking, in the northwest, and the less warlike races have been driven towards the southeast. Despite such exceptions as the Rajputs and the Sikhs, the Mahomedans are for the most part the better fighting men in India, and they are still only 68,000,000 against 216,000,000 Hindus. If we abandoned India, there is little doubt that the Mahomedans would struggle fiercely for their old position of dominance and control.

Compare those facts with another set of facts produced by our system of education. While the fighting qualities have remained on the whole centered in the north of India, the intellectual qualities have been manifested in much greater degree in Madras and Bengal. In 1920 out of 13,681 candidates for a university degree, 8,461 entered at the Universities of Madras and Calcutta, and only 5,220 in all the rest of India. In the same year, of seven and a half million scholars in public schools, there were three and

a half millions in the Presidencies of Madras and Calcutta alone, a million in Behar and Orissa, which in some ways is closely connected with Bengal, a million in Bombay, and a million in the United Provinces. You will observe therefore that the level of education is, broadly speaking, much lower in the northern parts of the peninsula, higher in the east and south.

This is a very important fact at the present time. The men returned to the legislatures which we have created are returned by an electorate of only one million in a total population of 320,000,000. The electorate is small, but it was made to contain every individual capable of recording an intelligent vote. The best men in a political sense come from the unwarlike tribes, and constitute an educated political class amidst a mass of surrounding ignorance. While peace and order are maintained in India by British rule, these educated classes are secure, and may proceed to use the political power which they have gained from the institutions established by us; but if we were to fail to keep the peace in India or to abdicate, they would have no guarantee against the warlike races of the North and would unquestionably collapse. It is a noteworthy fact that of the tens of thousands who volunteered from India for the war in the Middle and Near East, a very small proportion, indeed, came from the more highly educated provinces, and the great majority from the less educated North where the fighting peoples reside. The fighting races have none of the instincts which lead men to accept a government based on superior education and speaking power. There is, therefore, no force in reserve behind the system of representative

government which we have introduced except the British power. When once that is removed, if ever it is, the warlike races must inevitably reassert themselves and the educated oligarchies must collapse.

I have recently seen an interesting confirmation of this view from an Indian source. It is an interview with Rabindranath Tagore, the great Bengali poet, cabled to the *New York Herald* of August 5. Tagore in that interview says that "Hinduism may be a religion of the past before many years and the inhabitants of India converted to Islam by force." He then points out that Islam is a combatant religion, which transforms even Hindu converts into "fanatics with a lust to fight."

So [he ends] if the government falls into the hands of the Indian people, it probably will mean Mahomedan rule again. But even that would be preferable to the present government, because it would be government by our own kindred.

Bengali nationalism has been, and is, a powerful force. This is a curious example of the fact to which I have already alluded, that even so distinctive a Nationalist movement is racial and Asiatic in a broad sense rather than national in the more individual sense which Western democracy has given to national pride and self-consciousness. It is also a vivid indication of what the educated Bengali regards as likely to happen in India, if the moderating power of the Pax Britannica is withdrawn.

Here, then, is a problem peculiar to India, or peculiar at any rate to the East; and it raises another question of almost equal interest. If government in India in our absence is to this extent still likely to

be based upon the military qualities, are the Western institutions which we are seeking to introduce in any way suited to Indian ideas and character?

Who can tell? India has determined to try them and we have determined to do our best to enable her to succeed. Though these institutions are unfamiliar, India has before now produced men of great political capacity, and it may be that she will evolve something halfway between our modern institutions and her ancient ones which will suit her own needs in the new conditions of the present century.

It seems to me not impossible—it is at any rate an interesting speculation—that she will decide to develop something in the nature of the old Eastern method of government. I said just now that the East is accustomed to autocrats. It is. But the most successful autocrats in the East have always been those who took counsel with all classes of their subjects as they went about their realm. The characteristic method of government in India, the characteristic court of justice, is the Durbar, or meeting, where all interested parties say their say before the autocrat. They state their case, one by one, and then accept the autocrat's ruling, whatever it may be, with perfect content. In the old days, this system was, no doubt, easier of maintenance, because only the loosest control was necessary over districts and village communities which depended largely on themselves. The machinery of production and exchange, of imports and exports, of communications and scientific methods, which are all necessary to India now, require greater method in government. But I am not sure that something like the characteristic Eastern system will not in practice ultimately be resumed.

There is a valuable experiment as to what may be done in this direction at present in process in the Indian States where Indian rulers govern with much or little advice from us, according as they govern well or ill. The great Princes are constitutionally free to govern as they please and have handed over nothing but their foreign relations to the government of their feudatory head, the King. They cling to the feudatory tradition, and every Indian Prince still presents his sword for the King to touch whenever the King receives him. These Princes will not change the principle of autocratic rule, but they have been profoundly affected by the development of Western institutions immediately outside their borders in British India. The politically-minded classes in British India have indeed declared war upon the Indian States, and seem to have made up their minds to abolish them altogether if they can; but it is altogether unlikely that they will succeed. The Princes have the fighting power, and they will keep it at least for any period which we need consider now. But they are developing institutions of a most interesting kind in order to meet the new conditions. Many have created legislatures with considerable powers, although a Prince always retains an overriding autocratic privilege in his own hands. They have devoted themselves also to the improvement of agriculture, the increase of communications, and the establishment of industries with the help of advisers imported from the West. One of the greatest has lately also decided to substitute a British for an Indian Prime Minister or Diwan. It may be that many Englishmen who find their official life in British India no longer

to their liking will ultimately pass thus into the service of Indian States.

Here, then, you have two Indias alongside each other, for the Indian States own nearly half the total area of India and one-third the population. British India at present is developing on British lines by its own choice. The India of the native states is developing on Indian lines tinged by Western practice and advice. Which will make the best of the experiment? It will be an interesting indication of the general direction to be taken in the future by the institutions of the East.

You will observe, however, that the existence of these two Indias side by side still further aggravates the difficulty of the problem as to how India is to be safeguarded against internal strife and collapse while she moves towards the status of a single and stable self-governing unit, like the great Union. The only cement which has held the vast congeries of the Indian people together hitherto has been the cement of autocratic rule. Nothing else has kept the peace between its innumerable races and tribes with their many different languages, their profound divisions of religion, tradition, and custom. There are eleven separate languages spoken by over ten millions of the population in India and twelve more languages spoken by over one million. The total number of distinct languages is thirty-three. It is interesting to note that those who speak the English language number in all little over three hundred thousand, although English is the only language in which all parts of India can communicate and is the language in use in all the legislatures. That very fact gives some idea of the smallness of the class from which the

legislatures and politicians are drawn. The process of keeping India together while British India proceeds upon its great self-governing experiment, and while the India of the Princes develops new institutions of a different kind, is grave indeed. The central government, now in the hands of educated Indians, controls the customs for all India. The Princes are not at present represented in this legislature and do not wish to be. How long will they accept a customs system imposed upon them by politicians who are not responsible to them and whom they for the most part despise? The main ports of India are in British India, but some Indian Princes can develop ports of their own if they please, and it may well be that they will develop a separate customs system in each state if the customs legislation of the central government is not to their liking. There is no constitutional objection to their doing this. Communication, transport, water rights, customs, exchange—you know in a great federation like the United States how multitudinous are the questions which arise between the central government and the states, and between the states themselves. Even in this advanced civilization these questions have caused a civil war. Do you think that India can go through this process without breaking up into warring kingdoms and states again, if there be not maintained at the center some power sufficient to hold the framework together while the great experiments of the century are carried out? There is no power capable of doing this except the British power. If we fail, or if we abdicate, India must inevitably revert to the struggles of the eighteenth century, when state fought state, when foreign soldiers, adventurers, and

freebooters competed for privilege and influence, until in the end some great military leader restores her unity to her.

I say, "If we fail or if we abdicate." We do not mean to abdicate; we do not mean to fail. We will keep the peace of India and we will form the cement between states while she advances into the new era and shapes the institutions which will best provide for her peoples' material and moral needs. We have done this successfully for a century past, not because we have been strong but because we have been fair. We have never taken sides between religion and religion, interest and interest, province and province, caste and caste. We have held the scales as evenly as we were able; and the fact that we still hold them is sufficient proof of the broad contentment of the Indian peoples with the way in which our duty has been done. We cannot relax this duty, in India's interest, in our own interest, or in that of the peace of the world.

We must also continue to maintain the peace between India and foreign Powers. We must hold off lawless exploitation, and we must continue to strive to regulate the many questions which the renaissance of Asia is creating between Asiatic and Western states. The problem of emigration alone, for instance, may easily lead in the long run to a terrible world war if such a Power as we, with great responsibilities both in the East and the West, is unable in some way to remove the conditions which bring interest and passion to kindling point.

There are great difficulties before us, and perhaps the greatest of all is to obtain in sufficient numbers the kind of Englishmen which India now requires.

Englishmen of the old governing class—the Clives and Warren Hastingses, the Lawrences and Nicholsons—have gone to India for generations, and have served her well. But their sons no longer find the Indian service to their taste, and the few who now volunteer for government service in India are not for the most part of the type which India really needs. In some way the conditions must be changed, and the right men must be drawn again “east of Suez,” where their character and influence were never more required. It used to be the test of the Englishman in India that he himself made the districts for which he was responsible contented and secure. The new test will be different. Englishmen will no longer seek to do this work with their own hands. They will seek to do the work through Indian colleagues, who will continue to need and ask for their advice.

To all those who have known India and the British Government in India in past years, this is a painful moment in Indian affairs. With high hearts four generations of Britons have striven to give India an administration as just and perfect as it was possible for human capacity to create. India wants such administration no more. She wishes to revert to her own ways, and to adapt those ways in her own manner to the needs of the hour. We must help her to succeed. But do not let us lose sympathy with those who look with sorrow upon the lapse before their eyes of the work to which their own lives and the lives of their fathers’ fathers before them have been devotedly given.

I heard an Indian story once of a village girl whose lover was taken from her and bound to service in his court by a wilful Indian prince. Often the

lover begged to be allowed to return to his village, that he might marry and settle down. The prince required his presence, and obdurately refused his prayers. The lover, however, continued to press his suit, and at last the prince, like Eastern princes, grew weary and sent him back to his own people; but first he maimed and disgraced him in the eyes of his own folk by cutting off the flowing hair and beard which were his pride. News of this terrible disgrace had reached his village before his return. The girl who loved him came out along the road to meet him on the way, and as she went, she prayed to Kali, whose wayside shrine she passed, that she should make no sign of repulsion on meeting her lover and seeing him thus disfigured and maimed. Kali sent a storm upon her as she prayed. The thunder rolled about her, and the lightning flashed. The girl was waked from her prayer by hearing her lover's voice calling down the road, and suddenly she felt his arms about her, although she had not seen him come. She felt his arms, but she could not see them, and in a flash she realized that Kali had answered her prayer by striking her blind.

The story does not end there. In due season the girl's blindness was healed, but the healing was slow, and when at last her sight returned, behold, her lover's hair and beard had grown into their former dignity once more.

I do not want to press the moral of that Indian tale too hard, but it has a meaning for those who feel that they cannot bear to see the face of the India they love disfigured, as they think, by change. India indeed will change, and perhaps in the process she may go through a period in which her welfare is

shaken and her fortunes are low. She is indeed going through such a period now. But her welfare will come back to her, and those who have worked for her and loved her will not see upon the Indian scene the havoc and ruin which they have feared. The problems may be thick around us at this time, but I do not doubt that Britons and Indians will discover together in the hard school of experience how to build up a new era of welfare and progress in which the Indian peoples may attain their ideals without destroying their own unity or endangering the peace of the world.

LECTURE VI

BRITISH AND AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

IN my first lecture I spoke to you about the British Empire, and compared its growth with your own. To-night I propose to speak of British and American Imperialism—by which I mean the forces moral and material which have spread your Government across this continent and ours across the seven seas. Imperialism is the greatest power in the world to-day, for it combines with the force and inspiration of national needs and ideals a code of international conduct, aiming at the spread of law and the maintenance of peace. We have been long set upon both branches of the imperial task. You have but just added the second to the first, and history in this century will be profoundly influenced by the principles which you adopt. I will try to-night to give you the British view of the problem set by Imperialism, looking into the future as well as into the past. It must be a bird's-eye view of both, or I should keep you here all night.

It is not generally understood that British Imperialism in its modern form is a democratic product, new-born since the days of George III. Just as few people realize how modern the British Empire is, few also remember how completely Britain itself has changed since the days when the two branches of the English-speaking world parted company less than a century and a half ago. Most people regard the stage-coach as the very symbol of Merry England in the good old times. Yet the stage-coach only superseded travel by horseback in the reign of George III.

The stage-coach and the American Constitution are, in fact, almost contemporary innovations in the world. It is stirring to realize how completely Britain has changed since those two innovations came in.

The extent of change in England is often concealed by our tenderness for forms. We change almost everything except the outward semblance; and rather than abolish anything, we combine the old with the new. Almost every expedient we adopt is a standing exception to the scriptural saying that new wine cannot be put into old bottles. In England we hardly ever do anything else. You may find a typical example of this method of combining and preserving in the two senior infantry regiments of the British Army—my own old regiment, the Grenadier Guards, and the Coldstream Guards—which have been for two and a half centuries the two first regiments of the King's Foot Guards. The Grenadier Guards are a Royalist regiment formed in Flanders during Cromwellian times round the banished House of Stuart. They first crossed to England when the Stuarts returned, and became then the first regiment of Guards under the Crown. The Coldstream Guards, on the other hand, derive directly from Cromwell's "New Model," the great military instrument which won the civil war for Parliament against the King. They survived the Great Protector's death as Lord Monk's Regiment of Foot, and when the Stuarts returned, they laid down their arms as rebel forces and took them up again at the same parade as comrades to the Royalist Regiment of Guards, receiving from the King their proud motto of "*Nulli secundus*," "Second to none." Thus a Royalist and a Cromwellian regiment have headed the Army List to-

gether for two hundred and fifty years as joint pillars of the Throne.

You may see the same process in the forms of Parliament. The assent to bills passed by Parliament is still given by the King or his representative in the Norman-French phrase, "*Le roi le veult.*" The King's Speech, declaring the policy of the Government at the beginning of the session, is still read by the King to the House of Lords, the faithful Commons being summoned to listen at the Bar. Afterwards, when the House of Commons is back in its own chamber, the Speaker declares that by exceptional good chance, which never fails him, he has "for greater accuracy procured a copy of the speech," and he reads it to the House. In this way the policy of the Government is intimated to the Chamber which makes and unmakes Prime Ministers and really governs the land.

In the early days of George III, while everything went wrong with us abroad, life in England itself seemed to have reached a kind of perpetual rhythm. The countryside was governed by the self-confident and on the whole kindly gentlemen who look down upon us now with so much complacency from the canvases of Gainsborough and Reynolds. There were still two hundred crimes punishable by death; and although the death penalty was not often applied, the government of the country was aristocratic in every nerve. The gentry hunted and governed on the whole wisely; but the yeomanry and the laborer were free Englishmen, entrenched in fundamental legal rights, and despising lesser breeds upon the continent still wrapped in slavery. In some ways the rural England of those days was like a top asleep. Doctor Johnson

and his contemporaries could not believe that the world would ever change. A rhythm was established in English life and seemed as if it would be perpetual, like the rhythm of Roman life in the age of the Antonines.

Forms, I say, mean much to us in England. Having no written constitution, we find our anchorage in tradition, and in the framework of our political system we change as little as we can. But the persistence of the forms covers a revolution which has transformed English life from top to bottom since "Farmer George" and his utterly unrepresentative advisers brought about the great division of the English-speaking world. There is no more real similarity between the British Empire of that era and the British Empire of to-day than there is between a cut and trimmed yew hedge and a noble forest oak.

The most fundamental element in this revolution—more fundamental even, as I think, than the change in political thought which accompanied it—is the industrial revolution, which turned England from a self-supporting, though commercial, power into a manufacturing nation dependent on the world for its raw material, its markets, and its food. Look at the changes which this revolution brings about. Power passes from the old governing class to the middle class, and the two in the adaptable English method gradually become intermingled. The middle class strain forces a new outlook upon national policy, while the older governing class continues to supply its experience of government and its knowledge of international affairs. The island adopts free trade; and as wealth and population develop together, power passes again by fairly rapid stages

to the great mass of the adult population. The life of the people and the character of the state would be unintelligible to Edmund Burke or Lord North; but if they entered Parliament, the one walking into the House of Commons and the other into the House of Lords, the atmosphere in both would be familiar and the forms largely unchanged. They would be staggered by the new assumptions underlying every phase of the debate; but when the Bill under discussion reached its final passage into law, they would still, as I have told you, hear the ancient Norman-French formula, converting it into an Act—" *Le roi le veult*." An attempt was made in the reign of Queen Anne to alter this formula. Nothing came of it. Queen Anne, as you know, died a long time ago, but the formula is living still.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, what is the main characteristic of this change in English life and policy which the industrial revolution produced? It is the concentration of the main forces of the nation upon the oversea expansion of industrial as well as commercial activities; it is, in other words, the growth of modern British Imperialism.

Let me give you an example of the change. Industry in the last quarter of the eighteenth century began in a small way, and the invention of machinery and the application of power were not by any means monopolized in the first instance by capitalists. The Lancashire workman who had lived by his hand loom often borrowed a small sum and set to work with the new spinning and weaving machines. In this way the cotton industry gradually grew up. By the time of the Napoleonic wars it is reported to have supplied one-third of the total British exports. George

Trevelyan remarks in a striking phrase that this new growth of industry in England was "the hidden reef on which Napoleon's Empire struck." The town of Oldham, which I have the honor to represent in Parliament, was only a century ago a tiny village on the moors. Now it is the greatest spinning center in the world, and more than half the capital which has gone into its mills is capital placed there in modest savings loaned by men and women working in the mills.

The picture of this industry alone is sufficient to explain the tremendous colonizing pressure developed by the industrial movement in England during the nineteenth century. At the time of the American Revolution, the English population was only seven millions in all, and the country was so largely agricultural that it exported wheat. Agriculture is still the largest industry in England, but it produces only 40 per cent of our food. The rest we have to import from oversea, and to pay for by our own exports of manufactured goods. The cotton industry is now second only to agriculture; it is essential to our life. But not one bale of raw cotton is grown in England, and four-fifths of the manufactured product are sold in markets oversea.

Mr. Culbertson, in the course of the admirable Open Conferences on Raw Materials which he is conducting, offered a definition of Imperialism which struck me as a very useful one. He suggested that Imperialism might be defined as "the oversea expression of European economic civilization." That seems to me a luminous and valuable definition, though—as Mr. Culbertson himself said—it does not cover the whole ground. The growth of the cotton

industry in England, with hundreds of thousands in the home country depending on it for their livelihood, while its ramifications stretch across the world, is typical of the process which Mr. Culbertson's definition describes. The cotton industry is essential to the largest industrial grouping of the English people, not only to capitalists, but to the working class. Every bale of raw cotton must be imported at a price which profoundly affects the wages which the industry can pay. Four out of every five yards of cloth and yarn must be sold in oversea markets at a price which also fundamentally influences the social life and aspirations of a large section of the English people. The shortage of raw cotton created by your Civil War caused cotton-growing to be started ten thousand miles away, in India. So the story grows, till Lancashire becomes as dependent as the native inhabitants themselves on the progress and prosperity of remote corners of the world.

I need not, before an American audience, linger to describe the irresistible process of expansion which ensued, because that process in the British Empire differs from the same process in the United States in no way except one—that you were able to expand across this continent, while we were forced to expand across the sea. You have the romance of your transcontinental railroads; so has Canada. Our story is mainly told in ships, “swift shuttles of an Empire's loom,” as Kipling calls them, weaving the vast fabric of trade and industry on which our island welfare depends.

Our problem during the century and a half which has passed since we parted has, however, been more difficult than yours in one very significant way. There

are two sides to the movement called Imperialism. One is the problem of finding raw materials, markets, and food for the civilized races as they expand. The other is the problem created by the backward civilizations upon which the more highly civilized races in their expansion inevitably impinge. This problem is comparatively new to you, because you have only in the last generation been driven by your need and interest into the control of territory oversea. In America the Indian tribes were sparse and feeble, and you made short work in your conquering and civilizing advance of those wayward children of your adopted soil. We, on the other hand, have lived decade by decade with every phase of this problem, the most perplexing problem in the world. I shall come to speak in a few minutes of the moral and political questions which the contact between advanced and backward civilizations presses increasingly to the front. Before I do so, however, I wish to call your attention to another great force in the onward march of Imperialism which has not, I think, been considered in the conferences of this Institute, but which is nevertheless at moments decisive and irresistible—I mean, the directing and crystallizing force exerted by great men.

In previous lectures I have tried to describe to you the sense of duty to backward peoples and the persistent idealism which have never failed to control or at least to correct the purely economic activities of the Imperial movement in territories covered by the British flag. This combination of moral and material motives can nowhere be better studied than in the personality of our Empire-builders, who for

the most part did their work with little assistance and plentiful disparagement from home. The most typical and the most powerful of these in the nineteenth century was Cecil Rhodes, whose name is immortalized in the great central African territory of Rhodesia, a savage jungle forty years ago, now a prosperous and progressive self-governing colony.

Rhodes was a clergyman's son, born near London, whose career at Oxford was interrupted by bad health, with marvelous consequences. He went to South Africa, and became almost the tutelary spirit, in life and death, of the southern half of that vast continent.

Very early in life Rhodes's mind was absorbed by speculation on the purpose for which the Creator intended the earth. He concluded that the purpose was to produce that type of humanity which would most surely bring justice, freedom, and peace to all peoples, and to make that type predominant. Only two peoples, it seemed to him, were really engaged upon this task—the British and the American. And he concluded that the purpose of the world required their predominance.

You may call this childish and crude, but his boyish speculations governed Rhodes's life. At the age of twenty-four, while even more of a boy than most boys at that age, he drew up his first will. He had not a penny to his name, but he had made up his mind to acquire wealth and power, and he made his will without the slightest doubt that wealth would be his to leave. The object of the will was the foundation of a secret society entrusted with the following objects: "the colonization by British subjects of all lands where the means of livelihood are obtainable

by energy, labor, and enterprise . . . the ultimate recovery of the United States of America as an integral part of the British Empire . . . and the foundation of so great a power as to hereafter render wars impossible and promote the best interests of humanity." The dream and the method, especially the secret society and the designs upon the United States, are boyish indeed; but after a long life, and after eight more wills had been made, the last provided for the foundation of the Rhodes Scholarships, taking students from every part of the Empire and from the United States to Oxford for three years. Rhodes had discovered, as he said, that education is the greatest power in the world, and he left his wealth to further education and understanding between the two peoples in whom he chiefly believed.

This dreamer grew up in South Africa with two absorbing aims. One was to acquire for the British Empire so much territory to the north of the Transvaal as would link the Mediterranean and the Cape by an all-red rail, and would secure the development of these vast areas under the British flag. Those who wish to study British Imperialism in the nineteenth century cannot do better than to read the story of his wonderful achievement in the *Life of Cecil Rhodes* by Professor Basil Williams of McGill University, Montreal, published two years ago. It is not an indiscriminate eulogy, but a balanced, though sympathetic, study of a remarkable character and mind. I cannot tell the story here to-night, but can only remind you that by constant personal courage in the face of savage tribes, by endless resource in meeting every kind of emergency, by methods sometimes questionable, but mainly good, above all by sleepless

and untiring fidelity to his own dreams, Rhodes added that vast area to the British flag which now carries his name, and provided for the all-red route to the north. There is no better example of the decisive effect upon history sometimes exerted by great men. But for Rhodes, a far larger area of Africa would have been German or French. He worked unaided, by himself, and forced the Government at home to accept the facts with which he presented them.

His other aim was to unite the Dutch and British peoples in South Africa under the British flag as joint trustees for this vast inheritance. There have been critics who wrote of Rhodes only as one who preached the doctrine of grab and of racial predominance. Let me describe to you a scene in the last autumn of his life. In October, 1900, Lord Roberts had just reached Pretoria with the British forces under his command, and it seemed that the Boer War was at an end. A British gathering was held in Cape Town to rejoice over the victory. Basil Williams, who was present, describes the scene—Rhodes stalking in with a tired face, for he was then almost dying, and the old, absorbed, far-seeing look in his eyes. His first words struck an unexpected but with him familiar note. Basil Williams records it thus: "You think you have beaten the Dutch! But it is not so. The Dutch are not beaten. What is beaten is Krugerism, a corrupt and evil government, no more Dutch in essence than English. The country is still as much Dutch as British, and there must be no vulgar vaunting over your Dutch compatriots who have lost. Make them feel that the bitterness is past. Tell your children to remember when they go to the village

school that the little Dutch boys and girls sitting on the benches with them are as much part of the South African nation as themselves. Let them work as comrades for a common object, the good of South Africa." It was remarkable that Rhodes was always returned to the Cape Parliament by a constituency in which the Dutch vote preponderated over the British. That constituency stayed faithful to him throughout the time when he was Prime Minister. It stayed faithful to him even in his darkest days, the time of the unprovoked attack which he planned upon Johannesburg, known to history as the Jamieson raid. None, indeed, who knew him in the flesh ever failed to see in him, through many faults and weaknesses, the soul of a great idealist and pioneer.

Kipling has written his epitaph:

Dreamer devout, by vision led
Beyond our guess or reach,
The travail of his spirit bred
Cities in place of speech.
So huge the all-mastering thought that drove—
So brief the term allowed—
Nations, not words, he linked to prove
His faith before the crowd.

The annexation of Rhodesia under the strong impulse of Cecil Rhodes, the practical idealist, is very typical of the process which brought India under the British flag during the eighteenth century. Though they stand farther back in the perspective of history, and are thus veiled to some extent by the mist of years, it seems very certain that Clive and Warren Hastings were men of similar type. They lived for their vision with the same intensity. They acted

under the same broad impulses. Their motives were a curious blend of the instinct for commerce, the instinct for government, and the inspiration of a dream.

As servants of a great trading company they strove to expand and secure British trade. As patriotic and combative Englishmen they saw in the competition for trading areas in the East an essential and perhaps decisive element in the long struggle of their country to avert the domination of France. Above and beyond these two strong motives both were conscious of some greater humane and civilizing purpose, an ideal both vivid and vague, compelling but ill-defined, illusive and yet real, like the fabric of a dream. They were mystics, yet soldiers and men of affairs, Cromwells of a later day, concentrating their genius with rare success on the successive problems of the hour, but conscious always of some driving power within them, beyond the actual aim and motive of their daily acts. They had in them, it always seems to me, the very spirit of Wordsworth's last sonnet in the River Duddon series, which he called "After-Thought":

Still glides the Stream, and shall for ever glide;
The Form remains, the Function never dies,
While we, the brave, the mighty, and the wise,
We Men, who in our morn of youth defied
The elements, must vanish;—be it so!
Enough, if something from our hands have power
To live, and act, and serve the future hour;
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
Through love, through hope, and faith's transcendent dower,
We feel that we are greater than we know.

The most significant word in that great sonnet is surely the word "hands."

Enough, if something from our *hands* have power
To live, and act, and serve the future hour;

The poet of almost any other nation, who followed out this thought, would, I believe, have written "minds" for "hands." Wordsworth's line is in the very spirit of the British Empire-builder, seeking inarticulately to express himself and his ideals in action, and unable to express himself in any other way.

If I have carried you with me thus far, you will agree that the Imperialism of the British Empire-builders has been something more than "the oversea expression of British economic civilization." It was not a pure materialist who, besides acquiring Rhodesia, founded the Rhodes Scholarships. The British Empire is indeed from one standpoint the creation of economic needs, expressed at times, no doubt, in the two most primitive spurs to man's activity, love of power and love of gain. But from another and equally true standpoint, it is the expression of a great if still in part unrealized ideal; it is "such stuff as dreams are made on," and those can never understand it or appraise it justly who cannot share the spirit of the dream.

The purely material and critical view of British Imperialism is, however, not confined to its foreign critics. It is held, and has always been held, by a considerable minority of the British people at home. Wherever the triumphal car of British expansion goes by, there upon it you will see that most familiar and characteristic figure of British civilization, the

conscientious objector, explaining that the triumph is unjust and the motives mean. History, looking back upon our record in India in the eighteenth century, has now decided in the main to support Warren Hastings against Burke. There can be no question that Warren Hastings did more for the welfare of India than Burke ever did. But the figure of Burke is typical and is perpetually renewed, though without his transcendent genius, in our subsequent history. Take the two men who were most closely identified with the acquisition of new territory before the Great War, Lord Milner and Cecil Rhodes. Both have been the objects of vehement, unscrupulous, and utterly unbalanced criticism. We have no roses for our great Empire-builders, or, if there be roses, there is also a wealth of mud. But their work goes on, because it is in the main for progress and for right, whatever their critics may say to the contrary.

Now this school of conscientious objectors, which is sometimes called the nonconformist conscience, and which has certainly gathered great strength from the Puritan cast of mind, has profoundly influenced British history. It has a sleepless conscience, and it has always wielded considerable, though not decisive, political power. At the present moment, as always, it is strongly represented in the Liberal Party. For the past forty years that party has in reality consisted of two schools, the Liberal Imperialist and the Little England school. Those two strains are still combined in it. But the Liberal Party is no longer the sole exponent of this order of ideas. It is also strongly represented in the Labor Party, and there it has perhaps rather more than its normal degree of power.

I have a great respect for all this school of thought in English political history. Much as it distrusts the British Empire, there would be no Empire without it. It has had a constantly broadening and liberalizing influence upon our colonial development, and without that influence our innate conservatism would at some time or other have struck the rocks. I am myself of the other Liberal school, the school represented by Joseph Chamberlain, by Rosebery, by Grey, and by Asquith in the great period which bridged the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, and which has since been represented predominantly by David Lloyd George. But I take off my hat to the other Liberal school. It is the salt of the earth, and vital to existence, though none of us would like to see the whole earth salt.

Having this school at home, and having its voice at all times in our ears—a voice which is neither still nor small—we are naturally little hurt by a similar strain of criticism from our neighbors, and particularly from the neighbors who are closest to us in race. But in so far as this strain of criticism represents a cause of misunderstanding—and in my belief it does—I should like to analyze and sift it out.

The cardinal objection to the creed of Imperialism in the minds of your critics and ours is, to my mind, unquestionably the same. It is this—that Imperialism infringes the rights of peoples, however uncivilized, to live in their own way and do as they will with their own. This view was powerfully expressed in the “little nations” school which was represented by Gladstone and the Liberals of the nineteenth century. It has taken new life in a modern phrase, “the

right of self-determination." Now it is certainly true that Imperialism infringes the principle of self-determination in backward communities. If that be a sufficient count against it, the world must read the funeral service over it, and take to some other creed. But is the infringement of this principle of self-determination in other communities a license which no conscientious and liberty-loving nation can rightly permit itself? If the principle admits of no exception, it must mean that any community, however incompetent for managing its own affairs, and however small in proportion to the world, is entitled to go its own way, at whatever cost to its neighbors, and thus to defy the opinion and retard the progress of humanity in general. The United States has had many experiences in the course of its history which have brought this question to the front. Let us see how you have dealt with it.

Very early in your history, in the period following the Napoleonic wars, it seemed possible that the Holy Alliance, representing the autocratic empires of Europe, might seek to force their will upon South America, and thence to threaten your free institutions and your security. You faced this problem at once, with British sympathy and to some extent with British aid. England, under Canning, was as much interested as you in opposing the autocratic desire of the Holy Alliance to impose its ideas upon the world. You therefore proclaimed the Monroe Doctrine, and thereby gave the world to understand that any attempt by European Powers to reëstablish themselves on South American soil would be contrary to your interests, and would be resisted by you. In other words, you declared a special interest in

South America, and warned other Powers that they must respect that interest or settle their account with you. The declaration of the Monroe Doctrine was warmly hailed in England as a great reinforcement for free government against autocratic power. Canning, who took to himself some credit for the new alignment of forces in the world, declared, you will remember, that he had "called the new world in to redress the balance of the old."

That, then, was a remarkable example of the way in which you, a distant republic, divided from Europe by a great ocean, found it necessary very early in your career to assert your special interest in territory that was not your own, in order to prevent that territory from falling a prey to institutions or policies or forms of government which you thought incompatible with your own security and development.

Later on, in the time of President Polk, you carried this policy even farther, and declared that you would not permit the alienation of any land on the American Continent to a foreign State, even though the land should have been ceded or sold under no compulsion and at its own discretion by the American State to which the land belonged. That was evidently not self-determination for the peoples of Central and Southern America.

Later in your history, you faced the problem of self-determination within the borders of your own Republic. A very large section of your population, equal in civilization to the rest, except that it defended the cause of slavery, seceded from the Union, and proclaimed itself an independent state. In other words, the South, acting unquestionably upon the declared will of a great majority of its citizens,

claimed the right of self-determination as against the rest of the American Union. The majority refused to admit this claim on moral as well as on material grounds, and the issue was only settled in the end after a terrible and protracted war.

Here, then, was a second case in which the theoretic principle of self-determination came into conflict with broader ideas of freedom, and was firmly set aside by the conscience of the majority of the American people.

In the meantime, throughout all this period, you were steadily conquering and developing new territory in North America. In order to do this, you were compelled to dispossess the original owner, the Indian, and to take his land for yourselves. You dispossessed him on the ground that all these resources were necessary to supply food, raw material, and power to your growing population, whereas the Indian was making no effective use of it himself. There was no self-determination for the Indian. You imposed your will upon him, and the world has never questioned your right to do so. But the political thinker is bound to set this passage of history down as another of those in which the principle of self-determination has been seriously modified by the need and interest of a civilized race.

Let me give just three more instances from your own experience of the practical difficulties which the principle of self-determination presents. The islands of Hawaii had been an independent kingdom for nearly a century, when a revolution broke out there which might have led to the occupation of the islands by some other Power. You did not want the islands yourselves, but you were also convinced that

it would not be in accordance with American interests for any other Power to occupy them. Acting on this principle you annexed the islands in 1898. No one has questioned your right to do so. Almost at the same time you declared war against a European Power, Spain, because you objected to the Spanish method of governing colonies. The war was brief, and you were easily victorious. As a result you annexed the Philippines and Porto Rico. You also compelled the Spanish Government to cede Cuba to you, and established special relations with that island, securing to the American Government certain rights of intervention, a certain restrictive power over Cuba's foreign relations, supervision of the Cuban budget, and the right of the United States in war to use such places as it required for naval stations in Cuban waters. You are now very rightly resisting the right of the Cubans to self-determination in the matter of a lottery.

Finally, to bring this brief outline to an end, you developed at the beginning of this century the splendid plan left derelict by the French for cutting a canal through the Isthmus of Panama between the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans. The canal was not only a great trading enterprise. It was also a very desirable factor in your security. You were therefore right in taking no risks regarding the safety of the waterway. By methods which were effective and prompt, you secured that the territory of the Panama Canal zone and the islands adjacent to it should be ceded to you in return for payments to the Republic of Panama. I have paid two visits to Panama, and I observe that you have taken no risks in regard to the

security of the Panama Canal. Unquestionably you are wise in this policy.

I have given you this brief outline of your own experience, because I think it covers every form of infringement of the principle of self-determination known to British Imperialism. It is true that your problems have been in the main on a smaller scale. The United States is an almost self-sufficing and to a large extent isolated territory. Expansion has been possible across the mainland to the Pacific Coast. This has given you practically all the resources which you needed, and it has not involved competition of a serious international kind. It is only lately, therefore, that your activities have taken you on to the great international stage. Britain, on the other hand, is a tiny island, producing, as I have observed, only one-third of its own food supply and lacking within its boundaries the raw material necessary to most of its most vital industries. Being a small island, with a large population, and a lack of some prime necessities, Britain has gone farther afield with her Imperialism, and has dealt with the resultant problems on a larger scale; but the problems are in principle the same as those which have been presented to you, and the answers which Britain has given have been the same in principle as your own.

You may, of course, argue that your excursions into Imperialism have been so slight and tentative that they bear no real comparison to our world-wide Imperialist activities. The young woman with a contraband baby in *Midshipman Easy* endeavored to meet the moral reprobation of Mr. Easy, Senior, by pointing out that the baby, even if contraband, was a very small one. But, as Mr. Easy very properly ex-

plained, the morality of the matter was unaffected by the baby's size. Whenever interest or necessity has confronted you with these problems of Imperialism, you have in practice dealt with them on the same lines as ourselves. The more closely you have studied them, moreover, the more closely have your decisions in principle resembled ours. You imagined not many months ago that the time had come when you could rest from your labors in the Philippines and leave the Filipinos to look after themselves. You have decided on investigation that your labors must go on. You have twice informed the Cubans that you have no more desire to intervene in their internal affairs; but the Cubans insist on offending your ideas of financial propriety by establishing a state lottery, and they contemplate a reorganization of their transport and harbor system which will interfere with the existing channels of business in a more or less serious degree. So once more you set to work to guide them in a better way.

Ladies and gentlemen, I say, more power to you. You are on the only road which will make the world a better world for all its peoples to live in. You are on the only road which will spread the reign of law and bring on the reign of peace. You will have to follow this road because your own needs and interests will compel you; but other peoples will gain as much as you gain yourselves, and the world as a whole will have a better equilibrium, a greater stability, a new guarantee against earth tremors and shocks. I believe that American Imperialism is only on the threshold of its responsibilities. They must, and will, increase. I do not know how economic rivalry is to be prevented from embroiling the civilized nations,

if any more large areas of the world fall out of the normal processes of production and exchange. There is only one safeguard against that danger, and its name is Imperialism. Let me endeavor to present to you the world-wide problem with which Imperialism or some other policy must now be made to deal.

Consider first the level of organization which the world has now reached. Could it have been avoided? Was the organization unsound? Should it be modified or reversed?

In the first place, I ask, what power but the Eternal could have turned back the process which has brought the European races gradually into closer and more responsible contact with the more backward or more static civilizations of the world? The European peoples went forth in the first instance on many different quests—the love of adventure, the search for gold and treasure, the yearning for greater spiritual freedom, the almost inarticulate desire which comes over many individuals of our stock at times for tackling a new kind of life. All these motives have operated to send out the pioneers. Where the country has been suitable, the pioneers have been followed by larger and larger armies of settlers and colonists. Where it has been unsuitable, their work has been transmitted to a tiny band of administrators, soldiers, and police.

No one now attempts to quarrel with the process of Imperialism which has planted such numbers of European stock upon other continents as practically entirely to dispossess the original inhabitants and create new nations upon the new soil. Everyone knows that such colonization was inevitable; most

agree that it is good. What, then, of the Imperialism which has held backward peoples under various forms of European government? Are its moral foundations less sound?

The course of development in these chapters of history is always roughly the same. The pioneers in search of adventure, power, and gold make their first contacts with the backward peoples and gradually create a political problem. It is seen that unregulated exploitation leads invariably to one or both of two consequences. It leads in the first place to the collapse of the social organization of the primitive community. It leads also to conflict between the nations to which the various exploiters belong. In the early history of colonization and exploitation there was almost invariably for a period a bitter struggle between the pioneer nations, such as the struggle between ourselves and the French in India. In later times the civilized nations of the world have become so well aware of the dangers latent in competition of this kind that they have endeavored—for the most part with success—to regulate their competition by diplomatic methods, to divide up the undeveloped world into spheres of civilized influence or government without resort to war, and to agree on common standards of right conduct towards the native inhabitants of the territories which they control.

Take the case of Africa, the Dark Continent. But for the lead given by Britain at the beginning of the nineteenth century Africa would have been exploited as a slave-farm of continental extent. When the exploiter began to penetrate into its twilight in the middle of the nineteenth century, it might have become a cause of war between the Great Powers. I

do not say the record of the European Powers in Africa is altogether blameless. Such stories as the Belgian Congo are blots upon their shield. But the gradual partition of Africa under European governments both protected the native and prevented war. Standards of proper conduct towards aboriginal races were agreed upon in the African Convention of Berlin in 1885, and statesmanship labored by forethought and untiring diplomacy to keep competition to the peaceful plane. Considering how close and constant was the danger of war, it would be just, I think, to award rather more congratulation and rather less censure to the European Fire Brigade.

However that may be, what course was open to European statesmanship but that which it actually took? The choice did not lie between competition and no competition. Western democracies were seeking a higher level of life for all classes of the community; some of them were dependent upon expansion for the very livelihood of some part of their working class. This made competition inevitable. The choice therefore lay only between two forms of competition—competition regulated by civilized standards and competition unregulated by anything but individual greed for rapid gain. Unregulated competition spelt terrible exploitation of the native, and the constant risk of war. You know the cynical rhyme :

Wherever virgin wealth is sold,
We've scooped the helpless nigger in;
Where men give ivory and gold,
We give them measles, tracts and gin.

Regulation was therefore essential. Only one form of power in the world was capable of regulation on

this scale—the power of civilized governments. Since there was no world-government to undertake it, it could only be divided in spheres between such civilized governments as were sufficiently interested and powerful to undertake a part.

Now that process of division is complete. The World War has almost disposed of it, and two new problems have arisen in its place. Nationalism and racialism have been intensified in all parts of the world except Darker Africa, and there is a demand that even backward communities, prone without Western assistance and advice to disorder, injustice, and economic collapse, should be allowed to enjoy disorder and its consequences, whatever the effect upon the rest of mankind. At the same time the demand among civilized nations for a safe and adequate share of raw materials and markets is pressing the need of international regulation to the front in a new form.

I think I have proved in what I have already said that self-determination is not a solution of universal efficacy, even when it is the subject of a strong demand. You have been the latest to confront the problem which it presents, and you have brought to your treatment of the problem all the strong democratic conviction, all the rooted belief in elementary human rights, all the genuine idealism which are the stamp of American political thought. You have made sincere and courageous experiments in pressing self-government upon peoples to whom it has hitherto been an unknown thing. The world is, I think, the better for these experiments. They have helped to establish a high standard of conduct towards backward peoples, and have fortified the general con-

demnation of Imperialism as a mere engine of exploitation in the hands of civilized Powers. But you have found that there are peoples to whom self-determination is nothing better than a means of rapid suicide, and amongst such peoples you have stepped in to maintain justice and order because they would not otherwise have been maintained.

We are therefore agreed that self-determination is not in itself a golden rule suited to every problem of government in the world. In what conditions, then, should exceptions properly be made?

I will venture to suggest an answer. It is this—that the justice of any claim to self-determination can only be judged in each case by a fair and dispassionate consideration of its probable results. It is better for the world that all peoples should govern themselves, provided only that they are capable of maintaining order, resisting lawless exploitation, and developing their natural heritage. But the whole is greater than the part. The general interests of humanity and civilization take rank above the special rights of any single human community; and the world is now so small that no part of it can tumble back into primitive disorder without loss and suffering to all.

People sometimes say, "What matter if the natives make a mess of it? Give them self-government, and let them stew in their own juice." This argument might have great force, despite its cynicism, if the stew were confined to those who make it. But other people suffer, and their progress is retarded, when any considerable area of the world ceases to trade and produce. The supply of raw materials is even now a subject of acute anxiety to many civilized

Powers. The growth of markets is equally important to all. If the supply of raw material is reduced, its price and the cost of manufacture rise proportionally. If markets are curtailed, there is a corresponding fall in the selling price of manufactured goods. It is not only capitalists who suffer from these fluctuations in supply and demand. The capitalists have no choice but to pass the suffering on by means of lowered wages or reduced employment to millions of the working class.

I am convinced, therefore, that civilization must in self-preservation be guided by two economic laws. The first law is that where a native people cannot clear the jungle and develop the talent confided to them in the wealth of their soil, the task shall be undertaken for them by the civilized Powers. The second law is that where the jungle has once been cleared away, civilization shall not allow the jungle to return. The principle of self-determination will sweep the world into a new chaos of competition if these laws are not observed. For what would be the sure and certain result? As markets and raw material grew scarcer, competition would increase amongst the civilized Powers. The jungle creeping back over half-developed areas would warp the prosperity and infect the relations of people thousands of miles away. Settlements by agreement would become more difficult. Cutthroat conflicts would increase. The time is coming, it has almost come, when gangrene or paralysis in any member of the human family must be a loss and danger to all.

Imperialism, then, has vital and indispensable work to do, if only, in Mr. Culbertson's definition, as "the oversea expression of Western economic

civilization." It is born of the instinct of self-preservation and self-development. On the material plane, there is no stronger instinct in the world.

Material factors alone, however, explain no great process of human life or growth. I am not criticising Mr. Culbertson's definition when I say this. He himself was careful to tell us that the world is moved even more by moral ideas than by material needs. We are spiritual beings, and we do not live by bread alone. We do not even fight for the mere sake of crusts, when the bread will not go round. Let me conclude, therefore, by suggesting to you what is in my belief the moral code by which Imperialism must, and will, be justified.

There exists in American literature a noble analysis of the moral and material motives which together prompted the emancipation of slaves. I refer to Ralph Waldo Emerson's *Emancipation Address* delivered at Concord on the first of August, 1844, the tenth anniversary of the emancipation of all slaves under the British flag. Emerson's main thought was the irresistible, ultimate power of the idea of liberty amongst what he called the Anglo-Saxon peoples. On this he framed the peroration of his address, a peroration not so well known as some of Lincoln's great speeches, but worthy, I verily believe, to rank with them.

Seen in masses [Emerson writes] it cannot be disputed, there has been progress in human society. There is a blessed necessity by which the interest of men is always driving them to the right; and, again, making all crime mean and ugly. The genius of the Saxon race, friendly to liberty; the

enterprise, the very muscular vigor of this nation, are inconsistent with slavery. The Intellect, with blazing eye, looking through history from the beginning onward, gazes on this blot and it disappears. The sentiment of Right, once very low and indistinct, but ever more articulate, because it is the voice of the universe, pronounces Freedom. The Power that built this fabric of things affirms it in the heart; and in the history of the First of August, has made a sign to the ages of his will.

That passage seems to me something more than so much eloquent prose; it is profoundly true. "There is a blessed necessity," as Emerson says, "by which the interest of men is always driving them to the right." That has been the redemption, and it is now the law, of Imperialism. You cannot rightly appraise any human action, unless you weigh moral and material factors in a very careful balance. It is often hard to distinguish between them, because every nation has a tendency to confuse principle and interest where vital necessities are concerned. You remember the poem in the *Biglow Papers*:

This doth my cup with mercies fill,
This sets all thought of harm to rest:
I don't believe in principle,
But oh, I do in interest!

Well, Emerson is sounder than Lowell's poem. Interest drives our civilization ultimately to the right; and the right way of Imperialism is now clear for all the nations to tread.

The first article in the code must surely be this—that where self-government is withheld, the government which takes its place shall aim steadily and sincerely at building up the moral fabric of self-

government as a trustee responsible for a ward. American example has done much to secure acceptance of this article in the code by the rest of the world, and America is right. Aristotle remarks somewhere, with great acumen, that the only way to learn to play the flute is to play the flute. It is the same with the practice of self-government. Do not give a man a flute until you are sure he will not break it with ignorant and clumsy hands. But teach him steadily how to hold the flute and let him try to play it as soon as his fingers gain sufficient touch and skill.

The other article in the code of Imperialism, is, to my mind, equally clear. If unregulated competition is to be warded off from backward communities, the civilized nations who act as trustees must learn to avoid unregulated competition amongst themselves. In this respect also, as the world grows smaller and its needs grow greater, the common sense and the conscience of the great nations are becoming more sensitive and more articulate. A collective conscience is developing in civilized mankind, and it exercises year by year not only a greater but a more direct and immediate power over human society. The League of Nations is an expression—inadequate and tentative, no doubt—but a practical expression of that ideal.

The world, however, is not yet ripe for a fixed international organization to regulate economic competition and keep it within bounds. We must therefore strive as nations to pursue our various interests with the greatest possible regard for the interests of other nations which have the same economic necessities as ourselves. Diplomacy is an essential instrument in maintaining accord, securing agreements, and developing a common code. I do not agree with

the innovators who believe that diplomacy is duplicity, and that its day is past. Do these critics use no diplomacy or duplicity in the simple relationships of their own lives? When Mr. Smith does not wish to dine with Mr. Jones, does he simply tell him that he fears to be bored by his company, or poisoned by his cook? Of course not; he makes a polite excuse. In the same way, when Mr. Robinson wants to know whether Mr. Brown has quarreled with his wife, he does not ask Mr. Brown point blank in the street. He makes discreet inquiries of Mr. or Mrs. Brown's friends, and regulates his conversation with the Browns themselves accordingly. If consideration of that kind—call it diplomacy or duplicity, or what you will—is necessary in private life, much more is it necessary in international affairs. The niceties, the deferences, the reserves, the etiquette, are oil in the wheels of international intercourse. Democratic reformers, like the stalwarts of our Labor Party in England, will not promote international good will by putting sand in the wheels instead of oil.

But diplomacy has its limitations—the worst of which is that the intercourse for which it provides between the statesmen ultimately responsible for policy is always indirect. At some critical moment, for instance, an ambassador visits a secretary of state, presents a document, and expatiates upon its contents. In the capital of the other country the same process takes place. What happens? The secretaries of state report to their respective cabinets how convincingly they spoke to the ambassadors and how profoundly the ambassadors were impressed. The ambassadors, on the other hand, write home to their respective governments how persuasively they talked

to the secretaries of state. And in due course there is a fresh exchange of decisive conversations and notes. The diplomatic archives of every country are full of letters and reports in which statesmen and diplomats pay glowing tribute to the cogency of their own arguments.

There is, however, one progressive method of dealing with the questions which diplomacy cannot solve, and that is the method of conference. Of course it has defects; all methods have; but it has certain sovereign virtues, the greatest of which is that it brings all the parties to a dispute together, instead of leaving them to whisper in corners by pairs. All the parties to a conference speak in each other's hearing. A cannot say one thing to B and another to C without being found out. He has to state his case in the same terms to everyone, and that simple fact adds greatly to international lucidity in times of stress.

No methods can, however, succeed without the spirit to make them succeed. It is the spirit that counts. In prewar days there was a phrase current in Europe which meant exactly what we need to-day. We used to call this statesman or that "a good European," meaning that he did not forget the collective welfare of Europe while arguing his own country's case. Statesmen must be even more than that; they must be good citizens of the world. Their trial will be severe; for competition is not growing less but more, and Imperialism, necessary as I believe it to be, tests the morale of the trustee as much as it assists the character of the ward. The saving power must lie in fortifying the collective conscience of the civilized nations, and bringing differences between them to

the conference table in a practical spirit of give and take. I think their record shows that British statesmen will always approach the conference table in that spirit, doing their best for their own people but remembering also that they and their own people are citizens of the world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have done. The picture of British Imperialism which I have given you is, to the best of my belief, true in color and in line. Power in England passes from right to left and back again; political theories rise and fall; political parties come and go; under the old forms and customs, the realities of English life are transformed again and again. But British policy alters little in principle. The crew may change its habits; new officers may take the helm; but the course of the ship is set by the same stars and steered for the same goal.

As I have tried to show you, the fabric of English society and the basis of English life have changed like a moving picture since the time when you parted from us. The British Empire of to-day is the product of that period, the epitome of that change. We have no written constitution; and if you want to understand us, you must study us as you study a process of nature, not as you study a piece of mechanism. Written constitutions are made. The British constitution has grown. Yours is like the steel framework of a noble building; ours is like a tree. Trees are not shaped by conscious purpose; they grow instinctively by the law of life. The parent stem shoots up and grows in girth. Wide branches are thrown out. The branches themselves, as I have pictured to you, drop

tendrils to the ground. In one place the wood thickens to carry a new strain. In another the offshoots curve that they may offer less resistance to the prevailing wind. Here the stem carries a mass of ivy which cannot stand alone. There a branch bears nothing but the weight of its own fruit. Every change, every new growth, is instinctive; the whole being of the tree reacts by nature to its own needs of sun and moisture and air.

That, ladies and gentlemen, is the British Empire. It is not a constitution which is easy to explain. It is always changing, like life itself. It takes its problems as they come and solves them as instinctively as a tree. Ask us what we will do in this specific instance or in that, and we will give you a practical reply. Ask us for fixed constitutional theories written in a book, and we can only tell you that we live and grow as little by theories of any kind as one of our own unsymmetrical but deeply rooted oaks.

One word more. Since I have been in Williamstown I have received a certain number of letters and post-cards from kind critics in various parts of the United States. Some sign their names, some prefer to remain anonymous. Some express their pleasure with what I have said; others tell me I am engaged in propaganda and am wasting time and breath. I mention these latter, not because I attach particular importance to their advice, but because they raise a point on which it is well to be clear. I am not a representative of the British Government; and whether my views be representative or not, they are certainly not—as you may have judged from my remarks upon the Treaty of Lausanne—in any sense official. I came here to promote with such small capacity as I possess the cause

of international understanding and good will. If that be propaganda, I am proud to admit the charge. But my friendly correspondents must not think on that account that I am trying to secure a verdict for my country from them, and regard them as a jury or a judge. Their approval of our methods is not essential to the survival of the British Empire or even to its self-respect. We Britons shape our policies by our own sense of right; and I do the American people the honor of believing that they are equally independent of mind.

Towards international understanding this Institute of Politics marks in my opinion, for what that is worth, a clear and valuable method of advance. I trust the example which Williamstown has set will soon be followed in my own and other lands. I have enjoyed it all, the conferences, the flow of information, the good talk, the exchange of ideas, the unfailing hospitality, the college setting, the sunshine, the greensward, and the hollyhocks—I must add, the golf. Sometimes, I admit, after a particularly thorny conference, I have felt that the world just now is like a tangled fishing line. But even fishing lines can be straightened out. You know how they behave. You may fuss and struggle with them for an eternity and make no progress at all—and then by some lucky touch the tangle suddenly vanishes and the line runs clear. I only hope we may have the same experience with some of the tangled problems which are so perplexing to-day. It is idle to suppose that one generation can compose all the troubles of the world; but let one generation, one generation only, approach those troubles in a new spirit of international good will, and the hardest knot will be untied. We shall not

bequeath complete solutions to our sons and daughters, but we shall bequeath a world far better for all peoples to dwell in than that which we inherited from the past.

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
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